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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Optimization and game theory techniques for energy-constrained networked
systems and the smart grid
by
Lazaros Gkatzikis
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Thessaly, March 2014
Prof. Leandros Tassiulas, Chairperson
The energy needs of all sectors of our modern societies are constantly increasing. Indicatively,
annual worldwide demand for electricity has increased ten-fold within the last 50 years. Thus, energy
efﬁciency has become a major target of the research community. The ongoing research efforts are fo-
cused on two main threads, i) optimizing efﬁciency and reliability of the power grid and ii) improving
energy efﬁciency of individual devices / systems. In this thesis we explore the use of optimization
and game theory techniques towards both goals.
Stable and economic operation of the power grid calls for electricity demand to be uniformly dis-
tributed across a day. Currently, the price of electricity is ﬁxed throughout a day for most users. Given
also the highly correlated daily schedules of users, this leads to unbalanced distribution of demand.
However, the recent development of low-cost smart meters enables bidirectional communication be-
tween the electricity operator and each user, and hence introduces the option of dynamic pricing and
demand adaptation (a.k.a. Demand Response - DR). Dynamic pricing motivates home users to modify
their electricity consumption proﬁle so as to reduce their electricity bill. Eventually, users by moving
demand out of peak consumption periods lead to a more balanced total demand pattern and a more
stable grid.
A DR scheme has to balance the contradictory interests of the utility operator and the users.
On the one hand, the operator wants to minimize electricity generation cost. On the other hand,
each user aims to maximize a utility function that captures the trade-off between timely execution
of demands and ﬁnancial savings. In this thesis we focus on designing efﬁcient DR schemes for the
residential sector. Initially, we introduce a realistic model of user’s response to time-varying prices
and identify the operating constraints of home appliances that make optimal demand scheduling NP-
Hard. Thus, we devise an optimization-based dynamic pricing mechanism and demonstrate how it
can be implemented as a day-ahead DR market. Our numerical results underline the potential of
residential DR and verify that our scheme exploits DR beneﬁts more efﬁciently compared to existing
ones.
The large number of home users though and the fact that the utility operator generally lacks the
xi
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know-how of designing and applying dynamic pricing at such a large scale introduce the need for
a new market entity. Aggregators act as intermediaries that coordinate home users to shift or even
curtail their demands and then resell this service to the utility operator. In this direction, we introduce
a three-level hierarchical model for the smart grid market and we devise the corresponding pricing
mechanism for each level. The operator seeks to minimize the smart grid operational cost and offers
rewards to aggregators toward this goal. Aggregators are proﬁt-maximizing entities that compete
to sell DR services to the operator. Finally, end-users are also self-interested and seek to optimize
the tradeoff between earnings and discomfort. Based on realistic demand traces we demonstrate the
dominant role of the utility operator and how its strategy affects the actual DR beneﬁts. Although the
proposed scheme guarantees signiﬁcant ﬁnancial beneﬁts for each market entity, interestingly users
that are extremely willing to modify their consumption pattern do not derive the maximum ﬁnancial
beneﬁt.
In parallel to optimizing the power grid itself, per device energy economy has become a goal of
utmost performance. Contemporary mobile devices are battery powered and hence characterized by
limited processing and energy resources. In addition, the latest mobile applications are particularly
demanding and hence cannot be executed locally. Instead, a mobile device can outsource its com-
putationally intensive tasks to the cloud over its wireless access interface, so as to maximize both
its lifetime and performance. In this thesis, we explore task ofﬂoading and Virtual Machine (VM)
migration mechanisms for the mobile cloud computing paradigm that minimize energy consumption
and execution time. We identify that in order to decide whether ofﬂoading is beneﬁcial, a mobile
has also to consider the delay and energy cost of data transfer from/to the cloud. On the other hand,
the challenge for the cloud is to optimally allocate the arising VMs to its servers so as to minimize
its operating cost without sacriﬁcing performance though. Providing quality of service guarantees is
particularly challenging in the dynamic cloud environment, due to the time-varying bandwidth of the
access links, the ever changing available processing capacity at each server and the time-varying data
volume of each VM. Thus, we propose a mobile cloud architecture that brings the cloud closer to
the user and online VM migration policies spanning fully uncoordinated ones, in which each user or
server autonomously makes its migration decisions, up to cloud-wide ones.
Nevertheless, the transceiver is one of the most power consuming components of a mobile wireless
device. Since the medium access layer controls when a transmission takes place, it has signiﬁcant
impact on overall energy consumption and consequently on the lifetime of a device. In this direction,
we investigate the potential of sleep modes when several wireless devices compete for medium access.
In order to characterize the resulting energy-throughput tradeoff, we calculate the optimal throughput
under energy constraints and we model contention for wireless medium as a non-cooperative game.
The strategy of each user consists of its access probability and its sleep mode schedule. We show
that the resulting game has a unique Nash Equilibrium Point and that energy constraints reduce the
negative impact of selﬁsh behaviour, leading to bounded price of anarchy. We devise also a modiﬁed
medium access scheme, where the state of the medium can be sampled in the beginning of each frame
and show that it leads to improved exploitation of the medium without any explicit cooperation.
xii
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Finally, we move to a scenario where concurrent transmissions over the same channel are not de-
structive but lead to reduced performance due to interference. In this context, we consider the problem
of joint relay assignment and power control. We develop interference-aware sum-rate maximization
algorithms that make use of a bipartite maximum weight matching formulation of the problem and
geometric programming and are amenable to distributed implementation. We also identify the impor-
tance of interference for cell-edge users in cellular networks and demonstrate that our schemes bring
together two main features of 4G systems, namely interference management and relaying.
xiii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the last decades, the energy needs of all sectors of our modern societies have risen signiﬁcantly.
Indicatively, annual worldwide demand for electricity has increased ten-fold within the last 50 years
and has almost doubled in the last decade [1]. Thus, energy efﬁciency has become a major concern
of the research community. The ongoing research efforts are classiﬁed into two main threads, i)
optimizing the efﬁciency and reliability of the power grid and ii) improving energy efﬁciency of
individual devices or systems per se.
1.1.1 Efﬁciency of the power grid
Electricity market is about to undergo a paradigm shift. From a centralized model of operation,
where all the decision making is performed by the utility operator, we are moving towards a complex
market structure. Traditionally, the utility operator has been responsible for generation, transmission
and distribution of electric power as well as pricing of consumed electricity to the end-users. The
recent deregulation trend though promotes the separation of these activities. Typically, distribution
and transmission are undertaken by non-proﬁt operators, whereas generation and retailing are left in
the hands of free market. The structure of the electricity market is depicted in Fig. 1.1.
The role of the utility operator (a.k.a. Independent System Operator - ISO) has been reduced to
selecting and utilizing the least expensive resources to meet energy demand, a principle referred to as
economic dispatch. Utility is responsible for predicting the total consumption for each period of the
following day and conducts a day-ahead wholesale auction where a number of competing generators
offer their electricity output. Each generator makes a bid indicating the amount of energy that it can
provide at each given time period and the corresponding price. The best offers that meet predicted
demand are accepted. Generally, the market clearing price is the one of the highest bid accepted, in an
attempt to guarantee fairness among the generators. Evidently, since electricity supply and demand
have to be constantly balanced, higher demand calls for additional and more expensive powerplants
to be activated.
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Figure 1.1: The operation of the electricity market.
The latest advancements in the electricity market though, such as market liberalization and avail-
ability of low-cost smart meters, introduced the alternative option of dynamic demand adaptation. In
this direction, demand response (DR) programs provide incentives to the users, usually in the form
of dynamic pricing, to reduce their electricity consumption in peak demand periods. Compared to
activating additional power plants, DR can take place in a much faster timescale, almost in real time,
and leads to a more stable power grid system, signiﬁcantly lower electricity generation cost and re-
duced CO2 emissions. In general, DR programs pursue the win-win situation where end-users enjoy
a reduced electricity bill, while the operator enjoys reduced operating cost.
Although DR has been successfully applied in the industry, its application in the residential sector
is limited. According to a recent report [2] the main forces constraining rapid growth of residential DR
market are consumer backlash to smart meters, the cost of delivering demand response to residential
customers, and the lack of knowledge and time from the users’ side to respond to dynamic prices.
On the other hand, compared to large industries, small residential loads can provide more reliable
and faster response and are spatially distributed. Given also that the residential sector accounts for a
signiﬁcant portion of the total electricity consumption (31% in UK), DR mechanisms for the home
hold enormous potential. Currently, most homes are enrolled in static pricing programs (> 98%) and
schedule their demands for the most convenient time. Given the highly correlated daily schedules of
home users, this leads to unbalanced electricity demand throughout the day (Fig. 1.2).
This thesis aims to design and implement efﬁcient DR mechanisms that will pass residential
demand response from the realm of theory to practice. In particular, we focus on DR market models
that exploit dynamic pricing to incentivize users either to shift their demands out of peak consumption
periods or even to curtail their total consumption. The ultimate objective is to devise realistic DR
models that capture the particularities of residential demands and efﬁcient pricing schemes that lead to
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Figure 1.2: Daily demand distribution for a typical winter / summer day in UK.
a more balanced demand pattern. Based on the derived models we quantify the potential of residential
DR in terms of ﬁnancial savings for both the home-users and the operator.
1.1.2 Energy efﬁciency of networked systems
Apart from optimizing the operation of the power grid itself, minimizing energy consumption of
mobile devices and networked systems is an active area of research [3]. Currently, Information and
Communications Technologies (ICT) account for almost 5% of worldwide electricity consumption,
with communication networks and datacenters being the major electricity consumers (Fig. 1.3). To
counteract this, industry has devoted its efforts on designing energy-efﬁcient hardware, either in the
form of low-consumption mobile devices or efﬁcient datacenters [6].
Figure 1.3: Worldwide electricity consumption of ICT (source:[4]).
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Figure 1.4: Annual energy consumption broken down into the components of the wireless cloud
ecosystem in 2012 and two projections (low and high) for 2015 (source:[7])
Recently though, the authors of [7] showed that wireless access is responsible for 90% of total
energy consumption of the wireless cloud (Fig. 1.4). Based on the emerging trend of cloud services
being accessed via wireless communication networks such as WiFi and 4G LTE, they suggest that
energy efﬁciency of wireless access networks should be pursued instead. In this thesis, we explore
energy efﬁciency at the level of mobile device, wireless access and cloud infrastructure.
Energy efﬁciency can be viewed as a problem of maximizing the performance of a wireless sys-
tem under a given energy budget. Mobile devices are battery powered and hence are characterized by
limited energy capabilities. Thus, designing communication protocols and resource allocation mecha-
nisms that take full advantage of the available energy is a goal of utmost importance. In this direction,
we attempt a characterization of the energy-performance tradeoff in wireless access networks. In par-
ticular, we consider scenarios ranging from Mobile Cloud Computing, where energy-constrained mo-
bile devices ofﬂoad their tasks to the cloud, up to wireless access scenarios, where we investigate how
contention for the shared wireless medium and energy constraints affect the achievable throughput.
Contention for the medium may be realized in any of the following forms. In case of probabilistic
medium access, two concurrent transmissions to a single receiver lead to a collision and hence energy
gets wasted. On the other hand, concurrent transmissions between remote communication pairs over
the same frequency band are generally non-destructive, but cause interference to each other and hence
lead to reduced performance. In this thesis we explore both cases and show that some form of explicit
or implicit coordination of transmissions has to be enforced, so as to optimally exploit the available
energy.
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1.2 Synopsis
In this thesis we propose game theoretic models and optimization-based mechanisms for the smart
grid and for energy-constrained systems. The common ground of the investigated scenarios is the
autonomous nature of the participating entities. Each user acts independently towards maximizing her
own utility, a strategy that generally does not coincide with the social optimum. Thus, we investigate
mechanisms that align the interests of the involved entities and lead the system to more efﬁcient
operating points.
In Chapter 2 we provide an introduction to demand response and overview the structure of a
smart grid market. Then, we introduce a novel DR model, where the operator sets the prices and mul-
tiple home users respond by scheduling their demands. The objective of the operator is to minimize
electricity generation cost, whereas each user maximizes a utility function that captures the trade-off
between timely execution of demands and ﬁnancial savings. We show that optimal demand schedul-
ing is an NP-hard problem and derive an efﬁcient price setting strategy that results to more balanced
demand throughout the day. We exploit price discrimination to further improve user utility and use
per appliance demand traces to demonstrate that our scheme aligns the interests of the operator and
the home users.
In Chapter 3 we extend our DR market model in order to capture the role of the aggregators that
act as intermediaries between the utility operator and the home users. In the proposed market, the
operator seeks to minimize the smart grid operational cost and offers rewards to aggregators toward
this goal. Proﬁt-maximizing aggregators compete to sell DR services to the operator and provide
compensation to end-users in order to persuade them to modify their preferable consumption pattern.
Finally, end-users seek to optimize the tradeoff between earnings received from the aggregator and
discomfort from having to modify their demand pattern. Initially, we investigate a benchmark sce-
nario where all the decision making is performed by the operator under full information. Next, we
present how the proposed model could be realised in the form of a hierarchical DR market and inves-
tigate the required information exchange. We also use daily demand traces to quantify the beneﬁts
arising from the proposed scheme.
Next, we focus on per device energy economy and investigate the throughput-energy tradeoff.
In particular, Chapter 4 is devoted to efﬁcient VM (Virtual Machine) migration mechanisms for the
mobile cloud computing paradigm, where mobile devices outsource their computationally intensive
tasks to the cloud in order to minimize their energy consumption. On the other hand, the challenge for
the cloud provider is to minimize task execution and data download time to the user, whose location
changes due to mobility. In this direction, we model interaction of tasks / VMs within the cloud and
propose migration mechanisms that capture the interaction of co-located tasks. We also demonstrate
how VM migrations may lead to a more energy-efﬁcient cloud and we verify numerically the arising
performance beneﬁts.
In Chapter 5 we consider the problem of probabilistic medium access for devices that support
sleep modes, i.e. turning off electronic compartments for energy saving. Due to hardware limitations,
sleep mode transitions cannot occur at the medium access timescale, but only at a slower timescale.
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Each terminal can choose when to turn on/off and its probability to transmit on an arbitrary slot.
Thus, we develop a two level model, consisting of a fast timescale for transmission scheduling and a
slower timescale for the sleep mode transitions. We take a game theoretic approach to model the user
interactions and show that the energy constraints modify the medium access problem signiﬁcantly.
Interestingly, energy constraints lead to bounded price of anarchy and hence introduce some form
of coordination. Our results give valuable insights on the energy–throughput tradeoff for contention
based systems.
In Chapter 6 we consider an interference-limited wireless network, where multiple source-
destination pairs compete for the same pool of relay nodes. In an attempt to maximize the sum-rate
performance of the system, we address the joint problem of relay assignment and power control.
Initially, we study the autonomous scenario, where each source greedily selects the strategy (trans-
mission power and relay) that maximizes its individual rate, leading to a simple one-shot algorithm of
linear complexity. Then, we propose a more sophisticated algorithm of polynomial complexity that
is amenable to distributed implementation through appropriate message passing.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we summarize the ﬁndings of our work, we provide guidelines for the
design of practical energy-efﬁcient systems and we discuss open research problems in the area.
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Chapter 2
Energy Efﬁciency in the Smart Grid -
Part I: The Impact of Shiftable Demands
on Demand Response
In this chapter, we explore the potential of demand response (DR) towards a more stable power grid.
Most existing DR programs are tailored speciﬁcally to the needs of industrial and commercial clients.
Residential appliances though are characterized by signiﬁcantly different and diverse operating con-
straints. A major differentiating factor is the shiftable nature of residential demands that introduces
the need for a novel DR approach. In this direction, we introduce a model for the day-ahead electric-
ity market, where the operator sets the prices and multiple home users respond by scheduling their
demands. The objective of the operator is to minimize electricity generation cost, whereas each user
maximizes her utility function, which captures the trade-off between timely execution of demands
and ﬁnancial savings.
We propose a DR model that captures the diverse energy characteristics of different home ap-
pliances and derive an efﬁcient price setting strategy that leads to a more balanced demand pattern
throughout the day. We exploit price discrimination to further improve user utility and use per appli-
ance demand traces to demonstrate that our scheme aligns the interests of the operator and the home
users. Since most home users lack the knowledge and time to respond to dynamic prices, automated
DR schemes will be eventually developed. Any such scheme though would rely on an estimation of
the actual user utility. In this direction, we quantify the impact of estimation accuracy on the DR
beneﬁts of each market entity.
2.1 Introduction to Demand Response
For the proper operation of the power grid, electricity supply and demand have to be constantly
balanced. Currently, this is achieved by activating additional powerplants to increase available supply
and meet the arising demand. The latest advancements in the electricity market though, such as
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market liberalization and increased availability of smart meters, introduced the alternative option of
dynamic demand adaptation. In this direction, demand response (DR) programs provide incentives
to the users, usually in the form of dynamic pricing, to reduce their electricity consumption in peak
demand periods. Compared to activating additional power plants, DR can take place in a much faster
timescale, almost in real time, and leads to signiﬁcantly lower electricity generation cost and reduced
CO2 emissions.
Although DR has been successfully applied in the industry, its application in the residential sector
is limited. Compared to the large industrial loads, small residential ones can provide more reliable
and faster response and are spatially distributed. Given also that the residential sector accounts for
a signiﬁcant portion of the total electricity consumption (31% in UK) DR mechanisms for the home
have enormous potential. Currently, most homes are enrolled in static pricing programs and schedule
their demands for the most convenient time. Given the highly correlated daily schedules of home
users, this leads to unbalanced electricity demand throughout the day.
Dynamic pricing motivates home users to change their electricity consumption behavior and
spread demand throughout the day. A more balanced demand distribution can lead to signiﬁcant
beneﬁts for all the involved entities. In particular, the gain for the operator is twofold, namely a more
stable electricity network and reduced generation cost, since only the least expensive power plants
have to be used to cover demand. Home users on the other hand can shift their demands to low price
periods and reduce their electricity bill. However, this shifting usually causes inconvenience to the
user as it calls for changes in her daily schedule. Given the day–ahead prices, each user has to balance
inconvenience and ﬁnancial savings and schedule her demands towards maximizing net utility.
However, the broader market penetration of residential DR is hampered by the lack of knowledge
and time of the users to respond to dynamic prices [20]. Indicatively, the authors of [8] studied the
behaviour of home users charged by hourly time-varying prices and identiﬁed that most exhibit an
inherent discomfort in observing the price evolution throughout the day and adjusting their energy
consumption proﬁle correspondingly. To counteract this, we propose an automated DR mechanism
that requires minimal human intervention. In the home side, an estimation of the appliances to be
operated the following day and the exact time of activation is performed based on historical data.
As we show, the accuracy of this estimation is of crucial importance for the market operation. We
introduce parametric utility functions to capture the fact that each user evaluates the inconvenience/-
cost tradeoff in a different way and that different types of demand (appliances) exhibit different price
elasticity. The smart meter negotiates the following day’s schedule with the operator and proposes a
schedule to the user. In the end, it is the user that decides whether to follow the proposed schedule
partially or totally.
An important building block of any DR scheme is also the strategy of the price setting entity,
namely the utility operator. Most currently applied pricing schemes are either based on ﬁxed time-
of-use rates, and hence are not sufﬁciently adaptive, or simply expose users to the wholesale market
prices, causing thus extreme price volatility and uncertainty. Instead, we propose a negotiation mech-
anism that takes place in advance (day-ahead). Hence, the home users are not only aware of the exact
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pricing pattern for the following day but also of the exact cost of the proposed schedules.
In this chapter, we investigate the interaction between an operator, multiple competing generators
and a set of price taking home users in a day–ahead market. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows,
• we introduce a realistic electricity DR model that captures the diverse set of home appliances,
• we identify the conditions that turn optimal demand scheduling into an NP-Hard problem. We
show that this is the case for most types of residential demand, in contrast to the simplifying
assumption of totally splittable demands generally made,
• we propose a price–setting mechanism that converges within a small number of iterations and
aligns the interests of the operator and the home users,
• we show that price discrimination can be used to improve the total utility of the home users,
• we quantify the impact of inaccurate estimation of user utilities on the performance of demand
response.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the related
work. In Section 2.3 we introduce our DR model and show that optimal demand scheduling is NP-
hard. Section 2.4 describes the operation of a day–ahead market that coordinates demands through
dynamic pricing. In Section 2.5 we perform a classiﬁcation of home appliances and use demand
traces to evaluate the beneﬁts arising from the proposed DR scheme. Section 2.6 concludes our study.
2.2 DR Related Work
In a series of works the problem of demand response is mapped to the well investigated problem of
selﬁsh routing over parallel links, with each link corresponding to a timeslot. The authors of [22, 26]
consider a set of users that schedule demands within a ﬁnite horizon of several slots. Each user
receives some utility per unit of energy consumed and pays the corresponding electricity cost to the
operator. The difference of the two is the net utility, that the user wants to maximize by controlling
the amount of power allocated at each timeslot. The price setting entity on the other hand aims at
maximizing the social welfare of the system. Under convexity assumptions, they derive convergent
distributed algorithms based on auction mechanisms and dual decomposition methods respectively.
In a similar framework, a two time scale wholesale electricity market is considered in [11], where
renewable sources provide electricity at zero cost, while additional power may be purchased either
through a day-ahead market or in real-time. For the case of deterministic demands and social welfare
maximization the optimal strategy is to set prices equal to the marginal cost. Under the assumption
that consumers respond by adjusting their demand schedule, the system converges to the social opti-
mum. A simpliﬁed market model is considered in [18], where indicative utility functions for different
types of appliances are proposed. In place of deterministic knowledge of prices, [20] proposes a
prediction mechanism that uses historical pricing data.
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All the above works [11, 18, 20, 22, 26] share the simplifying assumptions that power is a contin-
uous control variable that can be arbitrarily allocated at the slots and the utility is a concave function
of the consumed power. However, this would require appliances that can operate at any power level.
In this work we show that the problem of optimal demand scheduling becomes NP-hard once a re-
alistic model for the demands is introduced. Besides, the scenario of maximizing social welfare,
though tractable since the optimal pricing comes directly from the fundamental theorem of welfare
economics, it does not capture the main objective of the operator i.e.,a balanced consumption pat-
tern throughout the day. To the best of our knowledge, [10] is the only work that adopts a model of
shiftable demands similar to ours; it neglects though the reciprocal interaction of pricing and demand
scheduling that is inherent in any DR scheme. Here, we consider also the DR beneﬁts at the user side,
we introduce price discrimination as a means to improve the total utility of the users, and investigate
the market operation under inaccurate estimation of the user utility functions.
Currently only a small percentage of households have enrolled into dynamic pricing programs,
where prices are set according to the day-ahead wholesale market. However, as market penetration
increases, the stability of electricity markets becomes doubtful. The authors of [25] show that making
the cost minimizing individuals aware of the real-time prices may lead to an unstable closed loop
feedback system and consequently to extreme price volatility. Thus, they proposed in [24] a pricing
mechanism that charges electricity usage beyond the predicted one by some a posteriori calculated
price. Such an approach cannot be easily applied in practice though, since home users need to know
the price per unit of consumed energy in advance. Instead, we propose a negotiation-based mechanism
that provides incentives to the end-users to enroll to DR programs, but also avoids instability.
In order to quantify the beneﬁts of any DR mechanism a realistic model of the home energy
consumption is required. In this direction, the authors of [9] derive a continuous time k-state Marko-
vian model for the total consumption of a house based on real life measurements. They derived 12
reference models, each corresponding to a different period of the day and a different type of house.
A detailed model that generates per appliance daily consumption traces was derived also in [23],
based on a survey conducted in United Kingdom in 2000. The model was successfully tested against
actual consumption data from 22 houses, yielding similar results. In our work we make use of an
extended version of this model, where we have incorporated parametric utility functions that capture
the elasticity of different appliances.
2.3 DR Model and Problem Formulation
We consider an electricity market consisting of a set of home users and a single operator. The operator
applies dynamic pricing by dividing the day ahead into T equal time slots. The timeslot duration
determines the market granularity. For example, a coarse-grained market would consist of T = 24
hourly intervals, whereas in a ﬁne-grained one the price could change even in a minute timescale. The
goal of the operator is to minimize electricity generation cost by balancing electricity consumption
throughout the day, while the users attempt to maximize their utility.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal washing machine schedule for a cost minimizing user under the shiftable (solid
blue) and the splittable (dashed red) models
2.3.1 Motivation behind the DR model of shiftable demands
Initially, we motivate why a new, realistic model for demand response is required. Most home ap-
pliances are characterized by a speciﬁc consumption pattern, consisting of cycles of operation that
have to be executed with a speciﬁc order and without any interruption. For example the solid blue
curve of Fig. 2.1 corresponds to the typical consumption pattern of a washing machine. In this work,
we propose that most home demands are of shiftable nature i.e.,users respond to dynamic prices by
shifting their demands to an earlier or a later time. In contrast, most works [18, 20, 22, 26] in the ﬁeld
of demand response are based on the simplifying assumption of splittable demands, where electricity
consumption per timeslot is the control variable. If this were true, at each timeslot we would be able
to operate the washing machine at any power level. Such a model of splittable demands violates two
basic constraints though; ﬁrst, that most appliances do not support a continuous range of operating
power levels and, second, that they cannot be preempted. These are hard constraints imposed by the
operation of the appliance and hence any DR schedule that violates them is infeasible.
Although we showed that the splittable assumption leads to infeasible schedules, one may claim
that it provides a close approximation of the actual case of shiftable demands. We depict in Fig. 2.1
the best response of a cost minimizing user for her washing machine under both models. The dotted
line represents the evolution of price throughout the day. In the shiftable case the cost minimizing shift
is selected, leading to the rightmost solid blue demand curve. The splittable approach is depicted with
the dashed red line, where the appliance is activated within the lowest price timeslots. Although the
total energy consumption is the same, the resulting demand pattern differs signiﬁcantly. Concluding,
the splittable approximation is neither realistic nor accurate, at least for the user side.
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2.3.2 Scheduling of residential demands under dynamic pricing
We consider a set N of N residential users issuing a set of demands D for the following day. Each
demand would be ideally (under ﬂat pricing) scheduled according to the most convenient schedule.
Hence, demand i ∈ D is characterized by a power consumption proﬁle, represented as a sequence of
power levelswi,t ≥ 0 and a total power requirement ofWi =∑Tt=1wi,t . Such a proﬁle can be constructed
either by explicit user input or automated measurement-based approaches [10]. Dynamic pricing
motivates users to move demand out of peak consumption periods. We categorize demands into
shiftable that cannot be interrupted and splittable ones that support a continuous range of operating
levels up to a maximum of Wmax.
For shiftable demand i, we denote with ai ∈ {1,2, . . . ,T} the most convenient starting time and
ei the corresponding ending timeslot. We assume that only speciﬁc shifts are feasible, e.g., the dishes
have to be washed by dinner time. Let Fi ⊆ [−ai+1,T −ei] denote the set of integer feasible shifts δi
for demand i. Each demand is a price-taker that individually responds to price vector p = {pt}1≤t≤T
with the shift δ ∗i ∈ Fi that maximizes net utility, namely a function of the amount of shift and the
electricity cost:
Response of shiftable demand i (max net payoff):
max
δi∈Fi
(1−θi)Ui(δi)−θi
ei
∑
t=ai
wi,t pt+δi (2.1)
The ﬁrst term, Ui(δi), captures the satisfaction received from the timely execution of demand i and
is generally decreasing in |δi|, since the larger the shift the higher the inconvenience caused to the
user. The second term corresponds to electricity cost. The net utility of timely execution less the
associated electricity cost is represented by the difference of these two terms. The trade-off between
them is modeled by parameter θi, which depends on both user behavior and type of demand. A high
value of θ represents either a user that mainly cares about minimizing cost as opposed to maximizing
her utility (convenience) or shift-insensitive types of demand, such as the laundry machine, that yield
the same utility irrespective of the time of day. As a result, parameter θi is indicative of the ”elasticity”
of each demand. In this work, we introduce also feasibility related parameter βi ∈ [0,1] and deﬁne
the feasible shift space as the integer subset Fi ⊆ βi × [−ai + 1,T − ei]. A low value of β captures
demands of tight activation constraints.
For each splittable demand i, we have to ﬁnd the optimal portion of demand xi,t of timeslot t, i.e.,:
Response of splittable demand i (minimize inconvenience + cost):
minimize
{xi,t :1≤t≤T}
(1−θi)
T
∑
t=1
Vit(xi,t)+θi
T
∑
t=1
xi,t pt (2.2)
s.t. 0≤ xi,t ≤Wmax ∀t ∈ {1, . . .T}, (2.3)
T
∑
t=1
xi,t =Wi, (2.4)
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where the disutility function V (·) captures the dissatisfaction caused to the user whenever modifying
her most convenient schedule. In general, V (·) is a convex function of demand since the differen-
tial dissatisfaction of a user increases as the distance from the most convenient schedule increases.
Indicatively, we may use the absolute distance from the ideal consumption level of timeslot t x0i,t to
capture dissatisfaction, i.e.,:
Vit(xit) = (xi,t − x0i,t)2 (2.5)
2.3.3 The role of the utility operator as the price setting entity
The operator aims at minimizing electricity generation cost, which for each timeslot t is an increasing
and convex function ct :R+ →R+ of total demand [18]. Its exact form is determined by the operating
cost of the power plants that have to be activated to meet demand. We perform an estimation of the
generation cost as a function of the demand in Section 2.5 based on publicly available price/demand
data.
Although the operator has no control over the demands of the individuals, it affects indirectly
their distribution within a day by applying dynamic pricing. If pﬂat denotes the price of the default
ﬂat pricing scheme, each day the operator has to solve the following optimization problem:
Operator’s problem (min operational cost):
min
p
T
∑
t=1
ct (χt(p)) (2.6)
s.t. 0≤ p¯≤ pﬂat ∀i ∈ D,
where χt is the total demand allocated at timeslot t for price vector p. The constraint implies that the
average price p¯ of any dynamic pricing program has to be at most equal to that of ﬂat pricing, so as
to attract users to enroll. In addition, this constraint ensures a fair comparison setting for different
dynamic pricing schemes.
Without loss of generality we consider an average price bound normalized to unity (pﬂat = 1),
since we are only interested in the distribution of the prices throughout the day and not on their exact
values.
Remark 2.3.1. Although a user’s demand scheduling affects the pricing strategy of the operator, its
impact on the resulting prices is negligible, since each residential user controls only a tiny percentage
of the total demand. This justiﬁes our assumption of price-taking users, who simply respond to the
announced prices.
2.3.4 What makes optimal demand scheduling NP-Hard?
Several works derive optimal polynomial algorithms for demand scheduling under certain assump-
tions. Here, we identify the characteristics of home appliances that turn cost minimization under
dynamic pricing into an NP-hard problem. Consider the simpliﬁed version of our problem where
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the operator has direct control over demands, i.e.,it can shift each demand at will. For rectangular
demands of arbitrary duration but equal power requirements, this is an NP-hard bin packing instance
[16]. Here, we generalize to demands of arbitrary pattern and consider the impact of pricing on
complexity.
Consider demands of single slot duration, but arbitrary power requirements. Without loss of gen-
erality, we can relax the feasibility constraint δi ∈Fi by assuming that each demand can be scheduled
throughout the horizon T . This can be directly mapped to the multiprocessor scheduling problem
(a.k.a. minimum makespan scheduling), where a set of jobs have to be scheduled on a set of identical
machines, so as to minimize the maximum load, i.e.,the sum of the processing times of jobs assigned
to each machine. This has been shown in [13] to be NP-Hard (by a partition reduction).
In our case, the T identical machines correspond to the T timeslots and the jobs are the demands
of different power requirements. Our objective is the minimization of generation cost, which is a
convex and increasing function of the total demand within a timeslot. Thus, the optimal scheduling is
the one that minimizes the maximum power consumption within a timeslot. This equivalence proves
the NP-Hardness of our problem for demands that can be preempted arbitrarily, leading to demand
quanta of single slot duration.
We showed that scheduling single slot demands of arbitrary power or arbitrarily long demands
of equal power [16] is NP-Hard. Next, we consider the special case of arbitrarily shaped demands
that can be split in both dimensions, time and power. If all the demands support the same range of
power levels (discrete or continuous) and preemptive scheduling, the problem can be mapped to the
load balancing one of [15], which for convex cost functions can be solved optimally in polynomial
time. Thus, we deduce that polynomial complexity holds only for demands that can be split across
both time and power. Otherwise, the non-splittable nature of demands makes demand scheduling
NP-hard.
Finally, we introduce pricing. If the utility function of each user is invertible and known to the
operator we have that there exists a price vector that leads to any feasible shift k, i.e.,:
∃pi : δi∗ = k, ∀k ∈ Fi (2.7)
In this case, by setting a different price to each user, the problem becomes equivalent to controlling the
demands directly. Thus, under complete information, optimal pricing can be cast as the previously
desribed demand scheduling problem. Since the utility functions is private information that is not
disclosed, we propose a DR scheme that is based only on the aggregate demand pattern.
2.4 A Novel Electricity Market for Efﬁcient Demand Response
In this section, we investigate how an automated DR mechanism can be incorporated into the elec-
tricity market. We assume that each user is price taking and autonomously selects her strategy. We
initially focus on the usual scenario of nondiscriminatory pricing that guarantees fairness across the
users. However, later we relax this assumption.
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Figure 2.2: The operation of the proposed market
2.4.1 Operation of the proposed market
The envisioned market consists of an operator, multiple competing generators and a set of end-users
that have enrolled to a dynamic pricing program. It takes place within two consecutive days, the
previous and the actual day, and its operation is depicted in Fig. 2.2. Initially, the operator deduces
the ideal daily consumption pattern of each household, by announcing a ﬂat price for the following
day. The smart meter of each home, based on locally available historical data, estimates the demands
to be scheduled for the next day and communicates its total demand pattern to the operator. The day
ahead estimation of demand is beyond the scope of this work. The interested reader may refer to [10].
Next, a negotiation phase starts, where the operator calculates the estimated aggregate demand of
all the homes, updates its pricing strategy by solving (2.6) and announces the new day-ahead prices.
Each smart meter in turn responds by calculating the optimal demand schedule to the announced
prices through (2.1). For this purpose the smart meter has to be aware of the utility function of each
demand. This could be provided either directly through user input during the installation phase or
through a training process. The negotiation phase takes place before the actual day and is repeated
until convergence.
In the end, the operator has at its disposal an estimation of the total demand for the following day.
Based on this day ahead prediction a wholesale auction is conducted, where a number of competing
generators offer their electricity output. Each generator makes a bid indicating the amount of energy
that it can provide at a given time period and the corresponding price. The best offers are accepted
to meet the predicted demand. Generally, the market clearing price is the one of the highest bid
accepted, in an attempt to guarantee fairness among the generators.
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In the house premises, the smart meter proposes the optimal schedule to the user for the actual
day. It is at her discretion though, whether to follow it totally, partially or even not at all. Generally,
this depends on the accuracy of the estimation of the day ahead demands and of the utility of the
user. A perfect prediction would lead to an equilibrium where all the users would follow the proposed
schedule exactly, since any deviation from it would reduce their utility. In a real system though, due
to imperfect prediction of demand, a deﬁcit of energy may appear within speciﬁc timeslots of the
actual day. This deﬁcit has to be covered from the real-time market, generally at a higher cost. In
Section 2.5, we quantify the impact of prediction accuracy on market operation.
2.4.2 Day-ahead DR negotiation mechanism
The operator applies day–ahead dynamic pricing to minimize electricity generation cost, which for a
given timeslot is a convex and increasing function of the total demand. If we assume that the same cost
function holds for each timeslot, the optimal price vector is the one that leads to the most balanced
demand for the given constraints of the users. Ideally, the total demand would be χ∗t = μ = 1T ∑i∈DWi
at every timeslot.
Obviously, χt is a decreasing function of the corresponding price pt , but increasing in the price of
any other slot. Thus, χt is a function of the whole vector p, and the exact dependence is determined
by the utility functions of the users. Since the operator is unaware of the utility functions, it cannot
deduce the exact impact of a price increase/decrease on demand distribution. Such information can
only be deduced by observing user response to the announced prices. For this purpose, we propose
the day–ahead negotiation phase of Algorithm 1. For notational simplicity we have discarded the
function arguments.
Generally, when the gradient of the objective function is unknown or cannot be calculated, ran-
domized pattern search methods are used [17]. Such methods perform steps of random size in random
search directions in an attempt to ﬁnd a local optimum. In contrast, we follow a deterministic search
direction and adjust only the step size. The strategy of the operator is to increase price at the peak de-
mand periods and reduce it at the off-peak periods. Thus, although the actual gradient is not available,
we use the total demand vector χ as an estimator of the gradient.
The operator orders slots according to their total demand (L5,L6) and decreases price by an ad-
justable step size ε at the lowest demand slots (L8), while price is equally increased in the highest
ones (L9). L4 ensures that prices do not become negative. However, by discarding L4 and the last
condition of L7 we may enable this option. L11-L13 correspond to the best response strategy of the
users. Each user responds by adjusting demand through (2.1), which for arbitrary prices and demand
patterns requires a search over the feasible horizon and through (2.2) for its splittable demands which
is of waterﬁlling nature.
Operator’s strategy extends to lines L14-L18. In order to ensure convergence, we apply a pattern
search like approach for the adaptation of step size. A price update is adopted (L15) only if it leads to
a reduction of the objective function, i.e.,the generation cost. Otherwise, the algorithm backtracks and
the step size ε is reduced (L17). Obviously, the rate of convergence depends on the step size related
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Algorithm 1 The negotiation phase of our electricity market
Input: ε: step size, q< 1: step adaptation parameter
1: μ ← 1T ∑i∈DWi // average consumption per slot
2: p ← 1 // start from ﬂat pricing
3: repeat // iteration k
4: r ←min{ε, p(k)} // the operator updates prices
5: Gmin = {timeslot indices ordered in increasing χ(k−1)t }
6: Gmax = {timeslot indices ordered in decreasing χ(k−1)t }
7: for all t ∈ Gmin∩{t : χ(k−1)t < μ}∩{t : p(k−1)t > 0} do
8: yt ← p(k)t − rt
9: yt˜ ← p(k)t + rt // t˜ the corresponding index of Gmax
10: end for
11: for all i ∈ D do // each demand responds
12: calculate δ (k)i from (2.1) or {xi,t} from (2.2)
13: end for
14: if Δc← c(k)− c(k−1) < 0 then // adopt solution
15: pk ← y
16: else // decrease step size
17: ε ← qε
18: end if
19: until Δc 0 // convergence check
parameters q and ε . Small enough values of q reduce the number of iterations required for conver-
gence, but may lead to inefﬁcient local minima. Nevertheless, our extensive simulations indicate that
generally less than 50 iterations are sufﬁcient.
This approach requires no knowledge of market parameters, such as the utility functions and the
types of demands. All the decision making is performed based only on the total demand pattern,
information that is communicated to the operator during the negotiation phase. Notice that in case of
time varying generation cost, the resulting generation cost vector should serve as the gradient instead.
2.4.3 Discriminatory pricing as a means of improving users’ utility
Price discrimination has been used extensively by companies as a means of maximizing revenue
[27]. In the smart grid scenario, differentiated prices enable the operator to exploit the elasticity of
demands of the users more efﬁciently. In this work, we investigate how price discrimination can be
used to improve the utility of the system as a whole. Generally, in order to fully exploit the potential
of price discrimination, the operator has to be aware of the elasticity of each user, which is private
information though. However, the operator can estimate elasticity by observing the response of each
user to the announced prices during the negotiation phase.
Notice that updating the price according to L7-L9 of Algorithm 1 for a user that is irresponsive
to price changes leads to a decrease of the utility without offering any improvement to the generation
cost. Thus, we propose that once the operator detects that h(k)j = {h(k)j,t : 1≤ t ≤ T} ,the aggregate
demand of household j, remains unaltered at iteration k, household j should be removed from nego-
tiation. In order to identify whether the demand of a household has changed in iteration k, we deﬁne
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the similarity index I(k)j given by:
I(k)j =
h(k)j ·h(k−1)j∣∣∣∣∣∣h(k)j ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣∣∣h(k−1)j ∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (2.8)
where < · > is the inner product operator and
∣∣∣∣∣∣h(k)j ∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
√
∑Tt=1(h
(k)
j,t )
2 is the 2-norm. The resulting
similarity index ranges from −1 for opposite vectors up to 1 for aligned ones. We also deﬁne simi-
larity threshold γ > 0, a design parameter that determines the aggressiveness of price discrimination.
The conservative approach of a high value of γ maximizes the number of users participating in nego-
tiations and hence leads to limited discrimination. By replacing L15 of Algorithm 1 with Algorithm 2
we derive a price discriminatory strategy.
Algorithm 2 Discriminatory pricing strategy
Input: γ: similarity threshold
1: for all j ∈N do // user selection
2: if I(k)j < γ then
3: p(k)j ← y
4: else
5: discard user j from negotiation
6: end if
7: end for
Notice that due to price discrimination, the price for each user j at iteration k is different and is
denoted by p(k)j . In addition, since the search step size ε is decreasing, such a discriminatory strategy
does not harm the induced generation cost signiﬁcantly.
2.4.4 A lower bound of the operator’s cost
For comparison purposes we consider the relaxed version of the original problem, where scheduling
of all demands is performed directly by the operator under the assumption of splittable demands. This
can be formally expressed as:
min
{xi,t}
T
∑
t=1
ct
(
∑
i∈D
xi,t
)
(2.9)
s.t. xi,t ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ D, t ∈ {1, . . .T}
ei+δi
∑
t=ai+δi
xi,t =Wi ∀i ∈ D,δi ∈ Fi
Since the cost function is convex, this is equivalent to the constrained load balancing problem of [15],
which can be solved in polynomial time. In particular, it leads to the most balanced scheduling of
demands and provides a lower bound of the actual generation cost. Notice that in practice due to the
non-splittable nature of demands this bound is generally not achievable.
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(a) Day–ahead prices as a function of demand
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(b) Real-time prices as a function of demand
Figure 2.3: Derivation of a generation cost function for Day-Ahead and Real-Time market
Notice that in practice due to the non-splittable nature of demands this bound is generally not
achievable. Besides, this centralized approach actually assumes that all the demand scheduling is
performed directly by the operator without considering the utilities of the users. Since this simplifying
assumption has been extensively used in the ﬁeld of DR scheduling, we will use it as a performance
benchmark.
2.5 Numerical Results
The main performance metrics of any DR mechanism are the total utility of end users and electricity
generation cost. In order to estimate the latter, we use historical demand/price data from the New
England market. Next, we build a realistic DR dataset based on the per appliance demand traces of
[23] to quantify performance of proposed schemes. Since different appliances exhibit different elas-
ticity, we classify household appliances according to their DR behavior and show that most support
only two power states, ON and OFF, and cannot be interrupted, hence fall within the class of shiftable
demands.
2.5.1 Estimation of generation cost
In order to quantify the beneﬁts of demand response we need a representative function for electricity
generation cost, which has to be a convex and increasing function of the total demand at each timeslot.
For this purpose, we perform curve ﬁtting on historical price and the corresponding total demand data
from the day–ahead electricity market of New England [12] by using piecewise linear functions and
quadratic polynomials. In Fig. 2.3(a) we depict the data used and the derived cost functions. In order
to derive an expression of the electricity cost at the real-time market, we perform the same procedure
on the corresponding real-time price/demand data (Fig. 2.3(b)). In the following evaluations, we use
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Table 2.1: DR related characteristics of home appliances
Appliance Preemptive Power levels Elastic θ β Power(W)
Refrigerator  2−∞  0.8 0.1 300
Hi-Fi, PC, TV X 2 X 0.1 0.1 100,150,150
Iron,Vacuum cleaner X 2 X 1 1 1000,2000
Printer X 2 X 0.5 1 300
Hob, Oven X 2 X 1 1 2200,2000
Microwave, Kettle X 2 X 1 0.1 1440,2000
Dishwasher, Washing machine X 2 X 1 1 1200,600
Tumble dryer, Washer dryer X 2 X 1 1 2800,800
Water heating X 2 X 0.3 1 4000
Electric space heating  2−∞  1 - 2000
Lights X 2−∞  0.4 - 400
the derived quadratic expressions to estimate the generation cost for different values of demand:
cDA = 0.066χ2−65χ +34967 (2.10)
cRT = 0.266χ2−567χ +343645 (2.11)
Notice that, as expected, the cost per MWh is signiﬁcantly higher in the real-time market.
2.5.2 DR behaviour of home appliances
Each household contains numerous appliances of diverse characteristics. We perform a classiﬁcation
of demands based on three basic attributes related to demand response:
1. Preemptive vs. Non-preemptive scheduling: The former can be stalled arbitrarily many
times, whereas the latter can be scheduled only in consecutive timeslots.
2. Multiple vs. Single operating power level: Some appliances support multiple power levels of
operation, while others only two states, ON and OFF. A small number of appliances support a
continuous power range, but these are not broadly available at household.
3. Elastic vs. Inelastic total energy requirement: Some appliances may allow for partial ful-
ﬁllment of their energy requirements. Our model can easily capture this case by using utility
functions that also depend on the amount of energy consumed.
In this work we consider the set of appliances of [23]. We classify them in the aforementioned
categories in Table 2.1. Additionally, in the last three columns we depict the ranges for the elasticity
related parameters θ and β that we used in our simulations and the typical power consumption for
each of the devices. Parameter θ captures the timely–execution/cost–saving tradeoff, whereas β
is indicative of how loose the deadline of each appliance is. The depicted values are the relative
maximum elasticity considered for each type of appliance. Thus, in order to capture the diverse
behavioral proﬁle of different users, we perform uniform sampling in the range [0,θi] and [0,βi].
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Notice that the vast majority of home appliances is of shiftable nature. Only two types can be
preempted, and even these generally support a limited number of power levels. It was only recently
that heating appliances operating on a continuous power range became available to home users. In
order to capture this ongoing change, we assume that all houses are equipped with heating/cooling
appliances of inverter-type that issue splittable demands. The rest of the appliances are considered
shiftable.
Next, we quantify the performance of the proposed market and show that the widely used split-
table model leads to an overestimation of the beneﬁts of demand response. For a fair comparison
with the ﬂat pricing scenario, we do not consider any tasks of elastic total energy requirement. Thus,
independently of the pricing strategy applied, the total consumption within a day remains the same.
2.5.3 Quantifying the beneﬁts of demand response
In order to evaluate performance of the proposed DR scheme, we consider also the proportional
pricing scheme of [21, 19], where day-ahead prices are set proportionally to total demand. For com-
parison purposes, in each ﬁgure we depict also the derived splittable lower bound that respects the
deadlines though.
In Fig. 2.4 we depict the distribution of total demand throughout a day for a system consisting of
200 households. In Fig. 2.4(a) we depict the case of ﬂat pricing. Next, we demonstrate in Fig. 2.4(b)
that applying proportional pricing smooths demand distribution slightly. Fig. 2.4(c) depicts the de-
mand pattern resulting from our scheme and Fig. 2.4(d) corresponds to the centralized relaxation of
splittable demands. We notice that our approach leads to a much more balanced demand. The small
spikes observed come from the non-splittable nature of demands, and hence are not apparent in the
relaxed approximation.
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Figure 2.4: Demand distribution throughout the day
In an attempt to quantify DR beneﬁts, we depict in Fig. 2.5 the resulting generation cost for dif-
ferent values of demand elasticity parameters β and θ . Fig. 2.5(a) depicts the impact of the deadline–
related parameter β on generation cost for an average value of θ of 0.5. We observe that a small
deadline horizon (captured by small values of β ) is sufﬁcient to guarantee most of the DR gains.
We notice that our scheme outperforms the proportional one signiﬁcantly. Fig. 2.5(b) quantiﬁes the
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Figure 2.5: Generation cost for different system settings
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Figure 2.6: System utility for different values of parameter θ
impact of balancing parameter θ on generation cost. Our scheme approaches the lower bound as elas-
ticity parameter θ increases, whereas the proportional scheme requires signiﬁcantly more elasticity
in order to achieve some cost reduction.
Until now we focused on the beneﬁts of the operator that due to its leading role in the market
may impose its cost minimizing strategy. However, transition from static to dynamic pricing would
require all the involved entities to derive some gain. Otherwise the end users would have no incentive
to enroll to such a program. Thus, we investigate the impact of the proposed market on the utility of
end-users. Fig. 2.6 depicts the total utility achieved for different values of θ . The depicted values have
been normalized, such that the utility of a cost minimizing user under ﬂat pricing is zero. Although
dynamic pricing schemes generally improve the utility of the users, we observe that the proposed
scheme causes a degradation of the utility in the very low elasticity regime. This comes from the fact
that the same price vector is applied to all users and hence inelastic ones will experience increased
prices and consequently decreased utility. This motivates us to modify our scheme.
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In this direction we investigate the beneﬁts of the proposed discriminatory scheme. In Fig. 2.6
we observe that our price discriminatory strategy improves the system utility signiﬁcantly for the
cases of low elasticity, whereas our original approach tend to overcharge users without deriving any
signiﬁcant beneﬁts. But what is the impact on generation cost? From Fig. 2.5(b) we deduce that the
modiﬁed scheme performs identically in terms of generation cost and hence it could be adopted by a
cost-minimizing operator .
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Figure 2.7: Impact on performance of estimation noise uniformly distributed in (−ζ ,ζ )
Until now we assumed that the estimation of the user’s utility is perfectly accurate and conse-
quently that the user follows exactly the announced demand schedule. In practice though, the utility
function is estimated based on historical data of the user behaviour and hence can not be perfect. In
order to capture this phenomenon, we assume that the negotiation takes place according to a noisy
estimate θˆ = θ + ζ of the actual elasticity parameter θ and demonstrate resulting performance in
Fig. 2.7. Under the assumption that the operator can buy the additional electricity required at the
day–ahead price, we show in Fig. 2.7(a) that the impact of noise ζ on generation cost is negligi-
ble. However, in reality this additional energy has to be purchased through the real-time market at
a signiﬁcantly higher price, leading to increased generation cost. As we observe in Fig. 2.7(b), esti-
mation error causes also a signiﬁcant decrease in the utility of the home users. Our results indicate
the importance of accurate utility estimation and that the signiﬁcance of users following the aggreed
schedule.
2.6 Conclusions
Our analysis provides a better understanding of DR schemes and their role on the ongoing electricity
market restructuring. We investigated the price setting strategy of the operator and the best response
of home users. By using realistic demand traces, we showed that, compared to existing DR schemes,
the proposed one exploits more efﬁciently the DR beneﬁts and leads to a win–win situation for all
involved entities.
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Given that not all users are similarly responsive to dynamic prices, we showed how price dis-
crimination can improve total user utility. Finally, we quantiﬁed the impact of inaccurate prediction
of user utility on the operation of the market. Interestingly, the erroneous estimation of utilities has
a negligible impact on generation cost, but leads to signiﬁcantly reduced user utility. Notice that
although we mainly focused on the residential sector, most of the derived results hold in general.
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Chapter 3
Energy Efﬁciency in the Smart Grid -
Part II: The Role of Aggregators in
Demand Response Markets
In the previous chapter, we outlined the importance of further penetration of DR schemes in the resi-
dential sector. The design of efﬁcient Demand Response (DR) mechanisms for the residential sector
though entails signiﬁcant challenges, mainly due to the large number of home users and the negligible
impact of each of them on the market. To counteract this, we introduce in this chapter a hierarchical
market model for the smart grid where a set of competing aggregators act as intermediaries between
the utility operator and the home users. The operator seeks to minimize the smart grid operational
cost and offers rewards to aggregators toward this goal. Proﬁt-maximizing aggregators compete to sell
DR services to the operator and provide compensation to end-users in order to modify their preferable
consumption pattern. Finally, end-users seek to optimize the tradeoff between earnings received from
the aggregator and discomfort from having to modify their pattern.
Based on this market model, we ﬁrst address the benchmark scenario of a cost-minimizing oper-
ator that has full information about user demands. Then, we consider a DR market, where all entities
are self-interested and non-cooperative. The proposed market scheme captures the diverse objectives
of the involved entities and, compared to ﬂat pricing, guarantees signiﬁcant beneﬁts for each. Using
realistic demand traces, we quantify the arising DR beneﬁts. Interestingly, users that are extremely
willing to modify their consumption pattern do not derive maximum beneﬁt.
3.1 Introduction to hierarchical DR markets
Recent advances in smart metering technology enable bidirectional communication between the util-
ity operator and the end-users and facilitate the option of dynamic load adaptation. In this direction,
demand-response (DR) programs provide incentives to major consumers of electricity, usually in the
form of monetary rewards, to reduce their electricity consumption in peak-demand periods. DR can
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take place at a very fast timescale, almost real-time, it leads to a more stable power grid system and it
signiﬁcantly reduces electricity generation cost and CO2 emissions [8].
Although DR has been successfully applied in the industry sector [28], its application in the
residential sector is a more challenging task. First, if the existing DR schemes were applied in the
residential sector, the operator would derive most of the DR beneﬁts for itself, since each individual
amounts to a small portion of the total demand and hence has limited negotiation power. Second, the
sheer number of home users introduces scalability issues. Third, the utility operator in general lacks
the know-how of designing and applying DR mechanisms at such a large scale.
Aggregators are new entities in the electricity market that act as mediators / brokers between
users and the utility operator. Aggregators possess the technology to perform DR and are responsible
for the installation of the communication and control devices (i.e. smart meters) at end-user premises.
Since each aggregator represents a signiﬁcant amount of total demand in the DR market, it can nego-
tiate with the operator, on behalf of the home users, more efﬁciently. The current role of aggregators
amounts to paying a monthly fee to the contracted end-users (mainly industrial ones) in order to gain
direct control of their appliances [28, 29]. Thus, in case of a peak-demand emergency they can turn
off the energy-intensive appliances of the users, e.g. air-conditioning, for a short period.
In this work, we devise a hierarchical DR market model for the residential sector that captures the
interaction of home users, the utility operator, and several competing aggregators through a day-ahead
DR market. Our model enables efﬁcient demand response in the presence of self-interested entities
and structures the DR market in three levels.
At the upper level, the utility operator provides monetary rewards to the aggregators for their DR
services. Its objective is to minimize its own operational cost. At the middle level, the aggregators
provide DR services to the operator by presenting a total demand proﬁle that minimizes the cost of
the operator to support it. The aggregators seek to achieve this demand proﬁle by providing monetary
incentives to home users to modify their demand pattern through a day-ahead market. The objective
of each aggregator is to maximize its own net proﬁt, namely the income received from the operator
minus the compensation it provides to home users.
At the lower level, home users negotiate with the aggregators to receive monetary compensation
in order to modify their consumption pattern. Users trade off their inconvenience that arises from
deviation from their preferable or customary usage patterns for a lower electricity bill. Given the day-
ahead compensation, the objective of each user is to determine a consumption pattern that strikes an
optimal balance of this tradeoff by maximizing a net payoff function. We capture this tradeoff through
an inelasticity parameter that is proportional to the inconvenience caused. The market operation that
involves all three types of self-interested entities is summarized in Fig. 3.1.
The introduction of aggregators in the market introduces novel challenges on how the arising DR
beneﬁts span the entire chain of utility operator, aggregators and end-users. To the best of our knowl-
edge very few recent works have considered the role of the aggregator in the future electricity market
e.g. [30],[31], but do not focus on the scenario of residential demands. Our proposed hierarchical
market and the corresponding DR mechanism guarantee that no deﬁcit exists in the market and lead
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Figure 3.1: The operation of the proposed day ahead market.
to signiﬁcant beneﬁts for all market participants. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We formulate the objectives of the utility operator, the competing aggregators and the home
users in a hierarchical DR market.
• We characterize the operation for the benchmark scenario of a DR market where the operator
has full information of all DR-related parameters.
• We devise a DR market scheme, where all entities execute non-cooperative strategies and show
the interaction of the entities, when each acts according to its own objective.
• Using realistic demand traces, we show that our hierarchical DR scheme guarantees a portion
of the DR beneﬁts for each market entity. Thus, despite the dominant role of the operator, both
the aggregators and the end-users can achieve signiﬁcant ﬁnancial beneﬁts through negotiation.
Interestingly, increasing the willingness of users to modify their consumption pattern (lower
inelasticity) reduces the grid operational cost, but is not always beneﬁcial for the aggregators
and home users.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of related
work. In Section 3.3 we introduce the hierarchical DR model and formulate the objectives of the
involved entities. Section 3.4 describes the benchmark scenario of a day–ahead market where all
the decision making is performed by the operator under full information about the demands of end-
users. In Section 3.5 we present how our model could be applied in a realistic hierarchical market and
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investigate the required information exchange. In Section 3.6 we use daily demand traces to quantify
the beneﬁts arising from the proposed market structure. Section 3.7 concludes our study.
3.2 Related Work
Numerous works in the ﬁeld of DR (e.g. [11, 22, 26]) assume a social-welfare maximizing operator
that communicates and negotiates directly with utility-maximizing end-users. In this case, according
to the fundamental theorem of welfare economics, the optimal strategy is to set prices equal to the
marginal cost of supply. However, this does not hold for our scenario, where a self-interested operator
seeks to minimize its operational cost. This has been considered lately in [32] that investigates the
problem of demand scheduling from the operator’s perspective. The authors devise a stochastic model
for demand requests which arrive according to a Poisson process, they have exponentially distributed
power requirements, and they need to be activated within a deadline. They derive a threshold-based
demand scheduling policy that is asymptotically optimal as the deadline expiration rate goes to zero.
In contrast to our work, [32] assumes that the operator has direct control over the demands and hence
they do not consider incentives for end-users. The DR scenario of a cost-minimizing operator that
incentivizes home users to shift their demands through dynamic pricing has been considered in [14].
In addition, several works cast the problem of demand response as a Walrasian auction, where
prices are set so as to match supply and demand, and use tatonnement mechanisms for its solution.
Indicatively, work [34] considers price-taking residential customers that schedule their consumption
throughout the day and a utility operator that sets prices to maximize social welfare. A similar taton-
nement process has been proposed in [35] for the stochastic version of this problem.
All the works mentioned above, require extensive message exchange between the operator and
the end-users. Hence, scalability issues may arise in a large scale deployment. Hierarchical market
structures, where aggregators serve as DR intermediates, appear as a promising approach to deal with
scalability issues. To the best of our knowledge only a few works have considered the role of the
aggregator in the future electricity market. Recently, [36] proposed that the aggregator should coordi-
nate electricity generation and demand response. Given a reference supply / demand imbalance signal
or an indirect signal in the form of time varying market price, the aggregator has to solve a convex
quadratic program for each time slot. The authors of [30] propose a simpliﬁed hierarchical market
mechanism, where the operator sets a target demand curtailment and the aggregator provides compen-
sation to the end-users to meet this target at minimum payment. Each consumer is a price-taker and
bids its supply function in order to minimize its disutility. In this setting, two bidding mechanisms are
proposed that converge to the optimum. Both these works do not consider the incentives that would
enable such a mechanism and consequently do not capture the interaction of competing aggregators.
To the best of our knowledge [31] is the only work that considers the interaction of several aggre-
gators, but for the microgrid scenario. A two stage market model is proposed, where in the ﬁrst stage
the price paid by the operator and the electricity provided by each aggregator is decided through a
tatonnement process. For the lower stage a supply function bidding mechanism is proposed, where
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Figure 3.2: The hierarchical structure of the proposed day-ahead market: i) at the lower level the
users modify their demand pattern according to the compensation advertised by the aggregators, ii)
at the middle level the aggregators determine their compensation strategy so as to maximize their net
proﬁt, given the rewards offered to them by the operator, iii) at the upper level the operator computes
the reward per unit of cost reduction for each aggregator so as to minimize its operational cost.
the microgrids bid their supply functions and the aggregator sets the price so as to maximize its
proﬁt. While [31] focuses on microgrid generation within a particular time slot, here we focus on the
scheduling of residential demands across time.
The importance of DR in the residential sector was also quantiﬁed recently in [37], where it was
shown that a slight extension of 10% in the total operation time of residential demands may reduce
peak consumption by 125MW. Here, we consider a similar framework that captures the discomfort
caused to the users and the incentives required to achieve such DR beneﬁts. In order to quantify the
beneﬁts of a residential DR scheme, a realistic model of the home energy consumption is required.
For this purpose, we use the generator of per appliance consumption daily patterns of [23] and we
extend it by incorporating demand elasticity parameters.
3.3 Hierarchical System Model and Problem Formulation
We consider an electricity market consisting of an electric utility operator, a set of aggregators A =
{1,2, . . .J} and a set of residential users N = {1,2, . . .N}, as the one depicted in Fig. 3.2. All the
involved entities are self-interested and rational. Each user participates in the market through an a
priori determined aggregator on a contractual basis, i.e., users do not move between aggregators. We
focus on the day-ahead market and assume that the day is divided into T equal periods. We denote
with T = {1,2, . . .T} the corresponding set of time slots. Throughout the text, we use the terms
demand and load interchangeably.
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3.3.1 The role of the utility operator
In a day-ahead market, the ensemble of users issues a cumulative demand of W Watts. Under the
current practice of ﬂat pricing, a ﬁxed price q f is charged per Watt of consumption, independently of
the period of the day. Thus, within a day the operator derives a total income of q fW from the users
payments.
In order to meet demand, the operator has either to activate costly powerplants or to purchase
electricity from third parties. The cost of generating electricity power is generally assumed to vary
with time, due to the time-varying availability of supply, e.g. from renewable sources. However, for
any given time slot t cost is a strictly increasing and convex function ct(yt) of the corresponding total
load yt ≥ 0 [32].
The operator seeks to calculate the cumulative daily load proﬁle vector y = {yt : t ∈ T } that
maximizes its revenue. If the operator could directly control the loads, its objective would be formally
expressed as:
max
y
q fW −∑
t∈T
ct(yt) (3.1)
s.t. ∑
t∈T
yt =W.
Since the received income is ﬁxed, (3.1) can be transformed into a convex cost minimization prob-
lem, which can be easily solved through convex optimization. Indicatively, for time-invariant cost
functions, the optimal solution is a perfectly balanced load across the day.
Since the operator has no means to exercise direct control over the user demands, alternative
means of indirect control such as dynamic pricing have been proposed, e.g. in [26, 11]. The large
number of home users and the fact that each of them has negligible impact on the total cost makes
such an approach challenging though. This challenge motivates the introduction of the aggregator as
an intermediary entity between the operator and the end users.
In our model, the operator provides monetary rewards λ = {λ j ≥ 0 : j ∈ A} to the aggregators
so that they perform DR on its behalf. Notice that in this case the load vector y is dependent on λ . In
particular, the operator is willing to provide a portion λˆ = ∑ j∈Aλ j of its DR gain to the aggregators.
The DR gain Δc is the reduction of the power generation cost that results from reward λ and is given
by
Δc
(
y(λ )
)
= ∑
t∈T
Δct
(
yt(λ )
)
= ∑
t∈T
[
c0t − ct
(
yt(λ )
)]
, (3.2)
where c0t is the power generation cost at timeslot t if no DR is applied.
Thus, in the presence of aggregators, problem (3.1) becomes:
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Operator’s problem (min operational cost):
min
λ
∑
t∈T
ct
(
yt(λ )
)
+ λˆΔc
(
y(λ )
)
(3.3)
s.t. 0≤ λˆ ≤ 1
λ j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ A.
The objective function of the operator captures all its expenses in a DR market, i.e. both power
generation cost and its reward to the aggregators for their services. Notice that the reward provided
to the aggregators depends only on the quality of their aggregate DR services. The exact way that
reward is allocated to the aggregators is addressed in Section 3.5.
3.3.2 The role of the aggregators
Since home users cannot negotiate directly with the operator, they enroll in DR programs provided
by an aggregator that aggregates several small residential DR assets into a larger unit, in order to
increase their negotiation power. Given that each user is assigned to an aggregator through a contract,
we denote with N j the corresponding set of users under aggregator j. The role of the aggregator is
twofold: i) to provide DR services to the operator and ii) to guarantee a reduced electricity bill to the
end-users.
Each aggregator tries to shape the load pattern of its users and receives compensation for the cost
savings incurred to the operator due to this shaping. We assume that an aggregator incentivizes users
to modify their power consumption proﬁle through dynamic compensation per unit of power. The
strategy of aggregator j constitutes of the compensation vector p j = {p jt : t ∈ T }. Let d j = {d jt : t ∈
T } denote the cumulative load of aggregator j at time slot t, over all its users N j, that results from
compensation p j.
From aggregator’s j point of view, the DR gain Δc of (3.2) depends on its own compensation
strategy p j, but also on the compensation strategy of all aggregators other than j denoted by P− j =
(p1, . . . p j−1, p j+1, . . . pJ). The same holds also for the actual reward received by aggregator j, since
power generation cost at time slot t is a function of the corresponding total load yt = ∑ j∈A d jt .
The objective of aggregator j is to maximize its net proﬁt by solving the following optimization
problem:
Aggregator’s j problem (max net proﬁt):
max
p j
λ jΔc(p j,P− j)−∑
t∈T
p jtd jt(p j) (3.4)
s.t. p jt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T . (3.5)
The ﬁrst term corresponds to the reward received from the operator, while the second term is the
compensation provided to the users.
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3.3.3 Residential demand scheduling
At the home premises, under the current model of ﬂat pricing, users tend to use their appliances at
the most convenient time throughout the day, driven by their personal preference. For example, most
people activate cooling within the hottest period of a day, thus creating demand peaks. We deﬁne as
x0i = {x0it : t ∈ T } the reference consumption proﬁle of user i that reﬂects its preferable (i.e. most
convenient) demand pattern in the absence of any DR incentives.
In our model, monetary compensation provided by the aggregators motivates users to move load
out of peak consumption periods. We assume that end-users are price-taking since they control a
negligible amount of demand and hence cannot affect the compensation strategy of the aggregator.
Each user is characterized by a total daily electricity requirement ofWi Watts that has to be scheduled
for the following day. We assume Wi to be ﬁxed and independent of the provided rewards. This
enables a fair comparison with other pricing schemes, such as ﬂat pricing, since the assumption of
curtailable demands further ampliﬁes the beneﬁts of any DR scheme. The operator charges a ﬂat price
q f for each Watt of consumption, which incurs a ﬁxed daily cost of q fWi for user i.
For each user i we deﬁne control xi = {xit : t ∈ T } capturing the power consumption pattern
of the following day. Clearly, for each aggregator j holds d jt = ∑i∈N j xit . Each user i ∈ N j aims
to maximize its net payoff, i.e. the compensation received by the aggregator minus the incurred
dissatisfaction, leading to the following problem of water-ﬁlling type:
User’s i problem (max net payoff):
max
xi
∑
t∈T
[xit p jt −Vit(xit)] (3.6)
s.t. xit ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T (3.7)
∑
t∈T
xit =Wi, (3.8)
where the disutility function Vit(·) captures the dissatisfaction caused due to deviation from the ref-
erence consumption. Function Vit(·) may be taken to be convex, since the differential dissatisfaction
of a user increases as the amount of deviation from the reference power consumption increases. An
indicative example of such a function that we also use throughout this chapter is
Vit(xit) = vi(xit − x0it)2. (3.9)
We call vi ≥ 0 the inelasticity parameter of user i. Small enough values of vi indicate elastic users
that experience minimum dissatisfaction if their consumption pattern is modiﬁed. On the other hand,
a large value indicates a user that is sensitive in changes.
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3.4 A Benchmark Model for Utility-Aggregator-User Interaction
In this section, we consider a benchmark scenario of full information, where the utility operator has
global knowledge of the system parameters, namely the reference power consumption proﬁles xi,
the inelasticity parameters vi and the set of allocated users N j to each aggregator j. This scenario
captures the case where all the involved entities are willing to report their parameters to the operator.
This approach provides insight on how misaligned are the interests of the market entities and
whether disclosing this information to the operator is beneﬁcial for the lower levels. It also serves as
a benchmark regarding the cost of the operator. We formulate the problem as a multilevel optimization
problem [33] and provide a characterization of the solution for the scenario where i) at the lower level
the users modify their demand pattern according to the compensation advertised by the aggregators,
ii) at the middle level the aggregators determine their compensation strategy so as to maximize their
net proﬁt, given the rewards offered to them by the operator, and iii) at the upper level the operator
computes the reward per unit of cost reduction to provide to the aggregators so as to minimize its
operational cost.
3.4.1 Aggregator-user interaction
The aggregator would ideally like to control the user appliances directly, in order to impose the
consumption pattern that maximizes its net proﬁt. However, each demand of a user participates
in demand response according to its own disutility function. Thus, the aggregator has to provide
incentives to its end-users in the form of compensation in order to motivate them to modify their
demand load pattern. In particular, for a given reward vector λ j from the operator, each aggregator
has to ﬁnd its compensation strategy p j that solves (3.4).
The optimal strategy of aggregator j depends on the aggregate demand proﬁle of its users through-
out the day, d j, which is directly affected by its compensation strategy p j through the user prob-
lem (3.6). In order to calculate its optimal response, the aggregator needs to know the analytical
form of d jt(p j) = ∑i∈N j xit(p j), which in our scenario is an increasing function of the correspond-
ing reward p jt , but it is decreasing in the reward provided for any other slot, i.e.
∂d jt(p j)
∂ p jt ≥ 0 and
∂d jt(p j)
∂ p jτ ≤ 0 ∀τ = t. This is expected since increasing compensation for a speciﬁc time slot motivates
users to move load there, whereas increasing compensation in any other slot motivates users to move
load out of it.
In the full information case, the aggregator is aware of the disutility functions of appliances and
hence can calculate from the Langrange optimality conditions the best response for each demand. For
a given reward vector p j, (3.6) is a convex optimization problem in xi. Under the condition that none
of the constraints (3.7) is active, we can derive an analytical expression for d jt(p j). The Langrangian
of user i is then given by:
L(xi,γi) = ∑
t∈T
[xit p jt −Vit(xit)]+ γi(∑
t∈T
xit −Wi), (3.10)
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where γi is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to constraint (3.8). Notice that we have not included
the terms of (3.7), since the corresponding KKT multipliers are taken to be zero. Then, due to
convexity of the objective function, the KKT conditions are necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
optimality. Thus, we may derive the following T optimality conditions:
∂L(xi,γi)
∂xit
= 0=⇒ p jt(xit ,γi) = ∂Vit(xit)∂xit − γi, ∀t ∈ T . (3.11)
From (3.11) we can calculate the demand portion xit of each user i at each time slot t as an expression
of p j and γi. Strict convexity of the disutility function guarantees that its partial derivative is strictly
increasing and hence invertible. Thus, for the disutility function in (3.9) we get:
xit(p jt ,γi) =
p jt + γi
2vi
+ x0it , ∀t ∈ T . (3.12)
In addition, the equality constraint (3.8) needs to hold. By replacing xit from (3.12) to (3.8), the
aggregator can compute γi as an expression of p j as γi(p j) = − 1T ∑t∈T p jt = −p¯ j, with p¯ j denoting
the average compensation provided by aggregator j over the day horizon T . By replacing this into
(3.12), we derive the actual distribution of demands as a function of the compensation vector:
xi(p j) =
1
2vi
(p j− p¯ j1)+ x0i , (3.13)
with 1 denoting the column vector of ones of dimension T .
Then, since there is no coupling among users, each aggregator j can derive p j by replacing
d jt(p j) = ∑i∈N j xit(p j) into (3.4), i.e. by solving:
max
p j
λ j
T
∑
t=1
Δct
(
∑
i∈N j
xit(p j),P− j
)− T∑
t=1
p jt ∑
i∈D j
xit(p j) (3.14)
s.t. (3.5), xit(p j)> 0, ∀i ∈N j, t ∈ T .
Although, for notational simplicity we have assumed that each aggregator provides the same compen-
sation to all its users, discriminatory compensation strategies can be easily captured by our model.
3.4.2 Operator-aggregator interaction
The operator has to ﬁnd the monetary reward vector λ ∗ that minimizes its operational cost. However,
the exact impact of its rewards on demand distribution is difﬁcult to quantify, since it involves also
the optimization problems of the lower two levels. In particular, the operator needs to know the
analytical expression of d jt(p j(λ j)). Notice that the reward strategy of the operator determines the
reward provided by the aggregator, which in turn determines the demands of the users.
This problem falls within the class of multi-level optimization problems, which are particularly
challenging to solve [33]. In the previous section, we showed how the lower two levels can be merged
into one optimization problem. However, the previously derived solution is a numerical one, while in
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order to characterize the DR solution from the operator’s point of view, we need an analytic expression
for the optimal solution of the problem of each aggregator. Since in general such an expression cannot
be derived, we calculate the reward strategy of the operator numerically and evaluate it in Section 3.6.
3.5 A non-cooperative market mechanism
In the previous section, we assumed that all the information about end-users (demand load and disu-
tility functions) and about the total demand load under each aggregator is available at the operator
side. We used this assumption to focus on the problem from the point of view of the utility operator.
Such a scenario of information exchange could be plausible in the case that such exchanges are part
of prior agreements between the involved entities.
In this section, we consider how the hierarchical market may function in a setting, where the
aforementioned assumption of information exchange is relaxed. We propose a top-down approach
where at the higher level the operator announces its reward strategy to the aggregators, while on the
lower level each aggregator presents monetary compensations to end-users and negotiates with them
about the DR services that they can provide for this compensation. Finally, each aggregator responds
to the operator with a cost reduction offer. All the required information exchange takes place during
the previous day, forming thus a day-ahead DR market.
Starting from the upper level, the operator has to ﬁnd the monetary reward vector λ that minimizes
its operational cost given by (3.3). The total gain of the proposed DR market is captured by Δc from
(3.2), which is an increasing function of the provided reward λˆ . Each aggregator receives a portion
λ jΔc of this gain and provides part of it to the end-users in order to incentivize them to modify their
consumption pattern. On the other hand the operator derives the remaining gain (1− λˆ )Δc. However,
the exact impact of reward vector λ on the operational cost of the operator is unknown, due to the
involvement of the aggregators and the private disutility functions of the users. Thus, we propose a
repeated auction mechanism with iterative elimination at each iteration step, where the aggregators
compete with each other to sell their DR services.
At each iteration k, the operator announces the current total demand load yk = {ykt ≥ 0 : t ∈ T }
and a scalar total reward λˆ k. Then, it conducts a ﬁrst price sealed-bid auction, where each aggregator
announces to the operator the DR service that it can provide for this reward. The operator accepts
the bid that guarantees the highest cost reduction, and this aggregator is removed from subsequent
auctions. Then, reward per unit of cost reduction is increased by the operator according to λˆ k+1 =
λˆ k +ξ , and a new auction is conducted with the remaining aggregators.
By increasing the provided reward, the operator enables the aggregators to provide even higher
compensation to the home users. Hence, the users get sufﬁcient incentives to move even less elas-
tic load out of peak-demand periods. This process is repeated until either there are no remaining
aggregators, or the provided reward λˆ k becomes larger than 1 which violates the constraint of the
operator.
In order to calculate its DR bid, the aggregator receives the modiﬁed consumption patterns of
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the users in response to the advertised compensation. Each aggregator would like to provide the
minimum compensation to end-users, in order to reap maximum beneﬁt for itself. However, such
a strategy would reduce the quality of its DR services to the operator and consequently it would
lower the chances that its bid wins over the bids of other aggregators. Thus, the competition of the
aggregators is implicitly beneﬁcial for the end-users.
Notice also that the seemingly plausible strategy of withdrawing from the ﬁrst auction rounds
does not guarantee increased beneﬁt for the aggregator. On the one hand, λˆ k, the operator reward
per unit of generation cost reduction, increases across iterations. On the other hand, each accepted
bid leads to a more balanced total consumption pattern. Thus, later iterations provide only limited
opportunities for further balancing, which in turn may lead to reduced proﬁt for the aggregator despite
the increasing reward.
At the lower level, the aggregator needs to know for each time slot t the analytical form of d jt(p j),
which by (3.11) is a function of ∂Vit(xit)∂xit , so as to calculate its optimal bid. Since the aggregator is
unaware of the user disutility functions, such information may only be deduced by observing user
responses to the announced compensation. For the single parameter disutility function (3.9) and
under the assumption that the aggregator is aware of the generic form of the disutility function, it can
deduce the inelasticity parameter through the following estimation phase. Each aggregator j selects an
arbitrary ∈ T and announces a unit compensation vector pj, where p j = 1 and p jt = 0,∀t ∈ T \{}.
Through the modiﬁed load pattern xi(pj), the aggregator can deduce the exact form of the utility
function of each user i, since it can calculate the corresponding vi parameters from (3.13). Notice that
this operation has to be performed only once.
At each iteration k, each aggregator j receives the total consumption vector ykt and reward λˆ k
from the operator. Thus, aggregator j can replace d jt(p j) into (3.4) and solve it similarly to the full
information case. The total load of aggregators other than j can be calculated as dk− jt = y
k
t −dkjt .
The exact operation of the proposed day–ahead market is described in detail in Algorithm 3. For
notational simplicity we omit the function arguments. Notice that lines 1− 3 describe a required
initialization phase where the aggregators and the operator deduce the behaviour of users under ﬂat
pricing. In this direction, the operator announces zero reward to the aggregators for the following
day, in order to deduce the reference consumption pattern of the residential users x0i . Given the zero
reward from the operator to the aggregators, the latter have no incentive to provide any DR services
to the operator and hence announce zero compensation to the users. The end-users respond with the
reference consumption pattern that they prefer in the absence of incentives. Lines 4− 8 correspond
to the inelasticity estimation phase, where each aggregator calculates the inelasticity parameters of
the demands (appliances) of its users. Lines 9−18 constitute the main body of the proposed market,
where the operator increases the provided reward, while the aggregators compete with each other
through their bids.
Remark 3.5.1. A nonproﬁt operator that only cares for the total beneﬁt of the system would set
λˆ = 1. This would maximize the DR market gain Δc but it would also lead to operational cost c0,
which equals to that of ﬂat pricing (i.e. no DR).
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Algorithm 3 The operation of the day-ahead DR market
Input: ξ : auction price increment step
1: λ 0 ← 0 // operator’s zero reward
2: p j ← 0 // aggregators’ zero compensation
3: c0 ← ∑t∈T ct(y0t ) // resulting load pattern- no DR
4: for all j ∈ A do // estimation of inelasticity param. vi
5: aggregator j announces unit reward vector pj
6: user i responds by xi
7: aggregator calculates vi from (3.13)
8: end for
9: repeat // iteration k
10: operator announces total demand vector yk−1
11: λˆ k ← λˆ k−1+ξ // operator increases reward by ξ > 0
12: for all j ∈ A do // each agg calculates its response bid
13: aggregator j calculates compensation pkj from (3.14)
14: aggregator j responds by dkj to operator
15: end for
16: operator accepts the maximum bid
17: A=A\{ j} // accepted aggregator j is removed from negotiations
18: until λˆ k ≥ 1 // termination condition
Remark 3.5.2. Given that the ﬂat price q f is set so as to cover operator expenses, i.e. q f ∑iWi = c0
the proposed market has no deﬁcit, since for any value of λˆ always holds c(λˆ )≤ c0.
3.6 Numerical Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed market, we rely on a realistic DR dataset based
on the per appliance demand generator of [23]. Our dataset captures the daily schedule of 33 types
of appliances of diverse characteristics that may exist in a residence. We assume that the disutility of
each user is given by the parametric disutility function (3.9) with vi uniformly distributed in [0,vmax],
with v= vmax/2 denoting the mean inelasticity value.
We consider a market of a single operator, J aggregators and N = 104 households equally divided
among the aggregators. In order to quantify the beneﬁts of our DR scheme, we use the power gener-
ation cost function c(yt) = y2t , which is a convex and increasing function of the corresponding total
demand yt at each timeslot t.
Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4 depict the total consumption pattern across a day for the market approach of
Section 3.5 for scenarios of low and high mean inelasticity v respectively. Fig. 3.3(a) and Fig. 3.4(a)
correspond to the default case of ﬂat pricing where no compensation is provided to the users. For
the case of low inelasticity, Fig. 3.3(b) and Fig. 3.3(c) show the evolution of the load pattern across a
day as the DR bids of the aggregators are accepted. The introduction of the aggregators’ DR services
smooths the load pattern signiﬁcantly. In the end, the total demand is spread throughout the day. In-
stead, in the scenario of higher inelasticity depicted in Fig. 3.4(b) and Fig. 3.4(c), consumption is less
evenly distributed across the day. Thus, inelasticity of demands, captured by inelasticity parameter
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Figure 3.3: Demand distribution throughout the day for low mean inelasticity v.
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Figure 3.4: Demand distribution throughout the day for high mean inelasticity v.
vi, plays a central role on whether the resulting consumption load pattern will be smooth across the
day.
Next, we quantify the DR beneﬁts for each of the participating entities, namely the net payoff
derived by the end-users given by (3.6), the net beneﬁt of the aggregators given by (3.4) and the total
cost of the operator captured by (3.3). The actual reduction of the user’s electricity bill is at least as
much his net payoff, since the latter contains also the disutility term. Therefore, our ﬁndings in terms
of net payoff can be directly translated to monetary savings in the electricity bill of the user. For
comparison, remember that under ﬂat pricing the cost of the operator is c0, while all the aggregators
and the users derive zero payoff.
First, we consider the impact of the reward strategy λˆ of the operator on the market for the case of
a single aggregator (J = 1). In particular, we investigate how the total DR gain of our market, Δc, is
allocated to the market participants. In Fig. 3.5(a) we observe that the operational cost of the operator
is not monotonic in λˆ , while electricity cost c is decreasing in λˆ . We depict also the optimal solution
λˆ ∗ that we derive from the benchmark case. In contrast, in Fig. 3.5(b) we see that the DR gain Δc is
an increasing function of λˆ and the same holds for the total net proﬁt of the aggregators and the net
payoff of home users. The actual share of the arising DR beneﬁts is depicted in Fig.3.5(c). Notice
that for λˆ < 0.15, the market derives zero DR gain. Hence, we depict the corresponding gains as
zeros. In the particular setting, the users generally derive almost double the gains of the aggregators.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of the operator reward strategy λ on the DR beneﬁts of the market entities.
In addition, at λˆ ∗ = 0.64, all participants derive a signiﬁcant portion of the DR gains which is not true
for extreme values of λˆ .
The exact amount of DR beneﬁts that each entity receives, depends on the efﬁciency of the ap-
plied DR scheme and the inelasticity of user demands. In Fig. 3.6 we compare the performance of
the full information approach and the proposed market mechanism as the average inelasticity of de-
mands increases. In the following plots, the rightmost point of the x axis corresponds to the case
of extreme inelasticity which coincides with the solution of no compensation (i.e. ﬂat pricing). We
observe that our approach sacriﬁces some of the operators’ gain for the sake of aggregators and users.
Thus, although the operational cost of the operator is in general comparable (except for low inelas-
ticity regime), our DR market provides a higher DR gain. This additional market gain is shared
unevenly between the aggregator and the corresponding end-users. Compared to ﬂat pricing though,
the proposed DR market guarantees signiﬁcant beneﬁts for all the participating entities.
Next, we compare the performance of the proposed scheme of adaptive rewards λˆ k with that
achieved when a nonproﬁt operator provides all the DR beneﬁts to the lower levels through a constant
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Figure 3.6: Impact of full information availability on the beneﬁt derived by each market entity for
different values of mean inelasticity v.
reward λˆ = 1. For a scenario of J = 5 aggregators, we depict in Fig. 3.7 and Fig. 3.8 the impact of
inelasticity on the beneﬁts of each entity. From Fig. 3.7(a) we observe that our DR scheme provides a
reduction in the total operational cost of up to 15% in comparison to the case of ﬂat pricing. However,
the exact cost reduction depends strongly on the inherent inelasticity of the user demands. The same
holds for the power generation cost. Our scheme guarantees also that the aggregators and the users
generally derive comparable ﬁnancial beneﬁts.
Interestingly, the net payoff of the users and the net proﬁt of the aggregators are not monotonic
in inelasticity parameter v. Instead the maximum is observed in the medium inelasticity regime. This
can be easily justiﬁed. In the high inelasticity regime, the aggregators spend most of the reward
provided by the operator in order to motivate end users to modify their demand pattern. This does not
lead to increased net payoff for the users though, since the compensation provided is counteracted by
the inconvenience caused. On the other end, low inelasticity leads to reduced negotiation power from
the user side and consequently reduced income.
Similar results are derived from the scenario of a nonproﬁt operator, depicted in Fig. 3.7(b).
However, here the total cost of the operator is constant, while small enough inelasticity enables the
aggregators to provide low compensation to the end-users in order to acquire their DR services and
hence exploit most of the DR beneﬁts for themselves. By comparing the two approaches, we observe
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Figure 3.7: DR beneﬁts for each market entity in a scenario of J = 5 aggregators.
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of DR gain derived by each entity in a scenario of J = 5 aggregators.
that although the beneﬁts of the aggregators and the users increase in the case of a nonproﬁt operator,
the electricity cost and the market gain remain almost the same. This indicates that our adaptive
approach exploits most of the beneﬁts arising from DR. However, as shown in Fig. 3.8 the portion of
DR gain received by each entity differs signiﬁcantly in the two approaches.
3.7 Conclusions
The main objective of this work is to analytically formulate the role of aggregators in future smart
grid. We focused on a hierarchical market structure and investigated the interaction of end-users,
the utility operator, and several competing aggregators. Under the assumption of price-taking and
self-interested users, we characterized the optimal solution from the operator point of view that seeks
to minimize its operational cost. We also proposed a day-ahead DR market that leads to signiﬁcant
beneﬁts for all the involved entities. The proposed compensation strategy guarantees that compared
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to ﬂat pricing no entity has a budget deﬁcit. In addition, the beneﬁts of DR are maximized when the
operator is nonproﬁt.
Based on realistic demand traces we demonstrated that access to user information enables the
operator to exploit most of the DR beneﬁts for itself, while the proposed non-cooperative market
mechanism leads to a more fair allocation of the DR beneﬁts. Interestingly, our numerical evaluation
indicates that the utility of the end-users in not a monotonously increasing function of elasticity. Here,
we assumed that the users truthfully respond to the announced compensation from the aggregators.
However, since additional beneﬁts may arise through strategic misreporting, the investigation of such
user strategies and the derivation of mechanisms that guarantee truthfulness are interesting topics for
future study.
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Chapter 4
Dynamic Allocation and Migration of
Mobile Tasks in Cloud Computing
Systems
Previous chapters were devoted to our efforts on improving the operation of the power grid. Next, we
investigate ways to make energy-constrained communication systems more efﬁcient. In this chapter,
we consider the scenario of mobile devices that, due to limited processing and energy resources,
outsource their computationally intensive tasks to the cloud. We propose a mobile cloud computing
architecture that consists of a local cloud, attached to wireless access infrastructure (e.g. LTE base
station), and a back-end cloud. Each task is hosted in a Virtual Machine (VM) and is associated with
an evolving volume of data.
The mobile aims to minimize energy consumption due to execution of the task. The challenge for
the cloud is to minimize task execution and data download time to the user, whose location changes
due to mobility. The key technique we propose is VM migration which enables efﬁcient exploita-
tion of the geographically dispersed cloud resources. In general, a VM should migrate to the server
where it is expected to end faster, considering also the incurred migration delay. To account for all
arising causes of latency, we propose a model for virtualized servers that captures interaction of col-
located VMs and its impact on performance. This feature, along with accompanying data evolution
and user mobility (which determines access to the local cloud) affects the task migration decisions
signiﬁcantly.
We propose three classes of online VM migration policies for the cloud, spanning fully unco-
ordinated ones, in which each user or server autonomously makes its migration decisions, up to
cloud-wide coordinated ones, where migration decisions are made by the cloud provider. We identify
when task ofﬂoading is beneﬁcial for a mobile user in terms of energy consumption. Finally, we
demonstrate how VM migrations can be exploited towards a more energy-efﬁcient cloud.
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Figure 4.1: Mobile Cloud Computing architecture
4.1 Introduction to Mobile Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is one of today’s most rapidly evolving technologies and it is increasingly adopted
by large companies to host various service platforms (e.g. iCloud by Apple, GoogleApps by Google,
EC2 by Amazon, etc). It facilitates rapid and ﬂexible access to a shared pool of dynamically conﬁg-
ured resources, notably, storage capacity and computational power. The collection of these pooled
resources reside in geographically dispersed servers. All these would not have been possible with-
out the recent advances in virtualization technology that enable the agile consolidation and parallel
execution of diverse applications on the same physical machine (server), each hosted in a separate
Virtual Machine (VM).
Parallel to that, end-user mobility has become an essential feature of contemporary wireless net-
works. Applications that run on mobile devices (e.g. speech recognition, environmental sensing,
games) are now becoming more sophisticated than ever in terms of computing requirements and data
generation. Proliferation of wireless access technologies like 3G, LTE and WiMax provide ample
promise in taking cloud computing to the next level, where mobile devices can access the cloud to
ofﬂoad computationally intensive tasks. The later asset has given rise to what is known as mobile
cloud computing. The problem we address in this work is how to best leverage cloud resources to
minimize execution time of mobile tasks. This goal is realized through task migration policies that
move the task/VM closer to the mobile user.
We consider the following architecture that brings into stage clouds together with mobile wireless
devices. Mobile devices access cloud facilities through readily available hubs like 4G/LTE base
stations or WiFi access points. There exists a back-end cloud facility whose servers are interconnected
through wire-line links while the access link from the mobile device-client to the cloud is wireless
(Fig. 4.1). In addition smaller sized cloud servers are attached to the points of wireless access, such
as 4G/LTE base stations, forming local clouds in order to avoid the additional communication delay
of the Internet. The local and the back-end cloud are interconnected and are both managed by a single
provider.
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The objective of the cloud provider is to efﬁciently handle application tasks that arise from cloud
clients, in our case from energy-constrained mobile devices. This oftentimes translates to executing
tasks as quickly as possible. Quicker task completion and data download time to the mobile user
enhances user quality of experience and positions the provider better in the market. Besides, cloud
resources become more often free and available for other tasks thus, increasing the available process-
ing capacity. On the other hand, a mobile user is also concerned about the energy required to execute
a task.
Efﬁcient management of the cloud infrastructure is a challenging task due to the highly dynamic
and unpredictable nature of the system. First, the pattern of instantaneous resource demand varies
with time and location, since new task demands arise continually at various locations while others
complete service.
Second, the resource supply is also subject to continuous changes. The available processing
capacity of virtualized cloud servers changes due to the unpredictable interaction of tasks/VMs co-
existing on the same physical server. This coexistence unavoidably leads to contention for available
resources (e.g. CPU, caches, network, I/O) and an associated overhead that is often task-dependent
and difﬁcult to model or predict. Thus, the true available computing resources change signiﬁcantly
with time. Another source of variation of the processing capacity of cloud servers comes from the
execution of cloud management tasks in the background.
Third, tasks are usually accompanied with a time-varying data volume, that may be increasing,
decreasing or constant with time, corresponding to different types of applications that generate new
information, compress it as they evolve, or do not modify data respectively. The time required to
transfer a task to another server depends decisively on the pattern of data evolution.
The issues above motivate the need for task migration. In this direction the latest version of
vSphere, the virtualization platform of VMware that has a market share of 60% [39], incorporated
the capability of VM migration across distant servers [40]. In vMotion, the migration scheduler
of vSphere, migrations are performed so as to keep average CPU and memory utilization balanced
across servers. Instead, we propose that migrations should be performed according to the estimated
performance. A task should migrate from its current server if the anticipated total execution time at a
new server (including the migration and download delay) is less than the execution time at the current
one.
User mobility introduces additional challenges, since at each time instant the task can be directly
uploaded only to a certain subset of servers, notably those attached to the points of wireless access
in range of the mobile user. The same holds for downloading the results once the task has ﬁnished
execution. In general, a different cost can be assigned to each server, which captures the time delay
of uploading/downloading data to/from this server. Thus, migrations should be such that the task
follows the mobile user i.e. the server that executes the task should be ”close” to the user in terms of
delay.
For a simple motivating example, consider a CPU intensive task of 1010 CPU cycles and increas-
ing volume of accompanying data. Initially the user uploads the task for execution to a back-end
45
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:14:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
cloud server of available CPU capacity 106 cycles/sec. Once the task has been completed by 50% the
user moves in range of a local-cloud/BS of double the available CPU capacity, 2×106 cycles/sec. If
the task stays on the initial server it will be completed after 5000 sec or 1.39 hours. Instead, given a
local-backend interconnection link of 10Mbps and a current data volume of 1010 bits a migration to
the local server will cost 1000 sec, and another 2500 sec for execution. Thus, the optimal strategy is
to migrate the task to the local server immediately, leading to a completion time of 3500 sec or 0.97
hours, i.e. an improvement by (1.39−0.97)/1.39×100%  30%. This migration is also beneﬁcial
regarding download time, since it avoids the additional communication delay over the Internet.
In this work we ask the question: what is the best way to perform migrations among the available
cloud servers to minimize the average completion and data download time of mobile tasks? In order
to adhere to a realistic scenario, we address the online version of the problem, in which information
about the dynamics above is not available a priori, but rather it is presented online, just before the
control decision is taken. For example, the rate of arrival of new tasks in each server is generally
unknown. To counteract this, we propose that from time to time the cloud facility has to be recon-
ﬁgured by properly reassigning some VMs to the cloud servers. We take a discrete time approach,
where at each decision epoch some tasks are selected to migrate to another server. We propose three
online task migration mechanisms that differ in complexity and required information exchange. The
key underlying idea is that a migration should occur only if it is beneﬁcial for the processing time
of the task, including the transfer delay for accompanying data. In addition, we identify when task
ofﬂoading is beneﬁcial for a mobile user in terms of energy consumption and we also demonstrate
how VM migrations can be exploited to reduce energy consumption of the cloud infrastructure itself.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• Given that the problem of online scheduling with reassignment is NP-hard [13], we develop
lightweight task migration mechanisms that capture the following cloud scenarios: (a) an ex-
treme autonomic one, where each task selects its migration path individually, (b) an uncoordi-
nated setup where migration decisions are taken by each cloud server separately based only on
local information, (c) a fully coordinated setup where the cloud provider solves the global task
scheduling/migration problem from the cloud provider point of view.
• We explicitly model the coexistence of several VMs on the same cloud server through an as-
sociated overhead on actual performance. This overhead depends on the number and types of
coexisting tasks, is constantly measured and fed back to the entity that decides on task schedul-
ing.
• We capture migration cost by incorporating the time required for communicating accompany-
ing data to the new server in the decision making.
• We capture the impact of mobility on the migration strategy. The main idea is to migrate the
task closer to the user as execution approaches its end.
• We demonstrate how VM migrations can be used for energy efﬁciency purposes.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Initially, we provide an overview of related work
in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we model interaction of tasks/VMs within the cloud. Section 4.4 de-
scribes the proposed migration mechanisms that capture the interaction of collocated tasks. Numerical
results quantifying the performance of our schemes are presented in Section 4.5, while Section 4.6
concludes our study.
4.2 Related Work
Virtualization enables diverse tasks to run over a shared hardware platform. Each task is hosted on
its own VM, which provides an isolated execution environment. However, operation over the same
physical machine introduces signiﬁcant contention for shared physical resources such as CPU, caches,
disks or network. The problem of noisy-neighbours, where collocated tenants cause signiﬁcant and
unpredictable performance degradation, has been reported by several cloud customers [46, 47] and
has even led companies to get off of the cloud [48]. The authors of [49] analyzed the performance of
the Amazon Elastic Cloud Computing (EC2) facility and observed signiﬁcant execution stalls due to
processor sharing among the collocated VMs and drastically unstable TCP/UDP throughput. Similar
performance limitations have been observed when computationally intensive scientiﬁc tasks were
executed on existing cloud facilities [50].
Several works attempt to perform analytical [51] or experimental [52],[53] estimation of the mul-
titenancy effect. The former though require a priori knowledge of the resource requirements(CPU,
Memory, I/O) of each task, while the latter perform extensive proﬁling of different types of cloud
tasks. However, [41] deduced from trace data from the Google cloud facility that signiﬁcantly di-
verse tasks exist in the cloud and hence a characterization through proﬁling is impractical. Thus, we
propose that multitenancy effect has to be predicted through online measurements as tasks are being
executed. In this direction, [54] also investigates ways to provide predictable network performance to
tenants.
Migration mechanisms in the context of cloud computing have received signiﬁcant research in-
terest mainly towards energy efﬁciency. However, migrations can be exploited also to improve cloud
performance. Indicatively, [55] provides an experimental evaluation of the performance beneﬁts of
migrations. The most related work is [56] that applies max-weight inspired policies to maximize
throughput through VM allocation/migration in dynamic cloud computing systems. In contrast to our
work, the multitenancy effect, the evolving data footprint and the cost of migration that signiﬁcantly
affect the actual execution time are not considered. In [57], the authors propose a system that moni-
tors resource usage and performs a migration whenever a Service Level Agreement (SLA) is violated
for a sustained period. In all these works, the VM assignment/migrations are performed according to
the required resources. Instead, we perform task migrations according to the actual performance of
the task as this is observed online and by considering also the impact of multitenancy.
Generally, the impact of mobility has been considered only in the simpler scenario where a single
task may migrate to a remote server, instead of being executed locally at the mobile terminal, a mech-
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anism generally known as ofﬂoading. The resulting energy and time savings have been considered
in [58], where a Markovian control framework is proposed. In a similar setting the authors of [59]
propose the CloneCloud system that enables smartphones to ofﬂoad their tasks to cloud computing
facilities. Contrary to our model, these works do not take into account the interaction of multiple
tasks and assume a static cloud environment that is not affected by the decisions made.
4.3 Mobile Cloud Computing Model
4.3.1 Cloud architecture
We consider a cloud architecture that consists of a set K of K cloud servers. A subset of these servers
forms the back-end cloud, whereas the rest are attached to the wireless access infrastructure (Fig.
4.1). Such small scale local clouds provide processing resources that are closer to the mobile users,
in order to avoid the additional communication delay of the Internet. Each server i is characterized
by ﬁxed processing capacity (speed) Ci ﬂops/sec with the local cloud servers being of lower capac-
ity in general. The available processing capacity may be time-varying due to cloud management
background processes. A mobile task may be executed either at the local or at the back-end cloud.
At time t a mobile user is in the range of a wireless access technology, say a 4G base station (BS)
j, and hence has access to its local cloud. Let K j ⊆ K denote the set of servers of local cloud j and
γi j(t) the capacity of the time-varying wireless link between user i and local cloud j at timeslot t.
In addition, each local cloud is connected over the Internet with any back-end server k through an
overlay link of delay Ljk. In order to simplify notation we may merge the two hop communication
user–BS–server into a single link that captures the end-to-end path. Thus, the delay per unit of data
between user i and server k through the corresponding BS j is 1rik(t) =
1
γi j(t) +Ljk.
The back-end infrastructure is connected through a fully mesh overlay network. We denote by
Wk(t) the available bandwidth (in bits/sec) of the overlay link that connects back-end servers  and
k. We assume the generic case of time-varying server interconnection link capacity.
4.3.2 Application tasks
Application tasks arise continually, generated by mobile users at various locations of the cloud. Task
i is characterized by its total processing burden Bi (in ﬂops, or CPU cycles). Each task is also accom-
panied by an evolving volume of data in bits, di(·). This pattern may be increasing, decreasing or
constant, modeling different types of applications that may generate new data or compress it as they
evolve. We refer to this accompanying volume of data as the data footprint of the task.
A typical CPU-intensive task of decreasing footprint is video compression. Starting from an
initial raw video of several gigabytes we end up with a compressed video of hundreds megabytes.
As processing evolves, the part of the video that has been compressed becomes obsolete. On the
other hand, most complex scientiﬁc calculations that are uploaded for execution at the cloud are
characterized by increasing data footprint, since new data is continuously produced.
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4.3.3 Task lifetime
The task lifetime consists of the following stages:
(i) Task Upload: Once a new task is generated by a user, the source code and any input data
required for the initialization of the VM are uploaded to the cloud through the wireless link between
the user and the corresponding point of wireless access. Then, the task is either executed at the local
cloud, or its data are forwarded over the Internet to the back-end cloud, usually to the server that
provides the minimum estimated data upload plus execution time.
(ii) Execution / Migration: the actual processing within the cloud. The execution of the task
cannot be stalled, but the task may be transferred from its current server to a new one to continue
execution there. This process is known as task migration and may occur multiple times during task
execution.
(iii) Download: the mobile user retrieves the ﬁnal results. We assume that once processing is
completed, the ﬁnal data are immediately downloaded by the user through its current BS. If the host
server is not in range of the mobile user, data needs to be transferred to an accessible server.
We use the term task lifetime Ti to refer to the total time that task i spends in the cloud, including
the time required for download. Upon initial assignment to a server, the task starts execution and
accompanying data are generated. Each task i carries with it a so called progress indicator xi(t)∈ [0,1]
that evolves with time and denotes the percentage of completion. To understand the notation, for a
task i that is executed at server j, and that presumably uses its entire capacity Cj, it would take Bi/Cj
time to execute, and hence the progress indicator would evolve as xi(t) =min
{
1, CjBi t
}
. The remaining
processing requirement for the task is given by bi(t) = Bi(1− xi(t)) while its data footprint evolution
is given by di(xi(t)).
4.3.4 Virtualization in cloud servers
A VM is a software segment that provides an isolated environment for the execution of a single
task. In general execution of a task may require several communicating VMs. However, due to
afﬁnity constraints all the VMs comprising a task have to be scheduled on the same server. Thus,
for simplicity we assume that each task is running on a single VM and use terms VM and task
interchangeably. Upon migration of a task, a new virtual machine (VM) is created for this task on
the destination server and the execution starts, while the initial VM is stopped and removed from the
current server. A VM is also removed when the task ﬁnishes execution.
Although in theory an unlimited number of VMs can be collocated on the same server, the co-
existence of several VMs intuitively affects the performance experienced by each VM. The incurred
overhead leads to a graceful reduction in true available processing capacity, due to the inherent con-
tention of multiple VMs for resources and the utilization of a part of CPU for performing other
inter-VM management tasks. The term multitenancy is generally used for the coexistence of multiple
VMs on the same physical machine.
We model this VM interdependence as follows. Let A j(t) denote the set of active tasks of server
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j at time t. For any server j with processing capacity Cj and |A j| = n, we assume that an amount
of its service capacity ε(n) is lost due to cross-VM management and VM contention. To model the
impact of multi-tenancy, ε(n) is taken to be increasing in the number of VMs n on the server. We
assume that the remaining capacity is equally shared among collocated VMs. Hence, each task on
server j obtains a processing share:
Cnj =
Cj
n
− ε(n) . (4.1)
The overhead ε(n) depends also on the type of coexisting tasks, in a way that is infeasible to
quantify through proﬁling due to the numerous and signiﬁcantly diverse tasks running on the cloud
[41]. In order to circumvent this, the actual overhead is continually measured and fed back to the
entity that makes the task migration decisions. Fix attention to computing the overhead ε(n) due to
n coexisting VMs on the same server. Let Sn denote the subset of servers that host n VMs. At each
server j ∈ Sn and at each decision epoch τ , several sample values, say K, {Cj : = 1, . . . ,K} are
taken for the processing capacity that each hosted task enjoys. CPU consumption measurements are
possible by using off-the-shelf cloud monitoring tools like Ganeti [42]. This leads to sample values
ε j(n) =
Cj
n −Cj, :  ∈ {1 . . .K} of the multitenancy overhead at server j.
All the sample values collected by servers in Sn are passed to the hypervisor, the entity responsible
for management of cloud resources. The hypervisor then aggregates these values to a sample mean
estimate as follows:
ε˜(n) =
1
K|Sn| ∑j∈Sn
K
∑
=1
ε j(n) (4.2)
This quantity serves as an estimate of the expected overhead for servers with n tasks, and it will
be used in migration decisions. In particular, since the actual value of processing share that each VM
enjoys is unknown (due to the unknown parameter ε(n)), all decision making regarding migrations is
performed based on the estimated share for a server j with n coexisting tasks, given by C˜nj =
Cj
n − ε˜(n).
4.3.5 Migration
During its lifetime, a task may migrate to a new server. The task carries with it its progress indicator
and its associated data volume. Consider task i migrating from server k to k′ at time t0. In order
to resume execution at k′ from the point it was interrupted, the entire volume of accompanying data
needs to be moved to the new server. This data transfer will take place over the overlay link of capacity
Wkk′(t0) and incurs a communication cost (delay) equal to
di(xi(t0))
Wkk′ (t0)
. Note that migrations from or to a
local cloud experience the overlay link delay L. A task may migrate several times to different servers
during the course of execution. Typically, each migration incurs additional delay, namely the setup
time of the new VM. However, in contemporary cloud facilities this can be considered negligible.
The need for task migration arises from the continual evolution of the system. A migration should
be performed, whenever it improves execution time. At any time we consider a possible migration,
we need to compare two metrics:
(a) the anticipated execution time at the current server
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(b) the expected completion time at the new server plus the time required to transfer the data volume
from the current to the new server.
Suppose that task i resides and is executed at server k at decision time t0. Its residual processing
requirement is bi(t0) = Bi(1−xi(t0)) and the amount of accompanying data is di (xi(t0)). Let there be
nk active tasks on server k. This means that the true available processing capacity for the task C
nk
k is
given by (4.1). and the remaining processing time for the non-migration case (a) is:
Di(k) =
bi(t0)
Cnkk
(4.3)
Next, we consider whether migrating to server k′ will lead to shorter task execution time (case
(b)). Let there be nk′ tasks on server k′. If task i moves there, it will receive a processing share of
C˜nk′+1k′ =
Ck′
nk′+1
− ε˜(nk′ +1). Let Wkk′(t0) be the available bandwidth of the link between server k and
k′. The estimated execution time at k′ is:
Dˆi(k,k′) =
di (xi(t0))
Wkk′(t0)
+
bi(t0)
C˜nk′+1k′
(4.4)
The hat notation will be used to refer to migration case (b), e.g. Dˆi(k,k′) is the expected execution
time of task i if it migrates from server k to k′. Notice that a migration is beneﬁcial only if the new
server can provide signiﬁcantly improved performance so as to make up for migration delay.
4.3.6 Mobility
In our setting, the mobility pattern of a user i can be represented as a sequence of pairs { ji(t),ri j(t)}.
For each timeslot t, the ﬁrst element describes the current point of wireless access and the second one
is the achievable link rate between user i and local cloud j. In order to simplify notation, we assume
that each user generates one task and hence we use the same index i for both a user and his task.
As the user moves from one BS to another a different subset of servers is directly accessible, the
one comprising the local cloud of the corresponding BS. In addition, the delay to each server varies
with time due to the varying capacity of the wireless link. The state of communication links is not
known a priori, but only at each timeslot just before a migration decision is made. Intuitively, as the
task proceeds to completion, the migration strategy should favor the servers of local clouds within
range of the mobile user.
The link capacity affects the duration of the download phase. Since we are interested in the total
lifetime of a task, we extend our migration model to capture also the impact of mobility. A task is
completed once its data have been transferred to the mobile user. For this purpose, we need to include
in the previously deﬁned metrics the additional term of the time required to move the ﬁnal data from
the server to the user. For the no migration case (a) the remaining lifetime of task i at the current
server k becomes:
Ti(k) = Di(k)+
di (1)
rki(t0)
, (4.5)
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where Di(k) is given by (4.3) and di(1) is the volume of the accompanying data once the execution
is completed, i.e. for xi(t) = 1. Notice that for the calculation we use the instantaneous value of link
capacity, rki(t0).
In order to decide whether a migration to server k′ (may be either local or back-end) is beneﬁcial,
we derive the following metric for migration case (b):
Tˆi(k,k′) = Dˆi(k,k′)+
di (1)
rk′i(t0)
(4.6)
where Dˆi(k,k′) is given by (4.4).
4.3.7 Energy consumption
Besides reducing execution time, task ofﬂoading can also provide signiﬁcant energy savings to mobile
devices. In order to execute task i at a remote server though, all the required data have to be uploaded
to the cloud through the corresponding BS, say j. The upload phase introduces an energy cost that
depends on the capacity γi j(t) of the time-varying wireless access link at timeslot t and the data
footprint di(t) of the task. The exact energy cost of the upload phase is Eˆi(t) = f (γi j(t),di(t)), where
f (·) is a function characteristic of the transceiver of the mobile device. Generally though, f (·) is
decreasing in channel capacity and increasing in the data footprint.
Let Ei denote the energy required for local execution of task i. Then, task i should be ofﬂoaded
at timeslot t if and only if Eˆi(t) < Ei. Given that a user is aware of the data footprint evolution of
his tasks and that the state of the wireless access link does not change within the time of interest, the
optimal ofﬂoading strategy for each task can be easily calculated based only on local information.
Notice that energy-aware ofﬂoading from mobile users does not affect the strategy of the cloud
provider. However, energy consumption of the cloud infrastructure itself and the resulting cost are
major concerns of any cloud provider. Generally, the energy consumption of a cloud server is an
increasing function of its load. In Fig. 4.2 we depict power draw as a function of load for a typical
cloud rack server. We observe that it can be accurately approximated by a linear function of slope
0< α = ΔPΔL < 1 . In addition, power draw at idle state is 51 Watts, i.e 25% of that at maximum load.
Thus, the speciﬁc server is characterised by the following power draw function:
p(L) = 0.155L+50 (4.7)
Obviously, the amount of energy consumed by a single server within a period of t hours is given by:
E(L, t) = p(L) t. (4.8)
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ΔL
ΔP
Figure 4.2: Power consumption of a typical cloud rack server as a function of its load (source: [60])
4.4 Algorithms for Efﬁcient Task Migration in the Cloud
Our objective is to derive the migration policy μ that minimizes the average lifetime of the active
tasks out of the set of available migrations M within a ﬁnite horizon H, i.e.
min
μ∈M
H
∑
t=0
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Ak(t)
Ti(μ) (4.9)
However, the cloud is a dynamically changing environment, and its performance is dependent
on a number of uncontrollable and unpredictable parameters, such as task arrivals and completions,
wireless link capacity variations and the effect of multi-tenancy. Thus, deriving the optimal migration
strategy is NP-hard as a generalization of the online scheduling problem [13]. With this in mind, we
propose three online migration mechanisms of different philosophy.
We follow a discrete time approach, based on the assumption that our view of the system status
is updated once in each epoch period. A period of 5 minutes is typical in commercial virtualization
platforms [40]. At the beginning of each epoch, control messages are circulated within the cloud,
including the number of tasks running on each server and an estimate of the multi-tenancy overhead
parameter ε˜(n). Using this information the estimated processing share per task C˜nkk at any server k
can be computed.
Initially, for ease of presentation we focus on what happens within the cloud premises, i.e. we
ignore the need for downloading the ﬁnal results and propose online migration algorithms that reduce
the average task execution time. The algorithms are based on a greedy approach that provides the
best available solution for the current state of the system. Next, we enhance the proposed algorithms
to capture the impact of mobility.
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4.4.1 Cloud–wide task Migration
Consider the fully coordinated scenario, where the cloud provider has to solve (4.9) by deciding
which tasks to migrate. An important issue when scheduling multiple tasks on the cloud is that they
compete for the same resources. Consider a task under tentative migration from its current server to a
new one. The migration affects the performance of all tasks running at the current and the new server.
A migration should be considered only if it is beneﬁcial for the system as a whole. In this direction,
we propose an online migration mechanism that considers the impact of a migration on all affected
tasks.
Under processor sharing, each task receives a portion of processing capacity inversely propor-
tional to the number of tasks running on the server. Thus, each migration improves the performance
of collocated tasks in the host server, since it reduces competition. Fewer tasks have to share the
available processing capacity, while the coexistence overhead also reduces. On the other hand, the
arrival of a new task at the destination server would lead to more tasks sharing the same process-
ing capacity, while the multi-tenancy overhead would also increase. Finally, the residual execution
time of the task under migration may increase or decrease, depending on the load at the host and the
destination server and the capacity of the interconnecting link.
At each decision epoch, all the active tasks located at any server are candidates for migration
to any other server. We focus on task i currently hosted by server k and consider the impact of its
migration to server k′. Initially, the remaining execution time of the involved tasks is calculated for
the case of no migration. This is given by:
Dtot(k,k′) = ∑
l∈Ak
Dl(k)+ ∑
l∈Ak′
Dl(k′). (4.10)
Both terms come from (4.3) and capture the execution time at each of the servers k,k′ if no migration
occurs.
Next, the remaining execution time is estimated for the case of migration to server k′:
Dˆtot(i,k,k′) = ∑
l∈Ak\{i}
Dl(k)+ Dˆi(k,k′)+ ∑
l∈Ak′
Dl(k′). (4.11)
The ﬁrst term corresponds to the improved execution time at the host server and is given by (4.3)
for nk = nk−1 and the second one is the expected execution time of the migrating task described by
(4.4). The third term captures the degraded performance at the destination server k′ and is given by
(4.3) for nk = nk + 1. The difference in total execution time Dtot(k,k′)− Dˆtot(i,k,k′) may be either
positive or negative. A positive value indicates that the migration of task i to server k′ is beneﬁcial for
the system.
Since a migration to any other server is possible, this calculation is carried out for each possible
destination server k′. Finally, out of all the possible migrations the one of maximum positive gain is
performed. This process is repeated until no more migrations of positive gain can be found.
This online mechanism is executed in every epoch. Within an epoch new tasks arrive while others
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complete execution. In general, our algorithm picks tasks from overloaded servers and moves them
to underutilized ones. However, the selection of the task to migrate is performed according to the
following guidelines jointly:
• prioritize migrations of tasks of increasing data volume pattern, since the migration cost of any
such task increases as its processing evolves.
• migrate tasks of signiﬁcant residual processing burden. The beneﬁt of a migration is a function
of the remaining processing time of the task. For example migrating a task that is close to
completion, may not be beneﬁcial even if the destination server is idle. On the other hand, a task
of substantial remaining processing time can exploit the available capacity at the destination
server more efﬁciently.
• preferably migrate tasks that experience signiﬁcant multi-tenancy cost. Although this cost is
generally increasing in the number of collocated tasks, its exact impact depends also on the
type of collocated tasks.
Remark 4.4.1. Our approach requires the processing burden of each task to be known (see (4.3),(4.4)).
If such information is not available our model can be easily modiﬁed by replacing bi() = b¯, where b¯
is the average burden of tasks. In this case the second guideline would not be applicable.
4.4.2 Server-initiated task migration
The centralized nature and high complexity of the cloud-wide approach calls for distributed migration
mechanisms that require less information to be circulated throughout the system. In this direction,
we propose a server-initiated approach that enables each server to autonomously select which of its
active tasks should migrate and where. Each server periodically checks whether the execution time of
its active tasks can be improved through a migration to a new server. For this purpose, the anticipated
gain for each possible migration to any new server needs to be estimated. The anticipated performance
gain of migrating task i located at server k to server k′ is deﬁned a:s
Dtot(k)− Dˆtot(i,k,k′) = ∑
l∈Ak
Dl(k)− ∑
l∈Ak\{i}
Dl(k)− Dˆi(k,k′)
In this case, we consider the total reduction of execution time of the tasks hosted by server k. The
ﬁrst term is the total execution time for the case of no migration, while the second term captures the
execution time of the tasks remaining at k for nk = nk−1 and the third refers to the migrating task i.
Since migrations are initiated by the host server, the impact of the migration on the tasks located at
the destination server is unknown and hence not considered. In the end, the migration of maximum
gain is performed. This is repeated until no more migrations of positive estimated gain can be found.
The main characteristic of this algorithm is that it requires no synchronization among servers.
Each one decides autonomously when to check for beneﬁcial migrations. This exploration phase
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Figure 4.3: Transition graph for the single task migrating within the cloud.
could be triggered whenever a server considers it is overloaded, compared e.g. to the average server
load.
4.4.3 Task-initiated migration
In contemporary cloud systems migration related decisions are made by the cloud provider. How-
ever, one could envision a scenario where each task/user autonomously decides its migration strategy
towards minimizing its own execution time. Thus, we consider the case where a user may ofﬂoad its
task to one of multiple available cloud providers/servers, but is only aware of the advertised capacity
of each.
We follow a discrete time approach and assume that within each epoch of duration τ the system
state does not change. Due to multitenancy the actual capacity of each server k at timeslot t is a
random variableCk(t) taking values in [0,Ck]. Since this randomness is uncontrollable, the actual ca-
pacity can be considered independent across servers, while for a given server it is generally correlated
across time. The actual capacity is only revealed once a task migrates to a server. In addition, each
migration from the current server introduces migration delay. The optimal migration strategy of the
user is the one that minimizes its own execution time. This problem falls within the class of restless
bandits with switching costs which has been shown to be PSPACE-Hard [43]. In our case, each arm
corresponds to a server, the corresponding reward at timeslot t is Ck(t) ∗ τ , while the switching cost
from arm k to k′ corresponds to the migration cost di(xi(t))Wkk′ (t) .
However, under the assumption that the actual capacity of each server is i.i.d. across time, the
optimal migration strategy reduces to the following. At each timeslot t, task i may autonomously
check whether a tentative migration from its current server k to server k′ would decrease its estimated
execution time , i.e. whether Dˆi(k,k′)< Di(k) and performs the migration of maximum gain.
Next, we consider the off-line deterministic case, where the exact capacities of servers and links
at each stage are known a priori. The solution to this problem provides a lower bound of the execution
time. The optimal migration strategy of a task is the sequence of servers that the task should traverse.
The state space of the problem is depicted in Fig. 4.3.
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Let each state denote the server that hosts the task of interest. The execution phase is divided into
decision stages (epochs). In each epoch the user needs to decide whether the task should remain at the
current server or a migration should be performed. We use dashed lines to denote the no–migration
case that incurs zero cost and solid lines for the actual migrations. At each stage t, if task i remains
at its current server k execution proceeds by Ck(t) ∗ τ , whereas in case of migration to a new server
k′ execution proceeds by Ck′(t) ∗ (τ − di(xi(t))Wkk′ (t) ). The optimal migration strategy corresponds to the
shortest path and can be found through dynamic programming [44]. The search horizon is dictated
by the total processing burden Bi, i.e. the search is terminated once the shortest path that meets the
processing requirement is found.
Remark 4.4.2. The proposed approaches require the same information per task but the ﬁrst one
requires a system wide view, while the second one cares only for the tasks running on the server and
the last refers to a single task.
4.4.4 The impact of mobility on migration decisions
Our analysis up to this point has been focused on reducing the execution time of tasks. In mobile
scenarios though, the time required to download the results from the cloud is a signiﬁcant portion of
the task lifetime. Given also that the links between a server and a user are characterized by diverse and
time-varying capacity, bringing mobility in the migration selection strategy is of utmost importance.
In this direction, we modify the proposed algorithms so as to capture the incurred download cost,
by using the estimated task lifetime given by (4.5) and (4.6) in place of (4.3) and (4.4) respectively.
Hence, as a task moves towards completion (i.e. it has small remaining processing burden), it prefers
servers that are in range of the user, wherever the latter might be. For ease of presentation we have not
included the upload cost, since this has to be considered only once, namely in the initial assignment
of a task to a server. Subsequent migration decisions are not affected by upload time.
4.4.5 VM migration mechanisms for energy efﬁciency
The main objective of the proposed algorithms was to improve cloud performance. Here, we explore
an alternative use of VM migrations towards a more energy efﬁcient cloud. In this direction, we
devise VM migration strategies that minimize both energy consumption of the cloud infrastructure
and the corresponding electricity cost.
We assume that energy consumption of each server is given by (4.7). In this case, it is straight-
forward to show that the most energy efﬁcient strategy is to consolidate VMs in the fewest possible
servers and turn off the idle ones. Interestingly, this strategy is in contrast to the objective of minimiz-
ing execution time, since extreme consolidation introduces also the problem of multitenancy. In order
to deal with this tradeoff, we suggest that the cloud provider should consolidate VMs up to the point
that no performance SLA is violated. In particular, we propose a two timescale approach. At a slow
timescale, the operator makes a rough estimation on the number of servers that have to be activated
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based on historical data. At a faster timescale, VM migrations are exploited to counteract the effects
of multitenancy, according to one of the previously described algorithms.
Thus, the required number of active servers can be determined. Next, we attempt to answer
the question: which servers should be activated? Although all servers are equivalent in terms of
performance, electricity cost is not the same due to variation of electricity prices from place to place.
Given that cloud facilities consist of geographically distributed datacenters all over the world, VM
migrations can provide additional ﬁnancial beneﬁts by moving load to places of low cost. Given that
electricity prices for the following day are generally known, this problem can be easily solved in an
ofﬂine manner.
4.5 Numerical Evaluation
In order to compare the performance of the proposed schemes, we use an event driven simulator for a
cloud system of 50 servers, each of capacity C ∈ [0.1,2] Tera–ﬂops, interconnected through wireline
communication links of mean available link capacity W ∈ [1,10] Mbps. The link and processing
capacities are assumed to be i.i.d. across different slots.
New tasks arrive at each server i according to an inhomogeneous arrival process of parameter
λi(t) arrivals/sec, given by a gaussian distribution of mean 0.05 and standard deviation 0.015. The
processing burden follows a heavy tailed pareto-like probability density function (pdf) with P[Bi >
x] =min{1,(1/x)1.25}, where x is in teraﬂops, which is typical for CPU intensive tasks [45].
We consider tasks of increasing or decreasing data footprint evolving according to the linear
model di(xi) = min{0,αxi + β} with α ∼ U(−10,10), β ∼ U(0,100) for the increasing and β ′ ∼
U(10,1000) for the decreasing ones (in MBytes). The multi-tenancy cost due to VMs consolidated
onto a single server is modeled as a gaussian random variable of mean μ = (k−1)2k . For comparison
purposes, we depict also in each ﬁgure the performance of the no migration strategy and of a one-shot
placement scheme, in order to quantify the importance of migrations. Placement follows the logic of
our cloud wide approach, but now the server that will host the task is selected only once, when the
task arrives at the system. The depicted values are averages over 100 instances.
Initially, we investigate the population of tasks N hosted by each server, which indicates the
load balancing behaviour of each algorithm. Since N is a random variable, we depict in Fig. 4.4 its
cumulative distribution function (cdf), i.e. the probability P[N ≤ k] ∀k ∈ N for each algorithm. The
slopes of the curves indicate how balanced the cloud is. In the cloud-wide approach a server hosts
at most 3 VMs. Instead, the probability of having more than 3 VMs running on a server is 10% for
the server-initiated approach and 25% for the task-initiated one. In the latter case the probability of
having more than 20 tenants in a server is non-negligible (∼ 4%); compared to the no migration case
though the load is more balanced.
We depict in Fig. 4.5(a) the exact distribution of tasks on the servers through the probability mass
function of N. We see that the cloud-wide migration strategy leads to a more balanced network, where
in most of the cases the number of tasks N is from 1 to 3. Moving to the less coordinated strategies,
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Figure 4.5: Load balancing behaviour of the proposed algorithms
the pmfs broaden. For example, in the user–initiated scheme the probability that a server is empty is
signiﬁcant, while even for N > 20 the probability is non-negligible.
Next, we consider how the distribution of tasks is affected by the link capacity of the cloud
interconnection links. Thus, we depict in Fig. 4.5(b) the pmf of the cloud wide approach for three
different scenarios, one where the cloud servers are interconnected by high/medium/low capacity
links. As the link capacity decreases the pmf broadens indicating that it is not always optimal to
perform a perfect load balancing. This is justiﬁed by the fact that in low link capacity regime, the
migration cost becomes signiﬁcant and hence it is preferable to be slightly unbalanced.
In Fig. 4.6(a) we quantify the impact of per server processing capacity on the average lifetime of
the tasks. As expected the performance degrades as we move from the centralized approach that has
system–wide information to the decentralized ones that are based only on local information. Increas-
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Figure 4.6: The impact of system/task parameters on cloud performance
ing server capacity causes the performance gap of the proposed schemes to diminish, indicating that
careful migration decisions are most important when the cloud is overcommitted. Interestingly it is
only the task-initiated approach that performs worse than the cloud wide placement approach. In the
task-initiated approach we observed that although the average lifetime is not signiﬁcantly better than
the no migration case, the individual gain of the tasks that migrate is signiﬁcant.
In Fig. 4.6(b) we depict the impact of data footprint on the average lifetime of the tasks. As the
mean footprint increases the performance gap between the proposed algorithms decreases, since the
”heavier” the tasks the greater is the migration cost. Finally, we consider how often migrations are
performed by each algorithm in Fig. 4.6(c) for two different scenarios. For tasks of medium data
footprint we observe that signiﬁcantly more migrations are performed, compared to a system serving
data-intensive tasks.
In order to stress the impact of mobility in migration decisions, we depict in Fig. 4.7 the lifetime
of a task that is initially uploaded to a local cloud by a mobile user through its 3G access. We consider
a task of increasing data footprint that can be executed either at the local (L) or the back-end cloud
(B). We depict the task lifetime for the case of a) no migration, b) a strategy that does not consider
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Figure 4.7: The lifetime of a mobile task under different migration strategies
migration cost and download time and c) the proposed task-initiated migration strategy that is mobility
aware. We denote with shadow the closest to the user cloud facility in terms of communication
delay. The no-migration strategy executes the task at the local cloud and hence exhibits the worst
performance. Initially, the migration cost is negligible since the data footprint of the task is small.
Thus, as long as the user is in range of the local cloud and migrations are costless, the other two
migration strategies perform identically. Once the user moves out of range of the BS hosting the local
cloud to a place that is closer to the back-end (WiFi access), the mobility-aware approach moves the
task there. In contrast, the load-aware one performs several migrations to the least loaded server, in
an attempt to exploit the best option in terms of available processing capacity, without considering
though the increasing cost of each migration and the additional cost of downloading the ﬁnal data
from a distant server. Hence, it is outperformed by the mobility aware one.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the option of task ofﬂoading as a means of improving processing
capabilities and lifetime of a mobile device. To this end, we developed migration policies that oppor-
tunistically exploit available processing capacity at cloud servers. Our techniques explicitly take into
account user mobility by considering the download time of the data emanated from task execution.
This essentially biases the migration decision in favor of servers within range of the mobile user.
In contrast to the migration policies currently applied in commercial virtualization platforms like
vSphere [40], we demonstrate that migrations should be performed according to the estimated perfor-
mance and not based on the estimated resource demands of each task/VM. Our performance analysis
veriﬁes the beneﬁts arising from migration schemes that consider both migration cost and mobility of
users in decision making.
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Chapter 5
Energy Efﬁciency at the Wireless Device
Access Level: The Impact of Energy
Constraints on Medium Access
In this chapter, we move from the realm of Mobile Cloud Computing to the setting of energy-
constrained medium access. Contemporary mobile devices are battery powered and operate on a
tight energy budget. Besides, the scarcity of bandwidth resources leads to strong competition for
the medium. In an attempt to capture these facts, we consider random medium access schemes for
devices that support sleep modes, i.e. turning off electronic compartments for energy saving.
Due to hardware limitations, sleep mode transitions cannot occur at the medium access timescale,
but only at a slower timescale. Each terminal can choose when to turn on/off and its probability
to transmit on an arbitrary slot. Thus, we develop a two level model, consisting of a fast timescale
for transmission scheduling and a slower timescale for the sleep mode transitions. We take a game
theoretic approach to model the user interactions and show that the energy constraints modify the
medium access problem signiﬁcantly and lead to reduced price of anarchy. Our ﬁndings give valuable
insights on the energy–throughput tradeoff for contention based systems.
5.1 Introduction to Energy Efﬁcient MAC
As mobile communications become part of our everyday lives, new challenges for the system de-
signers come to the foreground. First of all, the scarcity of bandwidth resources leads to extreme
competition for the medium. Besides, the total energy dissipation by communication devices has
been shown to amount to a signiﬁcant portion of a nation’s power proﬁle, motivating efforts of per
device energy economy. In an attempt to minimize their energy footprint and/or maximize the battery
lifetime, existing wireless devices support radio sleep modes.
A generic wireless terminal consists of several circuit building blocks with the RF transceiver
(radio) contributing signiﬁcantly to the overall energy consumption. The RF transceiver itself con-
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Table 5.1: Switching time and energy consumption of a CC2420 radio
Power mode Switching Switching Current
time(ms) Energy (μJ) Consumption (μA)
Tx 0 0 10000
idle 0.1 1.035 426
power down 1.2 42.3 40
deep sleep 2.4 85.7 0.02
sists of four subblocks. The transmit block that is responsible for modulation and up-conversion (i.e.
transforms the baseband signal to RF), the receive block dedicated to the down-conversion and de-
modulation, the local oscillator that generates the required carrier frequency, and the power ampliﬁer
that ampliﬁes the signal for transmission. Existing wireless devices support radio sleep modes that
turn off speciﬁc subblocks, to minimize their energy consumption while inactive. For example, as
shown in Table 5.1 the CC2420 transceiver ([61]) provides three different low power modes. In the
deepest sleep mode, both the oscillator and the voltage regulator are turned off, providing hence the
lowest current draw. However, this comes at the cost of the highest switching energy cost and the
longest switching latency. On the other hand, the idle mode provides a quick and energy inexpen-
sive transition back to the active state, but at the cost of higher current draw and consequently higher
current consumption.
To address this tradeoff, the authors of [62] propose a scheme to dynamically adjust the power
mode according to the trafﬁc conditions in the network. They show that in a low trafﬁc scenario, deep
sleep should be preferred since most of the time the nodes tend to be inactive. In a high trafﬁc setting
though, a ”lighter” sleep mode would be preferable, because frequent mode transitions incur high
delay and energy costs, overshadowing the energy saving due to the low current draw. In a similar
setting, [63] considers optimal scheduling of the sleep periods for the scenario of a mobile receiving
data from a base station. The objective is to derive the sleeping strategy that balances the energy cost
of frequent waking up to check for new packets and the retrieval latency.
In this direction, several energy aware MAC protocols have been proposed, either centralized or
distributed ones, to resolve contention. However, most of them rely on the willingness of the nodes
to comply with the protocol rules. Hence, they are vulnerable to selﬁsh users that may deviate from
the protocol in order to improve their own performance. Game theory comes as the ideal tool to
model interactions among self–interested entities competing for common resources and it has also
been considered recently for medium access.
In [64], the Nash Equilibrium Points (NEP) in a slotted ALOHA system of selﬁsh nodes with
speciﬁc quality-of-service requirements are studied. It has been observed that usually selﬁsh behavior
in medium access leads to suboptimal performance. For example, a prisoners dilemma phenomenon
arises among selﬁsh nodes using the generalized slotted Aloha protocols of [65]. A decrease in
system throughput, especially when the workload increases due to the selﬁsh behavior of nodes, has
been observed in [66], [67].
In [70] a random medium access scheme is cast as a non-cooperative game where each node wants
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to maximize an expression of its medium access probability and contention. The proposed scheme
adapts to a continuous contention measure, which is estimated by observing consecutive idle slots
between transmissions, instead of the binary feedback of collision detection. However, it requires
that each node is aware of contention for the decision making and no energy constraints are assumed.
The interplay of medium access contention and energy consumption was considered recently in
[68]. In particular, a scenario of users selecting their back-off control parameters based on the mea-
sured collision rate and their power consumption was considered. Each user attempts to balance
the utility acquired by transmitting and the disutility caused to him due to the induced energy con-
sumption. The existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium points of the arising game were
investigated. In a similar framework and in an attempt to mitigate the effects of selﬁshness, the au-
thors of [69] study the problem of minimizing the energy consumption for given throughput demands
for a contention MAC. They show that whenever the demands are feasible, there exist exactly two
Nash equilibrium points and derive a greedy mechanism that always converges to the best one.
In this work we introduce an additional level of decision making capturing the ON-OFF strategy
of the terminals over the classic ALOHA game. We model contention for the medium as a game,
where users with speciﬁc energy constraints select both the proportion of time that they sleep and
their medium access probabilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that addresses
the interplay between contention and energy consumption for systems that support sleep modes. The
contributions of this work can be summarized in the following:
• We characterize the throughput optimal strategy under energy constraints, which differs from
traditional Aloha and serves as a reference point. We also provide a distributed counterpart
strategy, which focuses on fairness.
• We formulate contention as a non-cooperative game and show that it has a unique NEP and
bounded Price of Anarchy (PoA). Contrary to the game with no energy constraints, where the
PoA is inﬁnite, we ﬁnd that energy constraints reduce the negative impact of selﬁsh behaviour.
• Based on the rationality of the users we derive a modiﬁed strategy, which allows the users to
observe competition. This policy is more efﬁcient but has multiple NEPs.
The main characteristics of slotted ALOHA are also apparent in most contemporary contention-
based systems, such as the IEEE 802.11. For example, all these systems exhibit a certain amount
of inherent inefﬁciency; the total throughput in a common channel breaks down signiﬁcantly, as the
number of users and the message burstiness increase (see [71]). Despite its limited applicability and
mainly due to its simplicity, Aloha remains a tractable insightful tool for studying such systems.
Consequently, our results provide insights for other contention based systems.
5.2 System Model
We consider a communication scenario of N = |N | mobile terminals transmitting to a common des-
tination (e.g. uplink to a Base Station). Time is slotted and within each timeslot each user may select
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Figure 5.1: The structure of a superframe
either to transmit or to stay silent. Medium access is performed probabilistically, according to a slot-
ted Aloha protocol, where a collision occurs whenever two or more terminals transmit concurrently.
Each terminal has always packets at its buffer for transmission (i.e. saturated queue), but it has lim-
ited energy resources. Each device i is characterized by an energy budget e˜i, representing either its
available battery power or the maximum energy it is willing to expend. In order to save energy it can
turn into a sleep mode, where most of the circuits are turned off. For analytical tractability we assume
that each terminal may be in one out of two possible operation modes, ON or OFF.
In general, a mode transition incurs signiﬁcant energy and time (delay) costs. Besides, due to
hardware limitations the time required for a mode transition is of the order of msec, much larger
than the duration of a timeslot. Consequently, transition at the timeslot level is neither feasible nor
desirable. Hence, we introduce a new timescale (we call it frame) where the mode switching takes
place. Several timeslots constitute a frame. The beginning of each frame is a decision point, where
a node may change its operation mode. Within a frame, the nodes keep their mode ﬁxed and may
access the medium randomly with probability p. This is also assumed ﬁxed on a per frame basis.
For decision reasons and without affecting the operation of the system, we introduce yet another
timescale, that of the super frame, where an arbitrary number of frames, say K, forms a superframe
(Fig. 5.1)
A binary vector qi( j) = {0,1}K , represents the ON or OFF state of user i on superframe j, and
pi its access probability (i.e. the access probability is selected only once per superframe). In practice
the mobile terminals are autonomous and due to the limited knowledge available node level, synchro-
nization of sleep modes is a difﬁcult task. On the other hand, probabilistic ON-OFF has been deemed
a feasible strategy ([72]). Thus, we focus on a probabilistic version of the aforementioned problem.
Each user i is characterized by a probability of being ON, denoted with qi and a medium access prob-
ability pi. In matrix notation the strategy space can be written as I = {p,q}, with p = [p1, p2, . . . pN ]
and q = [q1,q2, . . .qN ].
If we consider the probability of user i successfully transmitting a packet in an arbitrary slot we
can calculate throughput as
T¯i(p,q) = piqi ∏
j∈N\i
(1− p jq j) piqi =1= piqi1− piqi ∏j∈N
(1− p jq j) (5.1)
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Notice that the throughput of user i is an increasing function of pi and qi, but decreasing in the number
of terminals N contending for the medium. The latter is in compliance with the classic ALOHA, but
in practice also holds for CSMA/CA protocols.
The energy cost of user i is a random variable with a mean value of E¯i(pi,qi) = qi(c1 + c2pi),
where c1 is the energy consumption while ON and c2 the additional cost imposed by the transmis-
sion. Obviously, in order to transmit, the node has to be ON. Here, we do not consider the energy
consumption of the transition itself.
5.3 The Impact of Constrained Energy Resources on System Through-
put
First, we would like to ﬁnd the ON–OFF and the medium access probabilities that maximize the
collision–free utilization of the medium, and consequently the throughput of the system. This can be
formally expressed as the following optimization problem:
maximize
I={p,q}
N
∑
i=1
T¯i(p,q)
s.t. E¯i(pi,qi)≤ e˜i ∀i
{pi,qi} ∈ [0,1]2 ∀i
(5.2)
The intuitive explanation of the energy constraint is the fact that each battery cycle provides e˜i
resource and thus, the maximum energy constraint is directly mapped to a minimum recharge time
for the mobile. Throughout this chapter, and without loss of generality, we assume that the users are
ordered in decreasing energy budget, i.e. e˜1 ≥ e˜2 ≥ . . .≥ e˜N .
5.3.1 Throughput optimal scheduling in energy constrained ALOHAwith sleepmodes
In the classic ALOHA setting, where no energy constraints exist, the throughput optimal strategy
would be the one that eliminates contention. Thus, if we could force only a single user, say user k,
to access the medium with probability pk = 1 in each frame, we would achieve the maximum total
throughput. In our scenario though, due to the energy constraints, the users may not be able to stay
continuously ON (i.e qk = 1) or to transmit with pk = 1. Then, what is the best way to exploit the
available energy resources? For each user we need to ﬁnd the portion of energy to spend for staying
ON during the frames and the portion used for transmitting while being ON.
Lemma 5.3.1. Out of all the throughput optimal strategies the most energy efﬁcient ones are of the
form I∗ = {1,a} with 1 = [1,1, . . .1] and a ∈ [0,1]N. Thus, without loss of optimality we may restrict
the strategy search space only to strategies where the nodes transmit continuously inside any ON
frame.
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Proof. Let Iˆ be a feasible throughput optimal strategy, where {pˆi, qˆi} the strategy of user i. From
eq. 5.1 we may see that throughput depends only on the pq products. Let ai = pˆiqˆi. The strategy
I∗ = {1,a} with a = [ pˆ1qˆ1, pˆ2qˆ2, . . . pˆiqˆi] achieves the optimal throughput, i.e. T¯ (I∗) = T¯
(Iˆ).
Then, we prove that I∗ is also feasible, as the most energy efﬁcient strategy.
Any other feasible throughput optimal strategy Iˆ can be written as an expression of a as {pˆi =
ai
ai+δi , qˆi = ai+δi}, with 0 < δi ≤ min{1−ai,
e˜i−ai(c1+c2)
c1
}. Thus, regarding the energy efﬁciency we
have:
E¯
(Iˆ) = N∑
i=1
(ai+δi)
(
c1+ c2
ai
ai+δi
)
=
N
∑
i=1
δic1+ai(c1+ c2) = E¯ (I∗)+ c1
N
∑
i=1
δi
> E¯ (I∗) .
This completes our proof.
Based on Lemma 5.3.1, the optimization problem described by eq. 5.2 can be simpliﬁed to an
expression that depends only on q leading to the objective function T¯ (q) =
N
∑
i=1
qi ∏
j∈N\i
(1− q j) and
constraints 0≤ qi ≤ q˜i =min
{
e˜i
c1+c2
,1
}
; this can be further simpliﬁed into a problem of binary integer
programming.
Lemma 5.3.2. The optimal solution is of the form q∗ = b∗diag[q˜1, q˜2, . . . q˜N ] where b∗ is a binary row
vector.
Proof. The partial derivative of the objective function is given by:
∂ T¯
∂qk
= ∏
j∈N\k
(1−q j)− ∑
j∈N\k
q j ∏
l∈N\{k, j}
(1−ql)
= ∏
j∈N\k
(1−q j)− ∑
j∈N\k
q j
1−q j ∏l∈N\k
(1−ql)
=
(
1− ∑
j∈N\k
q j
1−q j
)
∏
j∈N\k
(1−q j)
We have thus shown that the sign of the partial derivative with respect to the kth element depends
only in the parameter ∑
j∈N\k
q j
1−q j . This leads to the following decision making:
qk =
⎧⎨
⎩
q˜k, if ∑
j∈N\k
q j
1−q j < 1,
0, otherwise.
(5.3)
68
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:14:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
Lemma 5.3.3. The optimal solution b∗ is of the form b∗ = [1,1, . . .1,0,0, . . .0].
Proof. We will prove this by contradiction. Assume that b˜ = b∗, a vector of k ones (i.e. any vector
where the ones are not placed in the ﬁrst k places), is the throughput optimal binary vector. We can
construct a new vector bˆ = [1,1, . . .1,0,0, . . .0], which has only the ﬁrst k users activated and gives
identical throughput, by deriving the ON-OFF vector qˆ from the corresponding indices of b˜. To
construct such a vector we need to move the rightmost 1, say from position l of the initial vector to an
earlier zero position say m with m < l. Based on Lemma 5.3.2, we can show that by fully activating
or deactivating users (i.e. meeting the constraint with equality or setting access probability to zero),
we receive a new schedule b∗ = bˆ and the corresponding q∗ of increased throughput. This leads us to
a contradiction regarding the optimality of b˜.
Based on the aforementioned lemmas we may derive the centralized Algorithm 4 that yields
the throughput optimal probabilistic strategy and is of linear, in the number of users N, complexity.
The main idea behind this algorithm is that contention may or may not be beneﬁcial, depending on
the energy constraints of the users. Namely, an additional user is useful if and only if the energy
resources of the already active users are not sufﬁciently large, leaving thus the medium underutilized.
An additional user introduces a gain due to the exploitation of the empty frames, but also a loss, due
to the collisions whenever he is concurrently active within a frame with someone else. If the average
gain is greater than the induced loss, it is beneﬁcial for the system to be enabled.
Algorithm 4 Optimal probabilistic frame scheduling
1: Order users in decreasing e˜i. Without loss of generality,
we reassign the indices such that q˜1 ≥ q˜2 ≥ . . .≥ q˜N
2: q ← 0
3: j ← 1
4: while j ≤ N and
j
∑
i=1
qi
1−qi < 1 do
5: q j ← q˜ j
6: j ← j+1
7: end while
Theorem 5.3.1. Algorithm 4 yields the throughput optimal probabilistic strategy.
Proof. The optimality of 4 comes directly from Lemmas 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.
Note that this algorithm gives also the throughput optimal scheduling for the constrained version
of the Aloha problem, where each terminal has an individual constraint on its medium access prob-
ability pi. This is a simpliﬁed version of the problem considered in this work, where no sleep mode
support exists, i.e. qi = 1.
The algorithm above promotes the k less energy constrained users (0≤ k ≤ N depends on actual
constraints) and suppresses the rest. It will only serve as a performance benchmark, since it is a cen-
tralized algorithm that introduces important coordination and fairness issues. In particular, it requires
69
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:14:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
extensive coordination among the users and causes extremely unfair treatment of the users of low
energy budget. Thus, in the following sections we develop algorithms that capture the autonomous
nature of the users and ﬁt to the dynamic distributed environments considered here.
5.3.2 A distributed fair algorithm
In order to capture the notion of proportional fairness we substitute the original objective function
with the following: U(p,q) =
N
∑
i=1
wi log T¯i. The multiplicative factor wi can be used to balance the
throughput among the users of the system at will. For example, the value wi = e˜i∑k∈N e˜k would al-
low us to split the throughput proportionally to the energy budget of the users. By proper refor-
mulation, the objective function can be rewritten as U(p,q) =
N
∑
i=1
log
[
(piqi)wi(1− piqi)1−wi
]
. This
is a separable per user function that leads to a fully distributed implementation, requiring mini-
mal information exchange. Actually the only information required is the value of the total en-
ergy available in the terminals, namely ∑
k∈N
e˜k, information that can be easily acquired. The solu-
tion to this optimization problem, in accordance to Lemma 5.3.1, is of the form I∗ = {1,a} with
a = [min{w1, q˜1} ,min{w2, q˜2} , . . . ,min{wN , q˜N}].
5.3.3 A modiﬁed strategy
Up to now we assumed that each user makes a decision once for his strategy and applies it forever.
As a result, user k whenever active, transmits with pk = 1, independently of the number of active
users within a frame. Thus, whenever two or more users select to transmit within a frame they receive
zero payoff, but consume energy. Based on these observations, a rational player would be expected
to backoff whenever a collision is detected. Although, the terminal is not allowed to switch off in a
crowded frame, due to the switching time overhead incurred, it may reduce its access probability. This
way, it would avoid spending energy on useless transmission that always lead on collisions and could
utilize these savings for pursuing further contention–free frames. Building on this idea we propose
the following modiﬁed strategy.
Any active user attempts a transmission within the ﬁrst timeslot of the current frame. If the
transmission succeeds he selects a medium access probability of pi = 1 and captures the whole frame
successfully. Otherwise he adjusts his strategy, and reduces his transmission probability to p˜i. It can
be shown that this strategy always yields better throughput than the original one. The expressions for
throughput and energy consumption for this case are respectively given by:
T¯i = qi
{
(1− p˜i) ∏
j∈N\i
(1−q j)+ p˜i ∏
j∈N\i
(1− p˜ jq j)
}
(5.4)
E¯i = qi
{
c1+ c2
[
p˜i+(1− p˜i) ∏
j∈N\i
(1−q j)
]}
(5.5)
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Proof. In this approach user i exploits fully each frame where no contention exists and only partially
the ones where competition has been identiﬁed. Thus,
T¯i = qi
{
1 ∏
j∈N\i
(1−q j)+ p˜i ∏
j∈N\i
(1− p˜ jq j)− p˜i ∏
j∈N\i
(1−q j)
}
(5.6)
The ﬁrst term corresponds to the no-contention frames while the second captures the total through-
put derived from empty slots given that the user transmits with probability p˜i. Given that the slots
belonging to an empty frame have been counted twice, we have to remove the third term.
The resulting energy consumption of user i is either due to staying ON or a transmission:
E¯i = qic1+1qi ∏
j∈N\i
(1−q j)c2+ p˜iqi
[
1− ∏
j∈N\i
(1−q j)
]
c2 (5.7)
The ﬁrst term is the energy consumed when the terminal is ON, the second corresponds to transmis-
sion cost in empty frames and the last is the energy consumed in frames where competition has been
identiﬁed.
The complicated throughput and energy expressions for the modiﬁed scenario make the problem
of optimal scheduling analytically intractable. Thus, in order to get insight on the performance of
the modiﬁed strategy, we consider a simpliﬁed version of the problem by restricting the feasible user
strategies. In particular, we assume that all the users of the system can be classiﬁed in one of the
following three groups; the aggressive, the conservative and the passive ones. The former capture
the medium whenever they are active (ON), the second transmit only whenever they sense an empty
frame and the last do not participate at all.
We consider Algorithm 5 that performs a search over the solution subspace. This algorithm is of
exponential complexity and will be used only for comparison purposes. It can be shown that in the
optimal scheduling for our restricted solution space, at least one aggressive and one conservative user
exist. In all the simulation cases that we have tried, this categorization did not to limit the system
performance; nevertheless a formal proof that the optimal solution lies on the restricted subspace
could not be derived.
5.4 Game Theoretic Approach
Previously we derived probabilistic medium access protocols that require coordination of actions of
the users involved. However, in an autonomous setting as the one considered here, individuals may
not comply with the rules imposed by the protocol. Actually, users may exhibit selﬁsh behaviour and
select the strategy that maximizes their own utility, namely their individual throughput, at the expense
of others. Thus, in this section we model the user interaction/contention as a non-cooperative game.
We derive models for both the initial and the modiﬁed scenario.
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Algorithm 5 Modiﬁed optimal probabilistic frame scheduling
1: Search over B = {A,C,P}, i.e. the set of all the possible partitions of N of size 3, with |A| ≥ 1
and |C| ≥ 1 for the throughput optimal assignment:
2: for all i ∈ A (% aggressive) do
3: {p˜i,qi}= {1,min
{
e˜i
c1+c2
,1
}
}
4: end for
5: for all k ∈ C (% conservative) do
6: {p˜k,qk}=
{
0,min
{
e˜i
c1+c2∏ j∈N \k(1−q j) ,1
}}
7: end for
8: for all j ∈ P (% passive) do
9: {p˜ j,q j}= {0,0}
10: end for
A non-cooperative game is deﬁned by a set of players, a set of strategies and a metric that indicates
the preferences of the players over the set of strategies. In our case we have:
• Players: the N users
• Strategies: user’s i set of feasible medium access and ON–OFF probabilities Ii = {pi,qi : E¯i ≤
e˜i and 0≤ pi,qi ≤ 1}
• User preferences: represented by a utility function Ui(Ii); peer i prefers strategy Iˆi to Ii iff
Ui(Iˆi)>Ui(Ii).
5.4.1 The initial scenario as a non-cooperative game of perfect information
For the initial optimization problem (5.2) the utility function of user i is deﬁned as Ui(Ii) = T¯i =
piqi∏ j∈N\i(1− p jq j). It can be easily veriﬁed that the throughput maximizing strategy of each
individual is independent of the actions of the other users and comes as the solution of the following
optimization problem:
maximize
Ii={pi,qi}
piqi
s.t. qi(c1+ c2pi)≤ e˜i
{pi,qi} ∈ [0,1]2
(5.8)
Lemma 5.4.1. The throughput optimal strategy for user i is {pi,qi} =
{
1,min{ e˜ic1+c2 ,1}
}
. The re-
sulting game has a unique Nash Equilibrium Point, described by the strategy I∗ = {1,q∗}, with
q∗i =
e˜i
c1+c2
.
Proof. Since the utility is an increasing function of both pi and qi the energy constraint should be
satisﬁed with equality at the optimum.
The proof is similar in spirit to the one in Lemma 5.3.1. Let {pˆi, qˆi} be the throughput optimal
strategy of user i, with pˆi < 1. From the energy constraint we have qˆi(c1 + c2 pˆi) = e˜i. There exists
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the alternative strategy {p´i, q´i} = {1, pˆiqˆi} of equivalent utility (individual throughput) but of lower
energy consumption. In particular,
q´i(c1+ c2 p´i) = q´i(c1+ c2) = q´i(c1 p´i+ c2 p´i)< e˜i (5.9)
Consequently, there exists δ > 0 such that (q´i+δ )(c1+c2) = e˜i. This strategy {p∗i ,q∗i }= {1, q´i+
δ} obviously yields increased utility for the user, which contradicts the user optimality of {pˆi, qˆi} and
completes our proof. The same result can be derived through the KKT conditions.
Given that the optimal strategy of a user is independent of the actions of the other users and is
determined only by his own energy constraint, deriving the resulting NEP is straightforward.
From the above, we may deduce that at the Nash equilibrium point we receive throughput, only
when a single user is ON in a frame. Given the NEP of the game we may quantify the performance
loss arising due to the selﬁshness of the individuals, by using so called Price of Anarchy (PoA) metric.
This is the ratio of the value of the objective function at the global optimum to its value at the NEP
and in our setting is given by:
PoA=
∑
i∈S
e˜i
c1+ c2
∏
j∈S\i
(1− e˜ j
c1+ c2
)
∑
i∈N
e˜i
c1+ c2
∏
j∈N\i
(1− e˜ j
c1+ c2
)
≥ 1, (5.10)
where S is the set of enabled users at the global optimum.
Whereas in the classic Aloha games the PoA is unbounded, in our energy constrained Aloha
setting the PoA is bounded, since the energy constraints impose a ﬁctitious pricing scheme. The PoA
grows unbounded only when at least two users have unconstrained energy resources. These users
(e.g. power plugged stations) can capture the medium totally and consequently would involuntarily
act as jammers for each other and for all the others, yielding hence zero system throughput.
5.4.2 The modiﬁed strategy as a non-cooperative game of perfect information
Here, we consider the game arising from the modiﬁed strategy. In this setting, we derive a non–
cooperative game of perfect information, where at each iteration, given the parameters α = ∏
j∈N\i
(1−
q j) and β = ∏
j∈N\i
(1− p˜ jq j) a user selects its best response. By best response we mean that each
user updates his decision variables, so as to maximize its utility function, in response to the others’
actions.
Theorem 5.4.1. The best response strategy of user i is given by:
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p˜i =
{
1, if [c1+ c2α]β > (c1+ c2)α,
0, otherwise.
(5.11)
qi =
e˜i
c1+ c2 [p˜i+(1− p˜i)α] (5.12)
The arising modiﬁed game has multiple NEPs.
Proof. Since the utility is an increasing function of p˜i and qi, the constraint needs to be satisﬁed with
equality. Thus, we may replace qi from eq. 5.5 into the throughput expression, namely eq. 5.4. Then,
the partial derivative of the objective function is given by the following expression:
∂ T¯
∂ p˜i
= e˜i
[β −α] [c1+ c2α]− c2α[1−α]
{c1+ c2 [p˜i+(1− p˜i)α]}2
= e˜i
[c1+ c2α]β − (c1+ c2)α
{c1+ c2 [p˜i+(1− p˜i)α]}2
The sign of this expression depends only on α = ∏
j∈N\i
(1− q j) and β = ∏
j∈N\i
(1− p˜ jq j). As a
result given the actions of the other users, the objective function is either a strictly increasing or a
strictly decreasing function of p˜i. Thus, the best response strategy of user i is given by eq. 5.12.
5.5 Numerical Results
In order to quantify the throughput performance of the proposed schemes we perform extensive sim-
ulations of a small, easy to follow system. We consider a scenario of N = 5 terminals with energy
constraints given by e˜ = [30,25,15,10,5] and {c1,c2}= {50,70} units. By abusing slightly the def-
inition of PoA, we use the modiﬁed optimal as the performance benchmark and for each scheme we
derive the performance ratio metric deﬁned as:
Performance ratioX =
Throughput of modiﬁed optimal
Throughput of scheme X
(5.13)
Thus, all the ﬁgures depict the performance degradation in comparison to the modiﬁed optimal.
Since the modiﬁed game has several NEPs we depict the PoA i.e. the ratio of the throughput at the
optimum to the throughput at the worst NEP, the price of stability (PoS) i.e. the ratio of the throughput
at the optimum to the throughput at the best NEP, and the mean performance at the NEPs. Regarding
the initial setting, we depict the performance degradation of the original optimal, the fair approach
and the initial game theoretic scheme.
Initially, we consider how the energy budget of the less energy constrained user affects the
performance of the system as a whole. In Figure 5.2 we see that the additional power budget in-
creases the performance degradation due to the additional collisions caused. The system stabilizes
for e˜1 = c1+c2, where user 1 has sufﬁcient energy budget to capture medium entirely on his own. We
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Figure 5.2: The throughput performance of the system as an expression of the less energy constrained
user
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Figure 5.3: The throughput performance of the system as the total energy budget of the system in-
creases
notice also that the modiﬁed strategy, of backing off whenever a collision is detected, provides sig-
niﬁcant performance beneﬁts. The improvement is becoming more signiﬁcant as the available energy
budget increases.
In Figure 5.3 we depict the system performance as we relax the energy constraints of every ter-
minal. We start from the energy budget vector of e˜ = [30,25,15,10,5] and increase each dimension
by 5 within each iteration. The x axis refers to the e˜1 value, whereas the whole vector is given by
e˜ = [e˜1, e˜1−5, e˜1−15, e˜1−20, e˜1−25]. In this scenario, one may notice the beneﬁts that arise from
the coordination among the terminals. The coordinated approaches are robust again the increased
availability of energy, whereas in the game theoretic approaches this leads to an increased number of
collisions, due to the increased aggressiveness of the users.
Next, we consider the impact of the transmission cost c2. We notice in Figure 5.4 that in a
scenario of low energy constraints the increased transmission cost makes the users less aggressive,
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Figure 5.4: The throughput performance of the system as an expression of the transmission cost
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Figure 5.5: The throughput performance of the system an expression of the number N of competing
terminals
leading thus to reduced collisions and consequently the performance gap among the coordinated and
the game theoretic approaches diminishes. Nevertheless, the performance gap of the initial and the
modiﬁed strategy remains more than 40% throughout.
Finally, we investigate the impact of the number of competing users on the performance at the
resulting equilibria (Figure 5.5). Starting from a system of only two competing users with energy
constraints e˜= [5,10] we keep adding in each iteration a single terminal of increasing energy budget.
Thus, newcomer i is characterized by energy constraint e˜i = 5i. As expected the introduction of
additional users increases competition for the medium and leads to more collisions. Consequently,
the performance of the game theoretic approaches deteriorates very fast, whereas the coordinated
approaches exhibit signiﬁcant robustness.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we pursued a better understanding of the energy–throughput tradeoff for mobile de-
vices that support sleep modes and operate according to contention medium access schemes. Initially,
we derived the throughput optimal strategy of probabilistic medium access under energy constraints.
Next, in order to capture the autonomous nature of mobile terminals we developed game theoretic
models. Compared to the unconstrained case, we showed that energy constraints reduce contention
and enable better exploitation of the medium.
We observed that due to lack of coordination, distance from the optimal strategy (i.e. PoA)
tends to increase as energy availability increases. In order to counteract this, we developed a simple
modiﬁed medium access scheme, where the contention state of the medium can be sampled within
a frame by the competing stations. The modiﬁed scheme implicitly coordinates the actions of the
terminals and leads to even better exploitation of the limited energy resources.
In this work, we have assumed non–cooperative games of perfect information. The scenario
where each involved entity has only a subjective belief on its opponents’ strategies is an interesting
topic of future study. Besides, mechanism design could be considered as a means of driving the
system to more efﬁcient equilibrium points, e.g. by penalizing users that exhibit extremely aggressive
behaviour.
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Chapter 6
Energy Efﬁciency at the Wireless
Network Level: Interference-Aware
Relay Selection and Power Control
Algorithms
In this chapter, we consider an interference-limited wireless network, where multiple energy-constrained
mobile devices form source-destination pairs, communicate over the same channel and compete for a
pool of relay nodes. In an attempt to maximize sum-rate of the system, we address the joint problem
of relay assignment and power control.
Initially, we study the autonomous scenario, where each source greedily selects the strategy (trans-
mission power and relay) that maximizes its individual rate, leading to a simple one-shot algorithm
of linear complexity. Then, we propose a more sophisticated algorithm of polynomial complexity
that is amenable to distributed implementation through appropriate message passing. We evaluate the
sum-rate performance of the proposed algorithms and derive conditions for optimality.
We also provide guidelines on how our algorithms can be applied in 4G OFDMA systems. Our
schemes incorporate two of the basic features of the LTE-Advanced broadband cellular system,
namely interference management and relaying.
6.1 Introduction to Cooperative Communications
Cooperative communications exploit the broadcast nature of the wireless medium by using interme-
diate nodes as relays. Thus, a virtual Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) system is formed,
realizing the beneﬁts of spatial diversity even when each node is equipped with a single transceiver
[73].
In infrastructure-based wireless networks, strategically placed relays are part of the network in-
frastructure. Relays are generally used to extend coverage and enhance throughput with minimum
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deployment cost. Although multihop communications require additional radio resources (frequency
channels or time slots), relaying reduces the path loss signiﬁcantly, by shortening the propagation
path. This gain is maximized whenever a non line-of-sight (NLOS) path from a transmitter to the
intended receiver is split, through an intermediate relay, into two line-of-sight (LOS) links. The
relay nodes also create diverse paths that mitigate the effects of fading during the transmission of
data from the source to destination. Finally, relaying may also increase capacity by enabling spatial
reuse, allowing thus multiple transmissions to take place simultaneously in the same frequency/time
slot throughout a cell, as shown in [74]. However, in such scenarios interference management is of
crucial importance.
In this work, we consider the interference-limited environment that arises when multiple unicast
communications take place over the same physical channel. Our network consists of communicating
sources and destinations and idle nodes that may serve as relays. In this setting, we study relay se-
lection and power control as the main mechanisms of achieving the maximum sum-rate performance
for the system. We derive easy to implement heuristic algorithms that require minimal information
exchange. The proposed algorithms are ideal for scenarios where the resource allocation decisions
need to be made fast e.g. due to rapidly changing channel conditions. We also derive algorithms of
polynomial complexity that coordinate the actions of the terminals and exhibit near optimal perfor-
mance.
The difﬁculty of the problem under consideration lies on the following:
i. Interference couples relay selection and power control.
ii. Due to interference, the selected transmission power of any single device affects all the others
iii. The ﬁrst and second hop transmission rates are coupled, since the achievable rate of the bottle-
neck link determines the maximum end-to-end rate.
In order to deal with these challenges, ﬁrst we assume that each source is agnostic of relays,
i.e. transmits without knowing whether a relay will be used to assist its transmission. Since rate is
an increasing function of transmission power, everyone is expected to transmit at maximum power
to achieve the maximum individual rate. However, later we relax this assumption, by introducing a
protocol that allows sources and relays to coordinate their actions in an attempt to improve the total
rate of the system.
The contributions of this work are the following:
1. We develop lightweight resource allocation algorithms (of at most polynomial complexity),
amenable to distributed implementation and applicable to any relay assisted network (from
ad-hoc to infrastructure-based ones) and any relaying strategy.
2. We derive conditions for the optimality of the proposed algorithms and characterize their impact
on the sum-rate performance of the system.
3. We present a case study for the LTE-Advanced system, indicating the applicability of our pro-
posed algorithms and the performance beneﬁts derived.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides an overview of existing works in
the ﬁeld. In Section 6.3 we present our system model and the assumptions made. In Section 6.4
we describe our relay selection and power control algorithms and derive conditions for optimality.
Section 6.5 describes how our proposed algorithms can be applied in the LTE-Advanced framework.
Numerical results quantifying the performance of our proposed schemes are presented in Section 6.6
for an interference-limited ad-hoc network and an LTE-Advanced scenario. Section 6.7 concludes
our study.
6.2 Related Work
Several relaying strategies have been proposed with Amplify and Forward (AaF) and Decode and For-
ward (DaF) being the most common ones [75]. In the former, the relay acts as a repeater, amplifying
the received signal (noise included) in the analog domain, whereas in DaF the relay decodes the re-
ceived signal, re-encodes it and forwards it to the destination. Regardless of the strategy applied, the
performance of cooperative communications highly depends on the allocation of network resources,
namely the relay assignment and power control at transmitter side.
In this direction, the authors of [76] propose an iterative relay selection algorithm with a max-min
fairness objective, where out of the relays that lead to improved minimum capacity, the best one is
selected. After some iterations of reassignments, the proposed algorithm converges to the optimal
assignment. In [77] the problems of relay selection and power allocation are modeled as auctions,
where each user makes best response bids in an attempt to maximize its utility and the relay allocates
its transmission power according to the bids. This leads to a distributed algorithm that converges to a
Nash equilibrium point. The same resource allocation problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game in
[78], where sources are the buyers and relays serve as sellers. A relative problem, that of scheduling
users over multiple OFDM carriers in relay-enabled networks, is addressed in [79].
The signiﬁcance of relay selection is indicated by the recent interest of the research community in
relaying for next generation wireless systems. A practical system that beneﬁts from the introduction
of relay nodes is the 802.16j that was recently ﬁnalized in [80]. Besides, LTE-Advanced and IEEE
802.16m (under development [81, 82]) consider the use of relays so as to meet the 4G performance
requirements described by IMT-Advanced, especially for users located close to the cell edge. All
these systems are based on orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) schemes for the
downlink, mitigating thus the effects of intersymbol interference (ISI) and providing robustness to
frequency selective fading.
A scenario of a single 802.16 cell consisting of a Base Station (BS), several infrastructure Relay
Stations (RS) and Mobile Stations (MS) uniformly distributed within a cell is considered in [83]. The
authors of this paper show that in the downlink, when the relays operate in transparent mode, i.e. just
forward data but take no synchronization or control decisions, signiﬁcant throughput improvement
appears only for the half of the cell coverage area. In a similar setting [84] quantiﬁes the tradeoff
between coverage extension and capacity increase that relays can offer through spatial reuse.
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Most of the works in the ﬁeld of cooperative communications assume that the transmissions take
place over orthogonal channels. In TDMA, OFDMA and CDMA for example, interference is caused
only by transmitters using the same time slot, frequency channel and spreading code respectively.
However, due to the scarcity of channel resources, in an attempt to improve spectrum efﬁciency, fre-
quency reuse is very common in practice. For example, in cellular systems neighboring cells tend
to use the same channels. Most existing works either consider this interference negligible or handle
it as noise. Strong interference may appear though, whenever adjacent cells transmit over the same
time/frequency to users located almost in the same location. The impact of interference becomes even
more signiﬁcant when the coverage areas of neighboring BSs overlap. In such cases proper interfer-
ence management is of crucial importance, requires though extensive cooperation among the BSs for
the relay selection and frequency allocation. The most straightforward way to tackle interference is
transmission power control.
It was only recently that the standardization committees recognized inter-cell interference as one
of the primary limiting factors of the performance of current cellular systems and set interference
management as one of the major research directions for the next generation communication systems.
In this direction, the authors of [85] propose a heuristic power allocation scheme, where each relay
selects its power so as to achieve a minimum bit error requirement and minimize the interference
caused. Work [86] investigates the performance of several emerging half-duplex relay strategies
in interference-limited cellular systems. In [87] a message passing based algorithm for distributed
power control and scheduling in a line network is proposed and is shown to be optimal for the K-hop
interference model.
6.3 System Model
We consider a wireless network of N sources, N destinations and K intermediate nodes. The latter
are not communicating within the time of interest and hence can serve as relays for the active com-
munication pairs. All nodes are arbitrarily located in a plane. We denote with S = {S1,S2, . . .SN} the
set of sources, D = {D1,D2, . . .DN} the set of destination nodes and R = {R1,R2, . . .RK} the set of
potential relays. Sets S, R and D are disjoint sets. We consider only point-to-point (unicast) com-
munications with {Si,Di} deﬁning communication pair i. Each source has always queued packets
to transmit to the corresponding receiver and may transmit them either directly to the destination or
through a relay. All the transmissions take place in the same frequency channel and thus interference
has to be taken into consideration.
Each node has a single transceiver and consequently, simultaneous transmission and reception
is not feasible. Thus, communication is half-duplex i.e. each frame consists of two timeslots of
ﬁxed and equal duration of T/2 time units each. In the ﬁrst slot, the sources transmit and the relays
overhear the transmission. During the second one, each relay forwards the received signal to the
proper destination. Here, for simplicity we assume that the two timeslots are of equal duration.
Another option would be to set the relative duration of the timeslots, such that for each Source-Relay-
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Figure 6.1: A network of N = 3 communication pairs and K = 2 relays
Destination link, equal amount of information is transferred through the two hops. However, such
a scheme would require extensive coordination among the transmitters in order to synchronize their
transmissions. An analysis of the scenario of unequal timeslots is presented in [88], but for the case
of orthogonal channels, where no interference exists.
We use G, H and Q to denote the source-relay, relay-destination and source-destination channel
gain matrices respectively. For example, element GSiRk captures fading, path loss and antenna gains
of the link between nodes Si and Rk. We assume that the transmission frame length is small compared
to the channel coherence time and as a result all channel gains can be considered ﬁxed during the time
of interest. We depict in Fig. 6.1 an indicative such network.
In this general setting, we would like to ﬁnd the assignment a = [a1,a2, . . . ,aN ]T of the relays
to the sources and the transmission power of the sources pS = [pS1 , pS2 , . . . , pSN ]
T and the relays
pR = [pR1 , pR2 , . . . , pRK ]
T that maximize the end-to-end rate of the system. We assume a maximum
transmission power constraint for each transmitter. Without loss of generality, we assume that all
nodes are characterized by the same maximum transmission power pmax and the assignments are
described by:
ai =
{
Rk, if relay Rk is assigned to source Si
0, no relay assigned (direct transmission).
(6.1)
We mention here that we do not consider the scenario where multiple relays assist a single source.
Nevertheless, we allow the same relay to be assigned to more than one sources. In this case some
form of scheduling is required.
Our ultimate objective can be formally written as
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maximize
pS,pR,a
∑
i∈S
raiSi
s.t. 0≤ pSi ≤ pmax ∀Si ∈ S
0≤ pRj ≤ pmax ∀Rj ∈R.
(6.2)
The expression of raiSi , the end-to-end rate of source node Si assisted by relay ai, depends also on
the strategy that the relay applies, with Decode and Forward (DaF), Amplify and Forward (AaF) and
Compress and Forward (CaF) being the most common ones. Regardless of the strategy used, the rate
is an expression of the following form:
raiSi = f (SINRSiDi ,SINRSiai ,SINRaiDi). (6.3)
We use the notation Kab to denote a parameter K referring to link a→ b, where a is the transmitter
and b the receiver. Thus, the signal to interference ratio (SINR) at relay ai, when it decodes the
transmission of source Si is denoted as SINRSiai and is given by:
SINRSiai =
GSiai pSi
∑
l∈S\Si
Glai pl +σ
2
ai
, (6.4)
where σ2ai is the variance of the zero mean noise in the receiver of the relay. Obviously, if no relay is
used, the achievable rate depends only on the SINR of the direct link, i.e. the ﬁrst term of (6.3).
In this work, we mainly focus on a DaF scenario where only the sources transmit within the ﬁrst
timeslot. Then, each relay decodes the signal and re-encodes it. Within the second timeslot only the
relays transmit, forwarding the signal to the respective destination. In the end, each destination has to
retrieve the transmitted information out of the received signal. We assume that a destination decodes
either the signal received from the respective relay or the direct signal, if no relay is used, leading to
the following end-to-end rate expression:
raiSi = max
{
r0Si ,min{rSiai ,raiDi}
}
(6.5)
=
W
2
log2
(
1+max
{
SINRSiDi ,min{SINRSiai ,SINRaiDi}
})
,
where W is the channel bandwidth. Here, we have assumed that the sources transmit only during the
ﬁrst timeslot, leaving hence the second one for the relay transmissions, which results to the 1/2 factor.
However, this assumption may be easily relaxed. In order to improve the achievable decoding rate at
the destination, but at the cost of increased complexity, maximal ratio combining can be applied at
the receiver similarly to [75, 76]. If no relay is used, the destination will decode the signal coming
directly from the source, or the combination of signals received from the respective source and relay
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otherwise. Then, the achievable rate would be:
raiSi =
W
2
log2
(
1+max
{
SINRSiDi ,min{SINRSiai ,SINRSiDi +SINRaiDi}
})
. (6.6)
6.4 Relay Assignment and Power Control in Interference-limited Envi-
ronments
In order to solve the optimization problem (6.2), we need to calculate the transmission powers at
the sources and the relays, and the relay assignment that maximize the system-wide sum-rate perfor-
mance. These two problems are strongly coupled, since the optimality of a relay assignment depends
on the selected transmission powers and vice versa. Consequently, solving it even in a centralized
way is particularly challenging. Initially, we decouple these two operations, by solving the two prob-
lems in an iterative way, i.e. for a given an transmission power allocation we derive the optimal relay
assignment and then we derive optimal power allocation for the resulting assignment.
Given others’ powers, the rate of a node is an increasing function of its transmission power.
Hence, a natural starting point is to assume that all sources transmit at maximum power in an attempt
to maximize their individual rate. We also consider fully cooperative relays, that transmit at maximum
power in order to forward the signals to the destinations. Since we do not consider any power budget
constraints, which would restrict the willingness of the relays to forward messages in order to save
energy. Thus, the initial power allocation is p0S = p
0
R = pmax.
6.4.1 The relay selection problem
If we assume full Channel State Information (CSI) at the transmitter, the problem of ﬁnding the op-
timal relay assignment is of exponential in the number of sources complexity, namely O
(
(K+1)N
)
,
since each source has K+1 choices, either to transmit through one of the K relays or directly to the
destination. However, any schedule, where a relay is assigned to more than one sources cannot be
sum-rate optimal.
Remark 6.4.1. The sum-rate optimal assignment is a matching from the set of sources S to the set of
relays R.
Proof. We will prove this by contradiction. Assume that the sum-rate r˜ achieved by an assignment
where more than one sources, say {S1,S2, . . . ,Sl} use the relay Rk is optimal. Since each relay has
a single transceiver and operates over a speciﬁc channel a time sharing schedule has to be applied.
Given the randomness of the channel gains the probability that any two of these sources achieve equal
rates, i.e. rRkSi = r
Rk
S j is zero. As a result the rates are ordered, with say r
Rk
Si having the largest value.
Thus, if instead of having the relay being shared by all these sources, we assign it to user Si we get
a r∗ > r˜. Consequently no assignment, where a relay is assigned to more than one sources, can be
sum-rate optimal .
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This way the complexity of the problem is reduced, but remains exponential. In this work we aim
to develop distributed protocols that can guarantee near optimal performance in at most polynomial
time.
From the rate expressions above, we notice that even under full CSI at the transmitter, the sources
are ignorant of the CSI of the second hop, and consequently cannot identify whether using a relay is
beneﬁcial. However, they can exclude some relays, which compared to direct transmission cannot of-
fer any rate improvement. Generally, each source Si is able to categorize relays in two sets, namely the
bad ones BSi = {Rk : SINRSiDi ≥ SINRSiRk} and the unknown ones USi = {Rk : SINRSiDi < SINRSiRk}.
The ﬁrst one includes all the relays, which cannot improve the performance of source Si, whereas no
decision can be made a priori for the relays in the latter one, since the achievable rate depends also
on second hop parameters. As a result, each source has to make a guess on which relay may offer the
maximum rate. In this direction, we devise the following alternatives.
One-shot greedy algorithm
Each source greedily selects the relay that is expected to maximize its own rate. That is, assuming
full CSI at each source for its links to the relays, the source selects out of USi the relay that has the
best ﬁrst hop performance, or none if USi = /0. This relay selection can be formally described as:
ai = arg max
k∈{R∪0}
rˆkSi
= argmax
k∈R
{SINRSiDi ,SINRSik} (6.7)
We use the hat to denote that this is an estimation of the actual achievable rate, based only on the
ﬁrst hop. Whenever a relay k is selected by two or more sources, since a relay within one timeslot
cannot decode and forward more than one signal (see previous remark), it will forward the one that
achieves the best rate, i.e. the strongest signal.
This myopic relay selection approach is of linear complexity and is expected to yield suboptimal
assignments, whenever the performance of the second hop is the limiting factor. Due to lack of
coordination this scheme may also yield suboptimal assignments even if all ﬁrst hop channels are
worse than the corresponding second hop ones. Since each source Si either uses its best candidate
relay out of USi or none (direct transmission to the destination), whenever a relay is selected by two
or more sources, useful relays may remain unassigned and the diversity gain is not fully exploited.
Remark 6.4.2. Whenever i) the achievable rates in the ﬁrst hop links are smaller than the corre-
sponding second hop ones (i.e. the ﬁrst hop is the bottleneck) for all the communication pairs, and
ii) the greedy algorithm returns an assignment where no relay is selected by more than one source,
this is the optimal assignment. In this case the optimal assignment is a maximum matching of size |S|
from the set of sources S to the set R∪D.
Other possible strategies that we do not consider in this work are either the unassigned sources
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Figure 6.2: The bipartite graph that we use to model the relay assignment as a MWM problem
not to transmit at all or the unassigned sources by using a marking mechanism to select the best out
of the remaining relays through subsequent rounds. Alternatively, relays could decide on their own
which signal to forward.
In the proposed approach each source acts for itself and no coordination of actions exists. Next,
we propose an alternative algorithm that enforces the cooperation of the nodes through appropriate
message exchanges.
Bipartite Maximum Weighted Matching (MWM) approach
The relay selection problem can be mapped into the problem of ﬁnding the maximum weighted
matching in a properly constructed complete bipartite graph G = {S,R,E}, as the one shown in
Fig. 6.2, where the weights of the edges are given by wSiRk = r
Rk
Si . If the interference in the receiver of
each link is known, then these weights can be easily calculated.
As previously mentioned, we assume that each node selects its transmission power without con-
sidering the interference it causes. Then, interference in the ﬁrst hop can be easily estimated through
appropriate pilot transmissions. However, the interference in the second hop cannot be known a pri-
ori, since it depends on which relays will be selected to forward data. Thus, interference at each
destination cannot be estimated prior to the relay assignment. Besides, without an estimation of in-
terference we cannot calculate the achievable rate in the second hop. To overcome this, we adopt a
conservative approach and assume that in the optimal assignment all the relays are used. Notice that
this approach may lead to an overestimation of actual interference.
Under this assumption, the distributed algorithm of [89] can be applied to ﬁnd the maximum
weighted matching. The relays and the sources exchange messages and ﬁnally after O
(
max(N,K)
)
iterations we converge to the optimal assignment. However, this algorithm has some limitations that
should be taken into account. First of all, it works only on balanced bipartite graphs. Thus, in order to
turn our graph into a balanced one, we need to introduce |N−K| virtual nodes, either on the left side
(virtual sources) with zero weights, if N < K, or on the right side (virtual relays) of the graph with
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wSiRk = r
0
Si otherwise. Secondly, it converges only when the maximum weighted matching is unique.
To guarantee this, we have to add inﬁnitesimal random values εi (disturbances) into the weight of
each link, making thus any previously equally weighted matchings, ordered.
Next, we derive conditions for the optimality of the MWM algorithm.
Remark 6.4.3. With high probability, i.e. with probability going to 1 as the number of sources over
the number of relays goes to inﬁnity (NK → ∞), our MWM algorithm ﬁnds the optimal assignment.
Proof. Whenever in the optimal assignment every relay is assigned to a source, all the relays will
eventually transmit. Consequently, the interference estimation that we made for the second hop will
be accurate and the MWM will return the optimal assignment. As NK → ∞ every source can ﬁnd a
relay to improve its rate performance leading thus to a perfect matching.
Starting from the initial power allocation p0S, p
0
R, these algorithms can ﬁnd an assignment of
the available relays to the sources. Given this, we may then modify the transmission powers of the
sources and the relays in an attempt to maximize the sum-rate. In the following section we propose
two alternatives for the power control part.
6.4.2 The power control problem
Given relay assignment a, we have to ﬁnd the optimal transmission powers for the sources and the
relays. In this direction, we propose heuristic power control that attempts to equalize the rates of the
ﬁrst and the second hop and one based on high-SINR approximation.
Rate equalization algorithm (Req)
In our setting, we have two apparently independent steps of power control, one in the ﬁrst and one
in the second hop. Nevertheless, they are coupled, since the rate of both hops have to be equal. If
rSiai > raiDi , the relay cannot forward the data to the destination at the rate they are transmitted by the
source. Thus, we say that for this transmission pair the 1st hop is the bottleneck link. On the other
hand, if rSiai < raiDi , the transmission rate of the relay cannot be fully utilized, leading to a bottleneck
in the second hop.
As a result, for the given relay assignment and starting from initial power vectors p0S, p
0
R, sources
and relays should iteratively update their transmission powers to match the rate of the other hop.
However, since increasing the transmission power, also increases interference, something that may
lead us to worse sum-rate performance, the rate equalization process should be applied only in the
non-bottleneck links, leading the transmitters to reduce their transmission power. That is, for each
source-relay assignment where rSiai > raiDi source Si will reduce its transmission power to match the
rate of the second hop. Otherwise, the corresponding relay will have to reduce its transmission power.
The proposed heuristic for each communication pair is formally described in Algorithm 6.
If we apply this iteratively and since power adaptation is always a power reduction we get a
contraction mapping and convergence to a stationary point is guaranteed.
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Algorithm 6 Rate equalization step for communication pair i
if rSiai ≥ raiDi then
pt+1Si = y such that rSiai(y) = raiDi(p
t
R)
else
pt+1ai = z such that raiDi(z) = rSiai(p
t
S)
end if
Joint source and relay power control algorithm (JsrPC)
The problem of sum-rate maximization through power control has been extensively studied for single
hop networks. Although it has not been solved yet due to its nonconvex nature, several approxima-
tions have been proposed. The authors of [90] proposed the approximation log(1+SINR) ≈ SINR
for the low SINR regime. On the other hand, in [91] a distributed algorithm that converges geometri-
cally fast was proposed for the power control in the high SINR regime, based on the approximation
log(1+SINR)≈ logSINR.
In our two-hop scenario the rates of the ﬁrst and the second hop have to be equal. Thus, we may
modify the aforementioned algorithms by incorporating the additional constraint rSiai = raiDi for each
communication pair i. To achieve this we may apply unconstrained power control on either hop, say
the second one, and then a constrained one on the other. If we apply the unconstrained power control
in the relay hop in timeslot t, the transmission powers of the sources for the high SINR regime will
be given by:
pt+1Si = min
{⎛⎜⎜⎝ ∑
k∈S\Si
GSiak
∑
l∈S\Sk
GSlak p
t
Sl +σ
2
ak
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
−1
, y such that rSiai(y) = raiDi(p
t
R), pmax
}
(6.8)
Here, the ﬁrst term corresponds to the actual control of transmission power as described in [91].
The second term corresponds to the constraint introduced by the fact that increasing the rate of the
source-relay link beyond the rate of the relay-destination link is meaningless. This is actually an
incorporation of the Req algorithm (see Algorithm 6). The third term corresponds to the physical
limitation of maximum transmission power pmax that we assumed for every node of the system.
Next, we derive conditions for the optimality of the JsrPC algorithm.
Remark 6.4.4. In the high SINR regime (i.e. SINR>> 1) the JsrPC algorithm yields the optimal
power allocation whenever the bottleneck is in the same hop for all the communication pairs.
Any combination of the aforementioned algorithms along with some control messages can lead
to the design of distributed protocols of at most polynomial complexity.
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Figure 6.3: The cellular structure of an LTE-Advanced system
6.5 Relay Selection and Power Control in the context of LTE-Advanced
The cellular downlink (uplink) communication scenario, where all the logical transmitters (receivers)
reside in the same physical entity, namely the Base Station, comes as a special case of the previously
described system model. In this section we focus on the downlink of the upcoming LTE-Advanced
system. Such a system is depicted in Fig. 6.3.
Cellular relay-assisted networks can be thought of as a multilevel hierarchical tree structure. The
BS lies at the highest level, being the root, the RSs are organized in the intermediate levels and the
MSs are the leaves. Thus, each downlink communication can be represented as a top-down path
starting from the root, whereas the uplink takes place the reverse way. Here, we consider a two-hop
downlink scenario consisting only of a single level of relays, which is also the case for LTE-Advanced.
Nevertheless, the analysis performed here can be easily extended to the uplink.
In contrast to the generic scenario described earlier, here relays are infrastructure nodes, strategi-
cally placed, either to serve cell edge users or in places where coverage holes appear, and much fewer
in number than the MSs. Besides, since communications within a cell take place over orthogonal
subcarriers, only inter-cell interference is apparent. Thus, now each BS has to decide how to assign
the relays to the MSs, and how to allocate the subcarriers to the communication pairs.
From the point of view of the BS, it is easily deduced that in order to maximize the downlink
throughput of the cell, it will allocate all the available subcarriers. Thus, for the ﬁrst timeslot the BS
has to assign every single subcarrier to a receiver, which may be either an RS or an MS. If we assume
that the subcarrier allocation is performed in an end-to-end path basis, i.e. the subcarriers used in the
ﬁrst timeslot for communication with relay Rk, are used in the second timeslot only by the same relay
for transmission to the corresponding MS, the problem of relay selection and power control for each
subcarrier can be mapped to our original problem.
If we focus on a single subcarrier, the sources of interference are the transmitters of the adjacent
cells that use the same subcarrier, namely BSs during the ﬁrst hop and either BSs and / or relays
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Figure 6.4: A cellular system of 7 cells, with the central one having N = 3 mobiles and K = 2 relays
during the second hop. Besides, in this setting no contention for the available relays exists among the
BSs, since each one can only use the relays within its cell. In other words for each BSi there exists a
set of relays Ri that can be used, but all these are disjoint sets. A representation of this structure for a
single subcarrier, the SC1, is shown in Fig. 6.4. From this ﬁgure it is obvious that for each subcarrier
and each BS a proper bipartite graph like the one depicted in Fig. 6.2 can be created . Then, the relay
selection algorithms of the previous section can be directly applied in this graph. The proposed power
control algorithms are also directly applicable to this new setting, with the only difference being the
sources of interference. However, in the cellular networks all the resource allocation decisions are
made by the BS. Thus, the distributed versions developed earlier are needless. Instead centralized
approaches should be applied like the well known Hungarian algorithm for MWM [92].
We saw earlier that in order to maximize the beneﬁts of cooperative communications, the source
(the BS in our case) has to be aware of the physical layer conditions for the BS-RS, BS-MS and
RS-MS links. In LTE-Advanced such information can be acquired through the CSI-reference signals
(CSI-RS), which estimate the condition of a channel and assist the beamforming and scheduling deci-
sions. CSI-RSs are transmitted in every kth subframe, with k being conﬁgurable. In our scenario the
BS needs also to know the interference caused by the adjacent cells. This can be realized through the
Relative Narrowband TX Power (RNTP) indicator, which is transmitted by each BS to its neighbors
through the X2 interface.
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6.6 Numerical Results
In this section we present some simulation results for the generic scenario of an interference-limited
ad-hoc network. We also simulate a cellular network, similar to the upcoming LTE-Advanced, in
order to get some insight on the relative performance of the proposed schemes.
6.6.1 The generic scenario
For the following simulations we assume a speciﬁc number of nodes, uniformly distributed over a
given q×q square area. We use the channel gain function
GSiRk(dSiRk) = [max(dSiRk ,d0)]
−β , (6.9)
where dSiRk denotes the distance of Si and Rk, and d0 the radius around the transmitter where unit gain
is assumed to hold. In the following experiments we assume d0 = 1,a path loss coefﬁcient of β = 2,
maximum power (pmax) and bandwidth (W ) equal to 1 and white Gaussian noise (AWGN) of zero
mean and variance 0.01.
In an attempt to quantify the performance loss due to the decoupling of relay selection and power
control, we ﬁrst consider a simple motivating example of two communication pairs and one relay,
all randomly located within a square. For such a small network we can also derive the joint relay
selection and power control optimal solution. In Fig. 6.5(a) we depict the impact of side length
q on the sum-rate performance of the system. As side length q increases, the average distance of
any two nodes increases and transmissions experience higher path loss. As expected the polynomial
approach performs signiﬁcantly better than the lower-complexity greedy approach. Generally though,
all proposed schemes outperform the option of direct transmission.
In such a simple network, relay assignment is quite trivial, leading thus to identical sum-rate
performance for the greedy and the MWM approach. Furthermore, applying the Req algorithm has
no signiﬁcant impact, since no interference exists in the second timeslot. On the other hand, applying
the JsrPC algorithm, which combines the MWM relay selection with power control the performance
is improved towards the optimum solution, especially for small distances where the gain from the
interference mitigation is more signiﬁcant.
However, in the previous setting, at least for small distances the interference is signiﬁcant, making
the assumption of high SINR regime not valid. Thus, we consider a high SINR scenario where the
two communication pairs lie on the vertices of a square and the relay is randomly placed within
the square. In Fig. 6.5(b) we depict the impact of side length q, i.e. the distance separating the
two communication pairs. As expected here the proposed algorithms perform signiﬁcantly better,
exhibiting near optimal performance. We mention that all the values depicted are mean values of at
least 1000 simulation runs.
In order to demonstrate scalability of the proposed algorithms, we consider larger scale random
topologies consisting of N = 15 sources. We investigate the impact of the number of relays K on
performance. We expect that up to a point as the number of available relays increases, better sum-rate
92
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:14:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
0 5 10 15 20
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
Side length q
S
um
 R
at
e
(a) Generic SINR
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
Side length q
S
um
 R
at
e
Greedy (no PC)
Greedy + Req
MWM (no PC)
MWM + Req
MWM + JsrPC
Direct Transmissions
Optimal
(b) High SINR regime
Figure 6.5: Sum-rate performance (for different SINR regimes) vs. Side length q of the square area
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Figure 6.6: Sum-rate performance for 15 sources inside a square of side length q vs. Number of
Relays K
performance can be achieved. However, this is not always the case for our algorithms.
The greedy approach makes a myopic decision based only on the ﬁrst hop. On the other hand,
MWM relay selection overestimates interference in the second hop, when the optimal assignment
leaves some relays unused. Thus, we expect worse performance as the number of relays K gets larger
than N, something evident in Fig. 6.6(a). Here, the small side length q maximizes the impact of in-
terference overestimation, because the redundant terms have large values (due to high channel gains).
Nevertheless, compared to direct–transmissions, it is evident that our relay selection algorithms ex-
ploit the beneﬁts of cooperative diversity. Furthermore, the proposed power control schemes improve
the achievable sum-rate in general. However, since all transmissions take place in the same channel,
and we are considering a dense network, we lie in the extremely low SINR regime, where the JsrPC
provides only marginal beneﬁts.
In Fig. 6.6(b) we increase the side length q, which also causes path-loss to increase. Here, we
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Figure 6.7: The impact of number of relays K on sum-rate performance of 20 mobiles located in a
cell
observe that the performance beneﬁt from relaying becomes more signiﬁcant. Besides, this leads
us to an environment of less interference, where the power control algorithms perform signiﬁcantly
better. Through proper relay selection and power control the achievable sum-rate gain approaches
100%. Finally, here increasing the number of available relays does not degrade performance losses,
since due to increased pathloss most of the relays are beneﬁcial.
6.6.2 The LTE-Advanced scenario
In this section, we study the applicability of the proposed algorithms on a LTE-Advanced scenario.
We consider a system of 7 cells, one located in the center and its six direct neighbors, as the one
depivted in Fig. 6.3. Each cell has a radius of 3km, the RSs are deterministically placed in a distance
of 1.5km from the BS, so that cell edge users beneﬁt the most and 20 MSs are randomly placed within
each cell.
Given that OFDM is used in the downlink of LTE-Advanced, interference is only apparent from
neighboring cells. We consider a system of 32 data subcarriers sharing a total bandwidth of 5 Mhz.
Here, we assume LOS paths for the BS-RS, and the RS-MS communications. This is a logical as-
sumption, since usually infrastructure relays are placed on the rooftops of high buildings. On the
other hand, we consider NLOS path loss for the BS-MS links. We also assume lognormal shadow-
ing. The NLOS model that we use is given by 36.5+23.5log10 d+ χNLOS, where χNLOS ∼N (0,8),
χLOS ∼ N (0,3.4) in dB, and d denoting the distance between the transmitter and the receiver in
meters.
Under this model we study the sum-rate performance of the central cell. The neighboring cells
not only serve as sources of interference, but also participate in the power control updates. Fig. 6.7
shows the performance of our proposed algorithms as a function of the number of available relays in
the cell. The ﬁrst thing one may notice is that in the cellular setting the proposed algorithms perform
much better. This can be justiﬁed by the fact that in LTE-Advanced interference experienced by the
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receivers is in general some orders of magnitude smaller than the actual signal. Besides, the scenario
considered here incorporates the beneﬁts arising from the transformation of a NLOS link into two
LOS ones through relaying. Thus, the sum-rate performance of the cell is improved signiﬁcantly.
Concluding we could say that all the remarks made for the interference limited scenario also hold
here, but now the environment is less demanding (lower interference, higher transmission powers
etc.).
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the interaction of relay selection and power control in interference-
limited networks. We developed easy to implement distributed algorithms of at most polynomial
complexity that are applicable to any type of relay assisted wireless systems and offer signiﬁcant
improvement in the sum-rate performance. We also demonstrated that our algorithms meet the objec-
tives of interference management and relaying exploitation of 4G wireless systems.
Throughout this work we have assumed that the system parameters do not change within the time
of interest. It would be interesting though to derive online versions of the proposed schemes that
capture the dynamic scenario of nodes entering or leaving the system or time-varying channels. In
this case, instead of solving the problem from scratch, online matching schemes like the one proposed
in [93, 94] can be used.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis explores the challenges that arise from limited availability of energy resources at device,
system and community level. On the one hand, we considered ways to improve the energy efﬁciency
of the power grid itself. On the other hand, we devised resource allocation schemes that optimally
exploit the limited energy resources of mobile devices and we investigated the impact of energy
constraints on performance of networked systems.
7.1.1 Smart grid
Initially, we explored the potential of dynamic pricing towards a less costly and more stable power
grid. We proposed a day-ahead DR mechanism that captures both the price setting strategy of the
operator and the response of home users. Our negotiation-based scheme enables an accurate pre-
diction of the demand distribution for the following day and hence utility operator can efﬁciently
apply economic dispatch even in presence of DR. We showed that properly designed pricing mecha-
nisms align the seemingly contradictory interests of the cost minimizing operator and self-interested
home-users. Our realistic numerical evaluation provides ample evidence that existing works tend to
overestimate DR beneﬁts and provide only limited incentives to end-users. This partially justiﬁes the
limited penetration of DR schemes in the residential sector.
Due to the large number of home users and the negligible impact of each of them on the DR
market, we introduced a new market entity, the aggregator, that represents a set of home users in the
negotiations with the utility operator. In this direction, we devised a hierarchical DR market model for
the smart grid where aggregators compensate end-users to modify their demand pattern, and compete
with each other to resell DR services to the utility operator. Our numerical analysis showed that
DR beneﬁts are maximized when the utility is non-proﬁt, which is consistent with the current trend
in electricity market restructuring. Interestingly though, in such a hierarchical market the utility of
the end-users is not a monotonously increasing function of elasticity, which indicates that truthful
reporting may not be the optimal strategy of the users.
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7.1.2 VM migration schemes for the cloud
Next, in an attempt to improve the energy efﬁciency of mobile devices per se, we investigated the
scenario of Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) where energy-constrained devices ofﬂoad their com-
putationally intensive tasks to remote cloud servers. We considered the objectives of minimizing
execution time and energy consumption. We also identiﬁed the lack of QoS guarantees as the miss-
ing tile of cloud computing. However, providing QoS guarantees is particularly challenging in the
dynamic MCC environment, due to the time-varying bandwidth of the access links, the ever changing
available processing capacity at each cloud server and the time-varying data volume of each virtual
machine. Thus, we proposed novel cloud architectures and migration mechanisms that effectively
bring the computing power of the cloud closer to the mobile user.
In contrast to the migration policies currently applied in commercial virtualization platforms, like
vSphere [40], we showed that migrations should be performed according to the estimated perfor-
mance and not based on the estimated resource demands of each task/VM. The underlying idea of the
proposed schemes is that a VM should migrate from its current server if the anticipated total execu-
tion time at a new server (including the migration and download delay) is less than the execution time
at the current one. An overview of cloud scenarios in which VM migration schemes can be applied is
presented in [38].
7.1.3 Energy efﬁcient wireless access
We also investigated the energy-throughput tradeoff for mobile devices that support sleep modes and
compete for access to the shared medium. We characterized the throughput optimal strategy under
energy constraints and we developed game theoretic models that capture the autonomous nature of
terminals. As expected, the lack of coordination causes some performance degradation. Our analysis
shows that energy constraints modify the medium access problem signiﬁcantly. Interestingly, the
limited energy resources indirectly reduce contention and lead to bounded price of anarchy.
Next, we developed a modiﬁed medium access scheme, where the competing stations can sample
the contention state of the medium within a frame. In this case each mobile user faces an interesting
dilemma: whenever the frame is sensed busy, is it beneﬁcial to backoff in order to save energy or
a transmission should be attempted? The proposed scheme leads to more efﬁcient exploitation of
the medium, by implicitly coordinating transmissions within a frame, without any direct information
exchange among the competing terminals.
7.1.4 Interference management for energy efﬁcient wireless access
Finally, we considered the interaction of relay selection and power control in interference-limited
environments. Starting from an uncoordinated approach, we showed that system performance is
mainly determined by the competition of users for the same relays and by the interference they cause
to each other. Thus, we developed easy to implement distributed algorithms of at most polynomial
complexity that are applicable to any type of relay assisted wireless systems. The key idea is to
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coordinate the selection of relays and adjust transmission power through appropriate message passing.
For a given subcarrier allocation, we outlined how the proposed algorithms can be applied in
OFDMA systems like LTE-Advanced. Our algorithms meet two major objectives of 4G systems,
namely relaying and interference management. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrated that
the proposed schemes guarantee signiﬁcant improvement in terms of sum-rate performance and by
adjusting transmission power also lead to tangible energy savings for mobile devices.
7.2 Usefulness of Results in Practical Systems
In this section, we attempt to translate the major ﬁndings of this thesis into practical guidelines for
the design of energy-efﬁcient systems.
7.2.1 Electricity market restructuring
In this thesis we proposed a novel DR market, where all the required communication between the
utility operator and the home users takes place before the actual day of operation. Our day-ahead
approach provides numerous advantages. First of all, guarantees that the home users are aware of
the exact pricing pattern for the following day and hence can schedule their demands accordingly.
Second, enables the operator to accurately predict the total consumption for each period of the fol-
lowing day. Finally, guarantees that there is always sufﬁcient time so that the negotiations among
generators, the utility operator and the home users converges to a stable operating point. That would
not be possible if a real-time market approach was adopted instead.
We also suggest that DR should be performed in an automated manner with minimum human
intervention, since the lack of knowledge and time from the users’ side to respond to dynamic prices
hinder large-scale penetration of residential DR programs. Finally, existing DR schemes expect users
to bear the investment cost of smart meter installation, while the utilities reap most of the DR beneﬁts.
This is mainly due to the fact that each individual amounts to a small portion of the total demand and
hence has limited negotiation power. Our work provides tangible evidence that organization of home
users into communities under the umbrella of an aggregator is an efﬁcient way to deal with this issue
and will drastically change the DR landscape.
7.2.2 Cloud providers
In the pursue of energy efﬁcient cloud computing, most cloud providers focus on improving the ef-
ﬁciency of their infrastructure per se. In this thesis, we suggest that signiﬁcant improvements can
be also derived through novel migration mechanisms that require no changes of the existing infras-
tructure. Live VM migrations enable providers to adjust the load at each server. Given that energy
consumption is an increasing function of the load of a server, we suggest that VM migrations can be
used to reduce total energy consumption of a cloud facility by consolidating tasks on fewer physical
servers and turning off unused ones.
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Apart from energy consumption, a major objective of a cloud provider is the minimization of
the corresponding electricity cost. In this direction, VM scheduling enables the cloud provider to
exploit temporal variation of electricity prices by scheduling non-critical tasks in low-cost periods. In
addition, given that servers are geographically dispersed over the world, exploiting spatial variation
of electricity prices is an additional option. Summarizing, VM migrations enable execution of tasks
wherever/whenever cost of electricity is the lowest.
Contemporary virtualization platforms, such as vSphere of VMware, introduced recently the ca-
pability of VM migrations across distant servers. Currently migrations are performed such that av-
erage CPU and memory utilization are balanced across servers. Since energy consumption of cloud
infrastructure corresponds to a signiﬁcant portion of a cloud provider’s operating costs, we expect that
migration mechanisms that consolidate load in fewer physical machines will be implemented soon.
However, any such migration scheme should also consider performance degradation caused due to
multitenancy.
7.2.3 Mobile network operators
In this thesis, we underlined the importance of relaying and interference management in 4G wireless
communication systems. Relays enhance throughput of cell edge users, while power control is a
promising mechanism for handling interference and calibrating energy consumption. Although both
are basic features of 4G systems, their exact implementation is not deﬁned in the corresponding
standards, but is vendor-speciﬁc. Thus, mobile network operators (MNO) should preferably invest on
4G implementations that incorporate such mechanisms and achieve better exploitation of the available
resources.
In addition, we suggest that sleep modes is a promising energy-saving mechanism since as we
showed it can provide signiﬁcant energy beneﬁts, especially in scenarios of contention-based medium
access. A mobile device by turning off its transceiver can increase its lifetime. A side effect of
sleep modes is that contention for the medium is implicitly reduced and hence throughput increases.
Although here we focused on the user side, similar energy saving techniques can be applied at the
base stations. In particular some base stations can be turned off in low trafﬁc periods, hence leading
to reduced operating costs for MNOs.
7.3 Future Challenges and Open Research Problems
We conclude this thesis with a discussion of open research problems in the area of smart grid and
energy-constrained systems.
7.3.1 Smart grid
In the smart grid context, we have developed day-ahead DR market models that rely on iterative ne-
gotiation mechanisms and hence require communication among the participating entities. In addition,
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we assumed that the actual preference of the user can be deduced in an automated manner. However,
as we showed the beneﬁts of DR strongly depend on the accuracy of this estimation. For this purpose,
novel regression methods that accurately estimate the utility function of a user through historical data
need to be developed in order to fully exploit the potential of demand-response.
Virtual aggregators and incentives
The potential beneﬁts from the introduction of aggregators has to be further explored. Since each
aggregator represents a signiﬁcant amount of total demand in the DR market, it can act strategically as
price anticipator by considering the impact of its actions on the price setting strategy of the operator.
Hence, the increased negotiation power of the aggregators can be exploited to maximize the DR
beneﬁts for the home users. Instead of being represented through a third-party, home users could
also form self-organized DR communities, i.e. virtual aggregators. For this purpose, tools from
game theory can be used to model coalition formation among users and to analyze the competition of
several virtual aggregators in selling their DR services to the operator. Here, we have assumed that
the users truthfully respond to the announced compensation from the aggregators. However, since
additional beneﬁts may arise through strategic misreporting, the investigation of such user strategies
and the derivation of mechanisms that guarantee truthfulness are interesting topics for future study.
Distribution automation
In this thesis, transmission and distribution constraints of the system are not taken into account.
However, such operational constraints are critical for proper operation of the grid. The power grid
is a dynamic system mainly due to the continual variability of demands, but also due to the massive
distributed and variable energy generation from renewable sources. In this direction, the potential
of distribution automation has to be explored and particularly towards the proper integration of re-
newables and energy storage devices. Distribution automation consists in frequency and voltage
control schemes that take into account the constraints of the distribution network through power ﬂow
equations. Frequency control keeps the active power generated in the grid equal to the active power
consumed, while voltage control at the distribution feeders minimizes distribution losses.
Optimal storage placement and dimensioning
An interesting topic of future study is that of optimal placement of renewables and storage facilities
so as to balance demand and supply and minimize distribution losses. This problem becomes even
more challenging when optimal dimensioning of energy storage facilities is also considered. In gen-
eral, energy has to be stored and consumed locally, close to where it is generated so as to minimize
distribution losses. On the other hand, central large batteries provide more opportunities to exploit
ﬂuctuations of price, demand and renewable generation. Deriving the optimal solution to this tradeoff
could eventually turn residential renewable systems into a reality. A preliminary study of optimal
storage placement within the distribution network can be found in [95].
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7.3.2 Energy efﬁcient cloud computing
In the context of cloud computing the derivation of optimal VM migration schemes towards a more
energy efﬁcient, and hence less costly, cloud is an active area of research. Such an issue becomes
especially critical given that cloud facilities are large-scale datacenter networks, which consist of
multiple dispersed server facilities. In this thesis, we showed that VM migrations can effectively
reduce energy consumption of the cloud ecosystem.
Energy-driven VM migration schemes
Energy consumption of a cloud facility depends on the number of active server machines. Further, for
each active machine, energy consumption is an increasing function of the server load. Task migra-
tion can contribute to signiﬁcant savings in energy consumption by (i)reducing the number of active
servers through appropriate concentration of active tasks on fewer physical machines with the aid
of virtualization (consolidation), and (ii) reducing the energy consumption of individual servers by
moving the processes from heavily loaded to less loaded servers (load balancing).
The challenge lies in that a migration has contradicting consequences due to the reasons above:
by reducing the number of active servers as reason (i) dictates, the load is concentrated on fewer
servers which are thus loaded more. On the other hand, by performing load balancing according to
reason (ii), the heavy load of some servers is alleviated, but at the same time more servers would
need to be activated to accommodate it. The ﬁnal choice will depend on the relative amounts of
energy consumption of servers when they are idle and loaded, as well as on the precise dependence of
energy consumption on physical machine load. An associated challenge would therefore be to derive
analytical models for energy consumption. Given also that consolidation introduces unpredictable
performance due to multitenancy, providing QoS guarantees is particularly challenging in this context.
Integration of renewable sources
In addition, the prevalent policy in datacenter server farms is to build a collocated renewable energy
source (e.g. wind turbine or photovoltaic) in an attempt to minimize the dependence of the datacenter
on the main power grid. The output of these renewable sources is highly time-varying and unpre-
dictable. On the other hand, migration of tasks among different datacenters allows us to control the
instantaneous power demand, which is a function of load. Given also that electricity prices are time-
varying and different from place to place, the arising challenge is to select the VM migration strategy
that matches the dynamic power supply of renewable sources and dynamic datacenter power demand
at a minimum cost, without violating any user QoS service level agreement (SLA) though.
7.3.3 Energy efﬁcient wireless access networks
Although important steps forward in energy efﬁciency of the cloud itself have been made, the wire-
less access network has been generally neglected. In this thesis, we mainly focused on the mobile
device side and we investigated how sleep modes enable better exploitation of the limited available
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energy. However, a recent survey [96] indicates that the potential energy efﬁciency gains at theMobile
Network Operators (MNO) side are even more signiﬁcant, ranging from 10% to 25%.
Energy efﬁcient infrastructure
The ﬁrst step required for more efﬁcient mobile networks is the identiﬁcation of the least efﬁcient
network components. For this purpose, tools that measure and monitor energy consumption of exist-
ing network infrastructure have to be developed. Based on this analysis, an MNO has to explore the
available options such as installing renewable energy sources, upgrading energy-intensive network
equipment or improving the design of its base stations so as to rely less on air conditioning (e.g. by
using techniques like free air cooling). Selecting the optimal option calls for a cost-beneﬁt analysis
of the available solutions.
Energy efﬁcient control
The main issue of the aforementioned approaches is that they require signiﬁcant investment. Instead,
less radical approaches could provide comparable beneﬁts. Indicatively, dynamic resource allocation
algorithms that adapt to the load conditions require only minimal changes of existing infrastructure
and hence can be easier adopted by telecom operators. Representative such methods are transmission
power control, turning off base stations in low trafﬁc periods and reassociation of mobile users, and
scheduling schemes such as bandwidth and capacity adaptation [97], that make use of the minimum
amount of resources required to meet the arising trafﬁc.
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